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Property tax is an important source of finance for local governments, which directly 
affects the extent to which they can make autonomous expenditure decisions. Although 
the literature indicates that, in principle, property tax causes less economic distortion 
than other taxes, in practice, designing and administrating an effective and impartial 
mechanism to enforce the tax remains challenging. Many countries including Thailand 
have avoided the formal market-price assessment of estate property and substituted it 
with non-market approaches because of budgetary and time constraints. The main 
concern is that spatial inequality marks an important price-determining and location-
associated factor, yet it is not taken into account systematically in the process of 
deriving the suitable property tax level. This study investigates what constitutes spatial 
inequality in property assessment and how we might improve the parity of the property 
tax system. The underlying hypothesis is that anomalies in the property tax system vary 
systematically across the study area and the problem inherently lies in the property 
assessment process. The study focuses on the private housing market of Bangkok as an 
empirical case study due to its diverse and complex patterns of land use. 
Given the infrequent property reassessment cycle and the adoption of the mass 
appraisal approach, a large proportion of the assessed price in Bangkok fails to reflect 
the market price. The fairness of the property tax system is therefore examined by 
measuring the accuracy of the assessed price using both spatial and non-spatial 
techniques. Drawing on the cadastral and the property data, the study employs three 
main methods: assessment ratio analysis, spatial autocorrelation analysis (local 
Moran’s I) and geographically weighted regression (GWR). Findings confirm the 
regressivity of property tax where owners of lower-priced homes are generally liable to 
proportionately higher tax than owners of high-priced homes are. The study also found 
signs of systemic biases in the property assessment that are area-specific. Over-
assessed properties are largely concentrated in the suburban areas where property 
market prices are relatively lower than in the city centre and inner city areas. These 
findings present a clearer case of spatial inequality in property taxation than has been 
previously suggested. The study thus makes a novel contribution to the literature of 
housing economy as well as urban inequality through the interpretation of the spatial 
patterns of the housing market in Bangkok and offers recommendations for local tax 
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“…[Property tax is] not unpopular for good economic reasons.  
It’s unpopular, in my opinion, for one simple reason.  
It’s the only tax left on the books for which people have to write a big cheque. 
 
The income tax is a far worse tax, but, and I have to admit that I have 
some part of the guilt in this process because, during World War II,  
I worked at the Treasury and helped to design the withholding system. 
My wife has never forgiven me for it.” 
Milton Friedman 
An interview at Human Events 




Chapter 1  Introduction 
The importance of taxation in the development of public infrastructure and services can 
never be overstated. This is because taxation is a major income source for government 
in most countries. For local governments, property tax is, at least potentially, an 
important source of revenue. It is a fiscal instrument from which a direct relationship 
between taxpayers and local service users can be established. Economists support 
property tax for two main reasons. One is that land is a highly visible base for taxation; 
and the other is that a considerable amount of economic rent is taxed, particularly when 
land is an important part of tax base. Therefore, compared with other taxes, property 
tax should, in theory, be a preferred option in terms of public revenue contributions. 
Property tax is one of the oldest forms of taxation in human history and it still exists 
all over the world. In ancient times, dating from approximately six thousand years B.C., 
agricultural land was the primary focus of early property taxation. Property tax was 
based on production value—i.e. crop yields and number of cattle—because the 
bookkeeping system was not advanced enough to allow tax assessors/collectors to 
determine the appropriate tax amount on income or transactions (Carlson, 2005). Not 
until the colonial period did the valuation of land begin to be based on income and 
property transactions, a system that emerged along with the development of modern 
towns and accounting practices (Ibid.). 
Property tax structure has become more complex as it has evolved over time. 
Nowadays, we can see many types of tax imposed on various classes of property at 
various rates. Property tax differs from country to country—and, in some cases, from 
state to state—due to different political regimes, local government systems, fiscal 
structures, government financial requirements, etc. But what most countries have in 
common is the difficulty of implementing or making changes to property tax, as it is 
politically unpopular (because of its high visibility). 
…Unlike the income tax, for example, the property tax is not withheld 
at source. Unlike the sales tax, it is not paid in small amounts with each 
daily purchase. Instead, the property tax generally has to be paid 
directly by taxpayers in periodic lump-sum payments. This means that 
taxpayers tend often to be more aware of the property taxes they pay 




Other types of property tax apart from those imposed on real property are difficult 
to administer. Personal property tax, for instance, can be easily evaded because 
personal properties—e.g. jewellery, watch or car—can be hidden and moved. 
Therefore, the term ‘property tax’ typically refers to ‘real property tax’. In this study, 
the term ‘property tax’ specifically refers to the recurrent tax on immovable property, 
excluding property transaction tax such as stamp duty land tax (SDLT). 
In Thailand, property tax is by far the most important source of local government 
revenues. Between 2008 and 2017, the two recurrent taxes on property (Building and 
Land Tax and Council Tax) contributed altogether about 70 per cent of self-collected 
revenues of local governments (Fiscal Policy Office, 2017). However, these two taxes 
are considered by the government obsolete and not suitable for current local 
government structures and financial needs. Accordingly, a new type of property tax 
called ‘Land and Building Tax’ was introduced in March 2019 and will become 
effective in August 2020. The Land and Building Tax is simply a combination of the 
two previous property taxes with a more comprehensive tax structure, covering all 
classes of properties (with some exemptions and reductions). The tax can be considered 
an ad valorem tax because it is based on property assessments provided by the Property 
Valuation Bureau (PVB). 
In this study, the evaluation of the property tax system begins with the tax base, 
which is the assessments of the PVB. The core analysis is based on the assessed values 
of residential properties in Bangkok, including all housing types. Housing market is the 
main focus of this study for two reasons. First, housing forms a majority of the property 
market in Bangkok, and presumably in many other cities as well. Residential properties 
account for almost four-fifths of total properties in Bangkok (PVB, 2016b).This means 
the spatial distribution patterns of residential properties are more consistent and 
prevalent throughout the study area compared with other types of property, resulting in 
more reliable and meaningful research findings. Second, the range of housing is a good 
reflection of the city’s different social classes. Owners and occupiers of residential 
properties come from a wider range of income groups and occupations than, for 
example, those of commercial properties, which may be limited companies. 
Furthermore, the ownership structures for commercial properties are more complex.  
Both efficiency and equity aspects of the assessments are considered, but more 




and dates back to 2008, covering three assessment cycles. Another data set has been 
drawn from the Land Registry, and a similar set of data from the PVB’s surveys is used 
to ensure accuracy during the data cleansing process. This study also uses data on 
property tax/assessment and relevant policies to identify tax rates, discounts and 
exemptions. Although these factors do not form a direct influence on property tax 
incidence, their extent can determine the level of tax contribution in the long term. 
However, because the implementation of the Land and Building Tax is still in its early 
stages and there is a lack of data on tax amounts, this study will not focus on the 
calculation of the tax incidence. The main analysis will involve only the assessment 
component of the tax.  
The remainder of this chapter presents the theme of the thesis and how it can 
contribute to the study of property tax and the housing market. The main subject of the 
thesis is presented in the first section (1.1), followed by the significance of this research 
in Section 1.2. Section 1.3 introduces four main research objectives, and Section 1.4 
addresses key research questions. The following sections describe the key hypotheses, 




1.1  The Subject of the Thesis 
This thesis discusses the anomalies in the property tax system in Thailand and their 
impact on society and the economy. Since property assessment is the cornerstone of the 
property tax system, it is essential that the assessed price is accurate and able to reflect 
the market price. Inaccurate property assessment jeopardises the fairness of the 
property tax system, decreases its revenue raising ability, and creates distortions in the 
economy (Payton, 2012). The property tax system is evaluated in terms of the 
inaccuracy of the assessed price and potential systemic bias in the assessment system. 
This study analyses the spatial distribution of, and the correlation between, several 
factors that play an important role in the housing market. Bangkok is chosen as a case 
study area, in which properties located throughout 50 boroughs are included. The two 
most important aspects of this research are: the investigation of the property assessment 
as a base of the property tax to find the degree of assessment equity and bias; and the 
discussion about the impact of assessment inequity from the economic, social and 
geographical perspectives. 
Economic inequalities that arise from the anomalies in the property tax system are 
due to two important reasons. First, the proportion of housing cost spent by poor 
households is relatively high (Harris and Lehman, 2001), which makes them more 
vulnerable to poorly designed and administered property tax systems (e.g. regressive 
tax rate and unfair distribution of tax burden). This problem has long-term impact on 
the housing market as the property tax capitalises into housing price. It is also evident 
that owners of cheap homes are likely to benefit less from the property tax system. The 
(property tax) appeal procedure has been more frequently made use of by owners of 
expensive homes who are likely to be better educated and better informed of their 
rights (Ross, 1971). 
Second, it is not unusual for assessment ratio—the proportion of assessed to sale 
price—to vary systemically across geographic areas. Studies of Indiana, Pennsylvania, 
Taipei, and several cities in Israel all point to a systemic variation in property tax rates 
across urban and suburban areas (Black, 1972; Heavey, 1983; Horne and Felsenstein, 
2010; Lin, 2010; Payton, 2012). Property tax rates may be uniformly higher in inner 
city areas than in suburban areas (Black, 1972) or vice versa (inter alia, Heavey, 1983). 




of neighbourhood in question. Again, these flaws embedded in the tax system tend to 




1.2  Significance of this Research 
Should we allow the property market to behave freely without any interference from 
the government? Before answering this question, an anecdote about the scalping of 
campsites in Yosemite National Park, California, provides potential insights (Sandel, 
2012). Yosemite attracts over four million visitors a year and there are about nine 
hundred available campsites, which can be reserved in advance at a nominal cost of $20 
per night. The demand is so enormous that the available sites are fully booked within 
minutes of becoming available. This creates an opportunity for scalpers to resell the 
reservations on Craigslist for $100 to $150 per night, despite being prohibited by the 
National Park Service. 
Advocates of the free market would argue that the scalpers should be welcomed 
because they offer the reservations to people who value the experience the most, as 
measured by the willingness to pay. Alternatively, the National Park Service could 
raise the price of campsite reservations to a level that eliminates the excess demand in 
order to maximise the state benefits and prevent the scalping. But either case is 
obviously unfair for people of modest means who cannot afford the market clearing 
price. In this regard, Sandel (2012) believes that market values are appropriate for some 
goods but harmful for others. Before we apply the free market logic to certain kinds of 
goods we must first decide how they should be valued. This very much depends on 
social norms, which are debatable and always subject to change. 
The housing market is similar to the case of Yosemite National Park in that it 
consists of people of all income levels, which means that we cannot use the willingness 
to pay as a fair measure to justify the market price. Capitalism makes it possible for 
people to accumulate wealth, as witnessed by the fact that in most economies the rich 
are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer. At the heart of the problem is the fact 
that the ‘top one per cent’ richest people own the majority of capital in a society, 
leaving a handful of wealth to the remaining ninety-nine per cent (Stiglitz, 2013). This 
is the reason why the market values are corrosive of justice in the housing system. 
Without government intervention such as property tax and capital gains tax, wealthy 
people can freely invest in housing, either reselling or letting for profit, while the poor, 
especially those with bad credit, can hardly access the market. Economic inequalities 
arise as property-rich people gain more wealth from economic rent—unearned income 




Economic inequalities are commonly recognised in the form of income, pay and 
wealth. In a sense, pay inequality is a subset of income inequality. Pay means a 
payment from employment only, while income could be money received from 
employment, investments, pensions or rent. Wealth inequality refers to the unequal 
distribution of net assets (total assets minus liabilities). A large part of wealth 
inequality is contributed by income inequality, particularly from investments and rent 
in the real estate market. This makes wealth inequality runs even more pronounced in 
many countries, as evident in a continuing increase of land and uinet national wealth to 
net national income ratio (see World Inequality Database, 2020). As well, Piketty 
(2014) asserts that rising inequality in recent decades can be explained by the fact that 
the rate of return to wealth—‘capital’ in Piketty’s terms—has exceeded the rate of 
economic growth. He also claims that inherited wealth has grown faster than the 
growths of output and income, and taxes on capital play a central role in alleviating the 
problem. In the UK, for example, housing wealth has been found to have increased 
faster than the growth rates of either fiscal or non-fiscal wealth (Ryan-Collins et al., 
2017). 
In Thailand, wealth and income inequalities are pressing problems and they are in 
part associated with inequality in the distribution of land ownership. Laovakul (2013) 
found that Thailand has a relatively high wealth Gini coefficient of 0.886, and the 
proportion of land ownership among the fifth quintile of the population is 326 times 
greater than among the first quintile. As described in Thailand’s 12th National 
Economic and Social Development Plan (2017-2021), the government claims that ‘the 
fundamental cause [of income disparities] lies in geographical disparities in the quality 
of social services, an imbalanced economic structure, uneven distribution of 
development opportunity and unequal access to justice’ (NESDB, 2017, p. 14). One of 
the solutions that has been prioritised in the national agenda is the reform of the 
property tax system, which aims to encourage more efficient and evenly distributed 
land use through the adjustment of property tax rates and bases—i.e. higher rates on 
vacant lands and wider tax bases—as well as the whole tax structure. 
Nonetheless, moving from one type of property tax to another, or even undertaking 
a reassessment, is not practically viable. There are of course some costs involved in the 
reassessment process but they are not considerable compared to the potential revenue 




become overwhelming as the research by the Resolution Foundation shows that the 
regressivity problem of the tax has the most negative influence on young adults and the 
poor (Corlett and Gardiner, 2018). Not only has the Council Tax system failed to 
capture dramatic increases in housing wealth (especially in London), but it has also 
proven inadequate in raising sufficient funds to pay for essential local services (Wolf, 
2018). 
One of the policy options to improve the property tax system is to have systematic 
and regular reassessment. In the UK, it is estimated that the reassessment cost could be 
as low as £3.24 per property, and it could be even lower if hedonic modelling is 
adopted (Policy Exchange, 2013). It is in fact the politics behind property taxation that 
makes the reform extremely difficult, either because of the fear of windfall gain and 
loss, or because of the notion that a rise in Council Tax would impose hardship on the 
housing-rich, income-poor—e.g. pensioners. However, the UK can hardly deny the fact 
that the ratio of wealth taxes to GDP has stagnated (Wolf, 2018), which means that the 
rise in Council Tax has mostly affected middle to poor income households, as defined 
by the eight broad tax bands. 
In Thailand, it took over 20 years following the first attempt just to have a new 
property tax legislation approved by the (junta) cabinet. Now the tax legislation has 
been passed by both houses of parliament and it will become effective in August 2020. 
The lack of flexibility in the property tax system implies that the initial design of tax 
structure is crucial to the efficiency and effectiveness of the tax in the long term. 
Therefore, this study prioritises not only the evaluation of the property assessment 
process but also the administration of the property tax itself. 
The new ‘Land and Building Tax’ legislation has been drafted to replace the two 
currently under-utilised property taxes. The property tax has been reformed because it is 
considered one of the least distortionary taxes. In general, taxation distorts the markets 
through the increase in price of affected goods (Kling et al., 2010) or the change in 
people’s decisions particularly on consumption, working, investment and saving 
(Boskin, 2016; Mirrlees et al., 2010). The distortionary impact depends largely on the 
elasticity of demand and supply for certain kinds of goods. In the case of the property 
tax, the supply of land is fixed and inelastic, but the supply of improvements is more 
elastic—greater than zero. Imposing tax on land alone does not significantly affect 




developments. The inclusion of improvements in property tax base would distort 
incentives, meaning that landowners would respond by devoting fewer resources to 
improving their land (Mankiw, 2014). 
Property tax is a local tax by nature because it tends to encourage taxpayers (as 
voters) to be aware of the costs of local public services and the spending of local 
revenues, and thus enhances the accountability of local governments (Bird and Slack, 
2004a). Property tax base is highly visible because the ownership of land can be easily 
established. It is ideal to have the most inclusive and large tax base (as many housings) 
possible, which means that there are more tax contributors and stakeholders included in 
the decision-making process of local authorities. 
It is therefore important to have accurate property assessments (tax bases), decent 
tax rates, and a well-functioning property tax system. Beginning with the analysis of 
the property assessment, this study attempts to identify patterns of systemic assessment 
biases and address assessment equity problems by first establishing a connection 
between assessed and sale price, showing the extent to which assessed price has failed 
to catch up with the sale price in each area of Bangkok. 
Most property tax studies in Thailand (Ananapibut, 2012; Laovakul and 
Phichaisanit, 2012; Varanyuwatana, 2004) focus on comprehensive fiscal reforms and 
present broad suggestions on the structural modification of property tax. However, no 
study has ever closely looked at the economic incidence nor the functioning of the 
property tax system. Incidence studies of other types of taxes could hardly be applied to 
property tax research because the property tax has several distinct characteristics of the 
tax base and rate. For example, property tax is a consumption tax when levied on rental 
housing, but it could be considered both a consumption and an investment tax when 
levied on owner-occupied housing. 
Other studies on spatial distribution of residential property price in Bangkok 
(Malaitham et al., 2013; Vichiensan and Miyamoto, 2010a, 2010b; Vichiensan et al., 
2011) were carried out before the openings of many new urban rail transit systems, and 
the methodology used in their studies is limited to hedonic regression and 
geographically weighted regression (GWR) modelling of commercial and high-rise 
residential properties. No comprehensive study of housing in Bangkok in terms of 




This study offers a new analytical approach in the evaluation of the property tax 
system and tax incidence distribution. It combines the simultaneous examination of 
property assessment performance, geographical distribution of tax incidence and urban 
policy conditions to identify the influence of property tax on taxpayers’ welfare and 
benefits. Based on the assumption that the validity of the property assessment depends 
on the extent to which it can accurately estimate market values, key underlying market 
determinants are examined along with the ratio analysis of the disparity between 
assessed and sale prices. 
Some studies have attempted to evaluate inequity in the property assessment system 
without considering spatial factors (Harris and Lehman, 2001; Lin, 2010; Payton, 
2012), while other studies have tested for the capitalisation of the property tax into 
house prices (Chalermpong and Wattana, 2009; Hamilton, 1976; Zodrow, 2008). The 
theoretical framework of this thesis has built on these studies by including the analysis 
of urban forms to reveal important development patterns that may be relevant to the 
property tax system. 
The originality of the methodology used in this study is the construction of separate 
spatial regression models to address various effects of inconsistency and bias in the 
assessment system, as well as the application of both spatial and non-spatial techniques. 
Although the tax base (in this case referring to the assessed price) is quite rigid, tax 
incidence is largely determined by tax rates and spatial variation in assessment level. 
The use of different methods allows this study to expand the analysis beyond a simple 
tax burden determination. 
Unlike other researches that perform partial analyses, the data used in this study is 
more comprehensive as it has been drawn from the whole Bangkok metropolitan area 
(BMA), which covers boroughs of different levels of urbanisation and development. 
Also, spatial autocorrelation analysis of property assessments is new in the context of 
Bangkok. Past literature has employed partial ratio analyses and hedonic regression 
models in the analysis of property assessment performance (Chalermpong, 2007). The 
use of both spatial autocorrelation and GWR analyses can help to better explain uneven 
spatial distribution patterns of property price in Bangkok. These methods provide for a 





1.3  Aim and Objectives 
As we saw in Section 1.2, the property market has created lots of opportunities for 
wealth accumulation. People with advantages in terms of property wealth can gain 
more money faster than people with limited resources. If this situation continues 
without appropriate fiscal countermeasures, the wealth gap will inevitably increase. 
These fiscal measures can take various forms such as housing policy and direct 
subsidy, but property tax is perhaps the most widely used. Yet few countries have 
succeeded in utilising property tax to its full potential. I believe this is partly because of 
the lack of accurate property assessments, which form an actual base for the tax. This 
problem calls for immediate academic work to seek and analyse reliable evidence 
regarding the property tax assessment system in Thailand. Therefore, this study aims to 
understand the impact of the performance of residential property assessments on the 
working of the property tax system in Bangkok. The property assessments are 
compared with sale prices to determine the degree of discrepancy, and are also 
analysed in relation to several factors to explore the level and spatial distribution 
pattern of their influence. 
There are four objectives in this study. Firstly, the study will explore existing 
knowledge in the fields of urban economics, fiscal economics, property taxation and 
property assessment. This will be carried out by reviewing relevant literature to 
establish a conceptual and policy framework for this study. The second objective is to 
investigate the nature of the property assessment system in Thailand. The investigation 
emphasises the degree of uniformity between, and spatial distribution of, different 
assessed value ranges in the case study area. This also includes determining the spatial 
distribution of the discrepancy between assessed and market prices. The main purpose 
is to identify geographical areas where inherent biases and related problems in the 
assessment system exist. The third objective is to identify important variables that 
determine housing assessed prices in Bangkok, which is done using GWR. The final 
objective is to discuss and synthesise research findings to produce policy 
recommendations, and to make contributions to existing knowledge on property 
assessment for taxation and suggestions for future research. 
To achieve the first objective, I begin with a review of the economics of taxation, 
which is part of fiscal economic discipline. The key theories are policy choice between 




relation to economic inequality. The concepts of equity and efficiency in taxation are 
discussed to establish a conceptual framework for later discussion on property tax 
incidence and administration. The review of the literature moves on to the spatial 
aspect, which includes the theories of land use, urban form and related problems. 
Subsequently, we discuss in detail the theory of property taxation using the framework 
set out in the early chapter. The discussion also includes evaluation of the property tax 
system in terms of distribution and stabilisation functions, property assessment for 
taxation, house price determinants and property tax reform. 
The second objective will be achieved by the empirical analysis of property 
assessments in terms of growth, and spatial distribution and variation in relation to sale 
prices. The analytical approaches employed to achieve this aim are assessment ratio 
analysis and spatial autocorrelation analysis. The analysis is based on the framework of 
horizontal and vertical equity, which is within the scope of the ability to pay principle. 
Income is normally used as the index of the ability to pay. A horizontally equitable 
system would place similar burden of payment on people with the same level of 
income, and a vertically equitable tax system would place higher burden of payment on 
people with higher income (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989). However, this concept 
does not directly apply to the case of property taxation and housing studies because the 
owners (or occupiers) of higher value properties do not always earn higher income. For 
example, retired people who own big, expensive houses may live on small pensions and 
no longer have other income sources. But in this study, it is assumed that owners of 
higher priced housing have higher ability to pay. 
The third objective concerning the identification of housing price determinants can 
be achieved through GWR analysis. These determinants of housing assessed prices are 
important to this study because they can reflect the property assessment process. The 
data on housing variables is provided by the PVB and the land registry, and some of the 
variables are calculated by the author using ArcGIS. The findings from GWR analysis 
will be compared with the analysis using the previous two methods (mentioned in the 
second objective) to confirm the validity of research results. The findings will also be 
discussed in relation to those of previous studies. This main purpose is to form a basis 
for the final chapter: discussion and conclusion. 
The last objective is the discussion of research findings and the formation of new 




synthesising the findings of this study and of the wider literature. The body of 
knowledge contributed by the synthesis will be compared with the current standard on 
property assessment in Thailand. Offering suggestions for assessment and property tax 
reform based on empirical evidence is the ultimate goal of this study. The validity of 
the evidence is confirmed by cross examination of the data and the use of 
internationally recognised analytical methods. In short, this work is an empirical study 
attempting to quantitatively evaluate Bangkok’s housing assessments with the aim of 
improving their accuracy and equity. It is hoped that the results of this study will help 




1.4  Research Questions 
The research objectives laid out in the previous section have been formulated in a 
logical order according to the process undertaken in this study. The key problem is 
whether or not assessment inequity exists and, if it does, what seem to be the main 
causes, and how does it affect property tax incidence. In an attempt to address this 
problem, the following research questions arise: 
(1) How uniform and progressive is the assessed price? 
(2) Are there any systemic biases in the distribution of assessed price in particular 
areas of Bangkok? And if there are, do these imply fairer or less fair distribution of 
the property tax incidence? 
(3) What are the geographical distribution patterns of the discrepancy between 
assessed and market prices, and do areas with disproportionately high discrepancy 
between assessed and market prices have any particular characteristics—compound 
of new housing developments, recently developed infrastructure, areas that have 
been gentrified, etc.—that make those neighbourhoods unique? 
(4) Are there any groups of cohorts—as defined by property value—that benefit 
from the discrepancy and uneven geographical distribution of assessed prices? If so, 
are they concentrated in any particular areas, and what are special about these areas? 
(5) Does the assessment standard, which informs the working assumptions of 
assessors, accurately identify and describe the influential determinants of housing 
assessed price in Bangkok? If not, what, in reality, are the key determinants? 
(6) What are the appropriate property assessment approaches that can produce more 
equitable tax liability, and to what extent will this help improve the property tax 




1.5  Formulating Hypothesis 
As the collection of the Land and Building Tax has not yet come into effect, it is 
difficult to judge either its effects or performance. If the tax had already been in 
operation for a number of years, we would have had concrete data relating to tax 
amounts. We can make predictions based on the capitalisation of property tax into 
property prices, but until the tax is implemented, any discussion based on these 
predictions would be of limited value (inter alia, Hamilton, 1976; Hilber and 
Lyytikäinen, 2017; Plummer, 2003). In light of this, I have developed six realistic 
hypotheses. 
Underlying this research is the hypothesis that assessments in Bangkok are 
reasonably uniform due to the practice of deriving assessed prices from street values—
a single value is determined for each street or part of street. Uniformity in assessments 
is further reinforced by a rigid assessment system that restricts price adjustment to 
every four years. Therefore, spatial distribution patterns of assessed prices tend to be 
area-specific, and a smooth transition of prices between adjacent areas or submarkets is 
expected. 
Second, it is expected that the housing assessed price tends to diverge from market 
price because the sets of factors valued by assessors differ from those valued by the 
market, and this divergence tends to vary within and between geographic areas. Given 
rigid and peculiar institutional constraints placed on the property assessment system in 
Thailand, the assessed price normally lags behind the market price by 30 per cent on 
average (PVB, 2016b). More frequent assessment and the improvement of assessment 
standards can promote horizontal and vertical equity within the property tax system. 
Third, considering the importance of the market assessment approach adopted by 
the PVB, some might assume that transaction price is the most influential determinant 
of the assessed price. This, however, does not seem to be the case. In fact, the PVB 
uses both market and cost approaches, the former for vacant land assessment and the 
latter for building assessment. In most cases, building values account for a small 
proportion of the total assessed values because they are calculated from mean building 
costs rather than from detailed assessment. Vacant land values, on the other hand, are 
derived from actual transaction prices, but sale data of properties on similar streets are 




in assessed prices seems to be directly affected by transaction prices, the comparable 
sale selection process plays a more important role in final price determination. 
Fourth, the level of urbanisation is believed to play an important role in the 
assessment process. Property density reflects the level of urban development, and it is 
determined by assessors during property surveys. A popular question among assessors 
is: ‘is this neighbourhood/area developed compared with another?’. After property 
surveys, however, assessors have yet to establish a reliable method for measuring 
development, and tend instead to reach arbitrary judgements based on anecdotal 
observations and unstructured discussion. In a mass appraisal system, the comparison 
of urban development levels is not limited to one type of property. All types of 
properties are collectively considered in the determination of urban development level. 
Areas with more commercial properties usually receive higher assessed prices because 
they are considered to be more ‘developed’ despite certain negative impact—e.g. traffic 
noise, pollution, dirtiness. 
Fifth, in terms of the development of residential areas, the east side of Bangkok is 
considered a more attractive location compared to the west side. The intensive 
urbanisation of the city began in the early 1910s with the expansion of roads in the east 
to connect government offices, hospitals, schools and other public amenities. West 
Bangkok was not part of the urbanisation plan until 1926 when Rama VI Bridge was 
completed, the first to cross the river; a second bridge followed three years later 
(Tangcholthip, 2001). However, as most public amenities were located in the east side 
and transportation from the west remained restricted, residential development in the 
east continued to outpace and exceed that in the west. By the time two more bridges 
were opened in 1959, the level of urbanisation in the east side was already much higher 
than that in the west. Today, Bangkok has twelve bridges, including four main roads1 
and a ring road network connecting both sides of the city. Therefore, there have been an 
increasing number of residential developments in the west side, but their average prices 
are not as high as those in the east. 
Finally, with respect to property assessment approaches that have the potential to 
produce more equitable tax incidence distribution, I believe that the abolishment of the 
sale data selection process and more frequent reassessments would make assessed 
 
1 The main roads include Petch Kasem, Bharomrat Chonnani, Ratchapruek-Nakhon-In (via Rama V 




prices more reflective of market price. The sale data selection process is unreliable 
because it relies on the subjective judgements of assessors. Strict standards that must be 
followed—e.g. coefficient of dispersion (COD) and coefficient of variation (COV)—
have reduced the number of effective data. The selections are based on a small number 
of data because many sales are regarded as outliers and are eliminated to keep 
COD/COV values below 10 per cent. A more frequent reassessment can be achieved by 
computer-assisted approaches. There are several computer-assisted mass appraisal 
approaches such as the determination of reference land parcels by regression 
modelling, which enables the inclusion of more data and accelerates the assessment 
process. These reference land parcels are then used to calculate assessed price for each 
property in the same submarket or neighbourhood using price adjustment techniques—





1.6  Scope and Limitations of this Research 
This study looks at the case of Bangkok as the focal area for the evaluation of the 
property tax system. The empirical research is carried out to quantify the level of 
assessed price disparity from the market price, and the trend of assessment anomalies. 
This study focuses on the assessed price because it is used as the base for the Land and 
Building Tax, which has been designed specifically to fund the local governments and 
to help encourage more efficient land use. This very same assessed price is also used as 
a base for the SDLT. But the scope of the analysis in this study is limited to the 
measurement of its performance as a base for the Land and Building Tax, and to show 
the magnitude of inequity caused by assessed and sale price disparity.  
The main concern of this study is the limitations of the sale price data, which may 
not always accurately reflect the assessed price data. The problem of the time lag 
between the point of property sales and the period during which the properties were 
assessed can hardly be precisely addressed in practice. The assessed price data included 
in this study has been drawn from three assessment cycles (2008-11, 2012-15 and 
2016-19). The most pragmatic approach seems to be the matching of property sale data 
to the appropriate assessment cycles. To obtain more meaningful results, the timing of 
the sale price data used in this study is approximately the same as that used in the 
assessment process. Some methods used in this study seem in a way like the reverse 
engineering of the official assessed price. However, the analysis based on these 
methods is carried out only to verify the assessment data used in this study. The main 
analytical approaches are obtained from the literature and include spatial approaches, 
which have been used to justify the spatial distribution of property price. 
Evaluation of the property tax system would be more precise if a way could be 
found to measure displacement triggered by property tax pressure. There is currently no 
data that exists that would allow this kind of analysis. Of course, many have anticipated 
that the Land and Building Tax will cause the costs of owning or renting property to 
rise according to tax rates. However, the outcome of such anticipation is intangible and 
unreliable due to the wide variation in tax exemptions and reductions. Therefore, this 
study adopts realistic approaches to analyse the property assessment system in relation 




1.7  Structure of this Thesis 
This thesis consists of four components that are formed around the theme of property 
taxation and spatial justice. The first component captures the theme of the economics of 
taxation in general as well as property tax in relation to the concept of urban 
geography. Chapter 2 presents important developments in urban economic and fiscal 
economic theory with respect to the concepts of spatial (in)justice. The main theme of 
the discussion is concerned with the equity and efficiency aspects of tax policies. The 
last section of the chapter reflects an attempt to establish a clear connection between 
urban system and tax structure. Chapter 3 narrows down the discussion to the concept 
of property taxation and the criteria by which property tax can be evaluated. The 
departure from the classic concept of the concentric urban form has made it difficult to 
capture property value in modern cities, especially those with complex urban structures 
and unsystematic city planning. Selected determinants of housing prices are discussed 
at the end of the chapter. 
The second component begins in chapter 4, which covers the background to the 
empirical study of the property tax system in Thailand and the property assessment 
process in Bangkok. The chapter begins with the local government structure in 
Thailand then moves to an overview of the geography of Bangkok and the property tax 
system. The final section of the chapter covers the property assessment practice which 
is the fundamental concept under analysis in this study. Property assessment in 
Thailand may be derived from market price but this does not mean that the assessed 
price is always kept up-to-date. The four-year assessment cycle and the employment of 
the mass appraisal2 approach have caused the assessed price to divert from the market 
price in a way that is believed to cause social inequality, the hypothesis from which the 
research questions have been drawn. 
The third component concerns the analytical methods used in this study, which are 
presented in chapter 5. The three key methods used in this study are ratio analysis, 
spatial autocorrelation analysis (local Moran’s I) and GWR. Ratio analysis is the study 
of the difference between assessed and sale price, and the term ‘ratio’ refers to 
‘assessment ratio’, in which assessed price is expressed as a proportion of sale price. 
The method is specifically designed to measure assessment inaccuracy in property tax 
 
2 Mass appraisal—or mass assessment—is defined as “the process of valuing a group of properties as of a given date 




systems (IAAO, 2013b). As I have investigated the spatial distribution of the ratio, the 
results can be used to identify the tendency of assessment problems to manifest at 
borough/jurisdiction level. The local Moran’s I is used to examine the patterns of 
assessment problems at individual property level, and to find clusters of inaccurately 
assessed properties as well as anomalies in the sale price data. Finally, GWR is used to 
determine the relationship between some key variables that are believed to have 
different impact on assessed values. 
The last component of this thesis presents data analysis, research findings and 
discussion thereof. Chapter 6 provides analysis of property assessments, sale prices and 
property data in Bangkok. It presents the findings of all three analytical methods, which 
are performed in sequential order. Finally, in chapter 7, the findings of this study are 
discussed in relation to the relevant literature, research questions and hypotheses. The 
chapter concludes this thesis by describing research implications and recommendations 




Chapter 2  Taxation and Spatial Justice 
This chapter defines important concepts of, and establishes a theoretical context for, 
taxation in relation to urban geography. The first two sections of this chapter (2.1 and 
2.2) present the general framework for taxation. The central focus is on equity and 
efficiency as the major criteria for the evaluation of tax systems. Section 2.3 reviews 
key urban economic theories, paying particular attention to the housing market. In 
section 2.4, I move the discussion to the geography of urban areas, which is the main 
arena of property taxation. Urban form is a very important concept in urban studies and 
the understanding of its impact on the flow of goods, people and information is crucial 
in explaining the relationship between tax policies and city economies. In section 2.5, I 
discuss in detail the concept of spatial justice within the scope of the transformation of 
the housing market. Section 2.6 presents some of the most pressing urban problems in 





2.1  Economic Approaches to Taxation 
This section reviews the strand of literature on various concepts regarding the 
economics of taxation. Just as fiscal economic theory saw some major developments in 
the 1950s, there has been a corresponding increase in studies attempting to evaluate tax 
systems. Several tax policies have been directly involved in the reshaping of cities and 
regions as part of wider economic policies. The influence of national and local taxes, 
and the relationship between them, are crucial to urban systems because they are 
important fiscal instruments that regulate the flow of capital and labour. As will be 
explained later in this thesis, the influence of tax policy and certain kinds of injustice 
that are infused into urban geographies are interrelated. 
In general, taxes are compulsory imposts that contribute the largest proportion of 
government revenues (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989). There are a number of criteria 
by which taxes can be classified: by the base on which they are imposed (income, 
consumption or wealth); by the type of taxpayers (firm or household, personal or in 
rem); or by the market in which they are imposed (product or factor) (Ibid.). Musgrave 
and Musgrave (1989) also point out the distinction between the direct and indirect 
taxes. Direct taxes are defined as ‘[taxes] which are imposed initially on the individual 
or household that is meant to bear the burden’ (Ibid., p. 215). The distinction between 
these taxes is that the burden of indirect taxes is meant to be shifted to the intended 
final bearer. An important characteristic of direct taxes is that they must be able to 
adjust to taxpayers’ individual circumstances (Atkinson, 1977). Therefore, income 
taxes are normally classified as direct taxes and most in rem taxes (taxes levied on 
things) are classified as indirect taxes. 
Policy choice between direct and indirect taxation has long been a topic of animated 
debate in the study of taxation. While contributions to the topic can be dated back to the 
work of Ramsey (1927), analysis of both forms of taxation was first seen in the optimal 
tax theory pioneered by Anthony Atkinson and Joseph Stiglitz. The Atkinson and 
Stiglitz (1976) theorem states that the extent to which indirect taxes can be employed 
depends on the restrictions on the type of income taxes that can be employed and the 
form of consumer preferences. The key limitation of this theorem is the difficulties in 
observing different characteristics of individuals. The use of surrogate characteristics in 
practice does not perfectly correlate with actual characteristics of individuals. It is 




the utility functions are separable between labour and all commodities, then there is no 
need for indirect taxes to be employed (Ibid.). 
An optimal tax structure—the balance between direct and indirect taxes—may vary 
by a number of factors. Differential commodity taxation is necessary when individuals 
differ in several unobservable characteristics, e.g. endowments, productivity or tastes 
(Cremer et al., 2001), and when there is the presence of uncertainty of wage earning 
ability of individuals (Cremer and Gahvari, 1995). In principle, when the government is 
concerned solely with the efficiency of a tax and has no interest in distributional 
objectives, only the direct lump-sum tax can be employed (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 
1976). However, it is argued that, in practice, the transparency of tax systems can be 
improved by employing both direct and indirect consumption taxes (Dahlby, 2003), and 
social welfare can be increased by a commodity tax with the presence of a non-linear 
income tax system, assuming that human capital accumulation is endogenous (Naito, 
2004). 
The employment of both direct and indirect taxes is common in most economies but 
the question of what the ratio between the two taxes should be remains uncertain. The 
selection of the ratio has various impact on the economy. The impact that is highly 
relevant to this study is that on income distribution. In their attempt to quantify the 
level of income inequality as a result of tax policy trade-offs, Martinez-Vasquez et al. 
(2011) found that a 10 percentage point increase in the direct to indirect tax ratio 
would, on average, reduce the Gini coefficient—an indicator of income inequality—by 
about one percentage point. However, the impact of the direct to indirect tax ratio 
adjustment on income inequality appears to be lower for developing countries because 
of their relatively smaller tax systems. 
The study of Martinez-Vasquez et al. (2011) has, to some extent, confirmed the 
positive relationship between the progressivity change of direct income tax and income 
distribution (as measured by the Gini coefficient), as also observed by Li and Sarte 
(2004) and Weller (2007). This may seem to be consistent with the conventional belief 
that more progressive direct tax rates can help improve income inequality problems. 
Nonetheless, this runs counter to the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) theorem, which 
claims that: 
…the use of indirect taxation stems from a pursuit of distributional 




purpose—that is, purchases of different commodities are used as a 
screening device—depends on the form of consumer preferences and 
on the restrictions (if any) on the type of income taxation employed 
(Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976, p. 74). 
The Gini coefficient is in fact a measure based on income level and, in some cases, 
may have left the consumption side out of the equation. When measuring the level of 
income distribution, it is important to take into account spending levels, as these in 
particular form real income, which is a meaningful measure for the analysis of tax 
effects. In this regard, Duncan and Peter (2008) found that the impact of (national) 
income tax progressivity on real income is significantly smaller compared to that on 
gross and net income, as approximated by the consumption-based Gini coefficient. 
Their finding suggests that the analysis of tax policies should consider both income and 
spending sides. If we look at the economy from a broader view, it is equally important 




2.2  Key Principles of Taxation 
In his 1776 magnum opus, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations, Adam Smith set out four canons of a good tax system: equity, certainty, 
convenience and efficiency (Smith, 1776, p. 825–826). First, an equitable tax system 
should allow taxpayers to contribute in proportion to their income. Second, certainty 
means that the amount of tax payable must be definite and not arbitrary. This is to 
avoid the impact of taxes on work incentives and corruption in the tax administration. 
Third, taxes should be levied at a time, and in a manner, that are convenient to 
taxpayers. Fourth, an efficient tax system is one that minimises collection costs. 
However, Smith’s idea was predominantly based on wealth and consumption taxes as 
Britain had no income tax at the time he was writing. 
The following sections discuss the two criteria for the evaluation of tax systems, 
equity and efficiency, which are the bedrock of the analysis in this study. 
2.2.1  Equity 
In an equitable tax system, each taxpayer should contribute his or her fair share to the 
costs of public goods, but agreement on the level of contributions is difficult to reach. 
In the analysis of equity, two strands of thought have emerged from the literature: the 
benefit and the ability to pay principle. 
The Benefit principle 
According to the benefit principle, an equitable tax system operates under the notion 
that taxpayers contribute in line with the benefits received from the state. Taxes are 
paid in return for public services provided by the government. In real estate markets, 
improvements in public services are reflected in higher prices of real properties, which 
should be paid by property owners (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989). The equity of tax 
systems depends on expenditure structures. In most democratic countries, tax and 
expenditure policies are closely related. Fiscal policies that are not popular among 
voters are likely to be abolished. In this regard, the benefit tax may be considered a 
voluntary payment for public goods. 
In terms of general benefit taxation, everyone should ideally be taxed according to 
his or her evaluation of demand for public goods. This concept treats the tax system 




play a vital role in the analysis of a consumer’s preference patterns. The general benefit 
taxation seems logical in principle but proves difficult in practice because it cannot be 
used in the case of pure public goods. The consumption of pure public goods—e.g. 
public parks, public libraries and street lights—is non-rival and non-excludable. 
Therefore, the magnitude of the benefits received by different individuals is impossible 
to identify (Stiglitz and Rosengard, 2015).  
Some practical applications of the benefit principle can be found in cases where 
goods and services are provided using direct financing. There are two classic scenarios 
in which public goods can be provided on a benefit basis. One is a direct charge, such 
as an airport and car park charge, which is an appropriate revenue raising option when 
the characteristics of public goods provided are similar to those of private goods, of 
which consumption is rival and excludable. The other is a more general scenario in 
which the imposition of direct charges is impossible or too costly, meaning taxes may 
be used in lieu of charges, for example the use of gasoline taxes to finance roads. 
For a benefit tax to become specific, many have argued that it should be earmarked 
and allocated to the government activities from which taxpayers directly benefit. 
Earmarking—or tax hypothecation—can exist independently from benefit taxation, and 
vice versa. As shown in Table 2.1, type A is clearly a strong form of earmarking in 
which the beneficiaries pay for the goods provided to them. This type of tax is possible 
to implement in cases where there are no or very few external benefits or costs. 
However, other forms of earmarking (types B, C and D) cannot be considered benefit 
taxation due to a tenuous connection between taxpayers and beneficiaries, especially 
for the taxes designed to redistribute income (Mccleary, 1991). 
As pointed out by Musgrave and Musgrave (1989), redistributional objectives 
cannot be achieved by the application of the benefit approach. There is no clear 
separation between taxes that are used to finance public goods and taxes that are used 
to redistribute income. Some parts of the tax bill can be allocated to defray the cost of 





Table 2.1 Varieties of earmarking 
Type Revenue Expenditure Examples 
A Specific tax or fee Specific end use Gasoline taxes and motor vehicle fees for highway 
investments. 
Social Security, unemployment funds. 
Support of public enterprises. 
B Specific tax or fee Broad end use Lottery proceeds and sin taxes (on tobacco and 
alcohol) to finance social sector programmes. 
Taxes and royalties from petroleum to finance 
development. 
C General tax Specific end use Fixed percentage of total revenue devoted to 
specific programmes (such as education). 
Revenue sharing for a specific purpose. 
D General tax General end use Revenue sharing. 
Source: Mccleary (1991, p. 83) 
The Ability to pay principle 
In contrast to the benefit principle, the ability to pay principle considers tax collection 
as independent from expenditure determination. The ability to pay principle 
encompasses the redistribution function because it calls for people to contribute in line 
with their taxable capacity. Income is the most widely used measure of the ability to 
pay, and high-income earners are considered to have higher taxable capacity. They are 
thus not only required to pay a higher amount of tax but also a greater fraction of their 
income in taxes, reflected in progressive income tax rates. There are two dimensions of 
equity: horizontal and vertical. 
Horizontal equity can be achieved when individuals who are similar in all relevant 
respects are treated equally by a tax system. In other words, the same level of tax 
burden should be distributed among individuals at the same level of taxable capacity. In 
practice, taxable capacity may be assessed by actual income level or stock of wealth, 
but difficulties arise when trying to estimate other capacities such as earning ability or 
personal circumstances. Individuals who have similar opportunity sets but make 
different choices of jobs or consumption may end up incurring different amounts of 
payable taxes. With consumption tax, some types of goods such as alcohol and luxury 
items attract a greater variety of taxes, with higher percentages. 
Vertical equity can be achieved when individuals who have higher taxable capacity 
pay higher taxes than those who have less taxable capacity. In practice, however, there 




rates; (2) how much higher the rates should be; and (3) how to design a tax system that 
can comprehensively implement this principle (Lymer and Oats, 2015). Suppose two 
persons, A and B, undertake the same job and earn exactly the same rate of pay. A 
chooses to work overtime while B chooses to spend more time on leisure activities. Is it 
fair if A has to pay more tax than B? Some might suggest that potential income is a 
fairer measure, but its determination has many practical difficulties and reliability 
issues. 
The ability to pay principle can be applied to property tax as well. Either capital or 
rental values of properties are, to a certain extent, related to the ability to pay. 
Horizontal equity is compromised when properties with the same market value are 
treated differently. It could be that they have not been assessed in the same fashion (by 
different methods or by assessors whose judgments differ) or their assessments are 
prepared at different points in time. Failure to frequently update tax base—i.e. property 
assessed price used for tax calculation—is one of the main causes of inequity in 
property taxation. 
When applying the concept of vertical equity to property taxation, owners of high-
value properties are considered to have a higher ability to pay because they possess 
more wealth. For a tax system to be vertically equitable, tax rates must rise with 
property values (progressive). However, this concept is not quite fair for people who 
are ‘asset rich, cash poor’ such as pensioners who live in high-value housing with little 
income (see for example Policy Exchange, 2013). Therefore, on an income basis, using 
property wealth as a measure of ability to pay is still central to debates. However, this 
problem may be solved by properly designed tax reduction schemes. The concept of 
equity in property taxation will be discussed in detail in the following chapters. 
2.2.2  Efficiency 
In dealing with efficiency we now shift our focus from the effect of taxes on market 
prices to quantities. The concept of efficiency will not be discussed in detail in this 
thesis but it is necessary to mention some key ideas. There are two main aspects to 






Many public finance theories are based on the assumption that agents fully optimise 
their decisions and perfectly react to tax policies in order to minimise tax burdens (see 
Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976; Harberger, 1964; Mirrlees, 1971; Ramsey, 1927). As 
taxation is compulsory, the levying of a tax may affect decisions of individuals and 
firms who tend to change their behaviour to avoid tax. Such distortion as a result of 
taxation may sometimes be deliberately intended by a government to control certain 
activities. For example, tobacco and alcohol duties (sin taxes) are used to restrict their 
consumptions and to finance public healthcare systems. 
The negative impact of taxation on economic activities is known as excess burden 
or deadweight loss. It is caused by inefficient consumption and production by 
individuals or firms. The degree to which economic efficiency is reduced depends on 
the elasticity of demand and supply for a particular good (Gruber, 2013). When either 
demand or supply is elastic, the quantity of goods being exchanged varies more with 
price. The more elastic the demand or supply for a good is, the larger the deadweight 
loss is. Tax decreases demand as buyers have to pay more, and it also decreases supply 
as producers gain less. This is because parts of consumer’s and producer’s surplus 
become tax revenue, and the rest becomes deadweight loss. 
Tax rate is another factor that affects the size of deadweight loss, which, assuming 
the supply of land is inelastic, seems particularly relevant to property taxation. The 
demand and supply schedules shown in Figure 2.1 (a and b) illustrate two different 
cases of tax collection in which one has a higher tax rate than another. Assuming there 
are two markets, A and B, which are identical in terms of demand and supply 
elasticities, but the tax rate in market A is higher than that in market B. Before tax 
collection, the equilibrium price and quantity are at P0 and Q0, which are the same in 
both markets. After collecting the tax, the product price in market A increases higher 
(from P0 to Pb) than market B, and the quantity of the goods in market A reduces more 
than market B (from Q0 to Q1). It can be seen that, in market A, both consumers and 
producers are liable to higher tax burdens compared to those in market B. This results 
in higher deadweight loss in market A (the highlighted area), as the price that 
consumers have to pay (Pb) is higher and the price that producers receive is lower (Ps), 







Another determinant of a good tax system is the cost of taxation, which can be divided 
into three main categories: distortion cost, administrative cost and compliance cost. As 
mentioned earlier, distortion costs refer to the extent to which taxpayers’ decisions are 
distorted by taxes. The risk exposure cost of tax evasion can be regarded as a type of 
distortion costs, and it varies by how much each individual is concerned about the risk 
(Mirrlees et al., 2010). 
Administrative costs are borne by the public sector in the management of tax 
systems. The costs are incurred by tax authorities in their effort to minimise non-
compliance with tax collections. In property tax systems, for example, the 
administrative costs are incurred in the form of the money allocated for property 
assessment and appeal processes. Compliance costs, on the other hand, are borne by 
taxpayers, which arise when complying with tax obligations and also when attempting 
to avoid or reduce tax liabilities. The more time and money needed in conforming with 
tax requirements, the less efficient tax systems are. 
The next section reviews fundamental theories in urban economics. A particular 
focus is placed on the workings of the housing market vis-à-vis key economic factors. 
  




2.3  Land Use Theory 
In this section we will turn to some key urban economic theories to help us better 
understand housing processes and outcomes. There are two key strands of research in 
urban economics (Carter, 1995). The first strand includes works on urban hierarchies 
primarily based on Walter Christaller’s central place theory (Christaller, 1966), and the 
other concerns works on urban land use such as Homer Hoyt’s sector model (Hoyt, 
1939) and William Alonso’s bid-rent theory (Alonso, 1964). In this thesis, we employ 
the latter strand of research as our analytical framework. Each important land use 
theory will be considered in chronological order. 
The most influential early land use theories are those of Ricardo (1821) and von 
Thünen (1826). The Ricardian theory is based on fixed supply of land and differential 
fertility of agricultural land. The starting point is that in relatively small populations, 
only the lands with greatest fertility are cultivated—i.e. lands that are most fertile and 
closest to the market. When population grows, the diminishing returns on existing lands 
force cultivation of inferior ‘marginal’ lands, which, given the same amount of capital 
invested, produce lower yields. The cultivation of marginal lands continues until it 
reaches the point where there is no surplus from the production (total costs equals total 
sales revenue). 
Land rent3 arises from the indestructible quality and locational scarcity of land. It 
varies according to the productive power of each plot of land. Lands with greater 
fertility earn higher rent, which equals the difference between the value of the produce 
of the superior lands and that of the inferior lands, assuming that the cost of production 
for all grades of lands are the same and lands are cultivated in descending order in 
terms of grades. Rent increases with additional units of capital applied to cultivate 
marginal lands at a diminishing return. Improvement in transport facilities/means can 
lead to a fall in transportation cost and thus a fall in rent. It is because the transportation 
cost is part of the production cost, that marginal lands tend to gain higher profits from a 
reduction in transportation cost, resulting in a decrease in differential rent. Ricardo 
believes that rent does not enter into price. Rather, price is determined solely by the 
demand for such produce and the availability of fertile lands. 
 
3 Ricardo (1821, p. 39) defines rent as ‘the portion of the produce of the earth, which is paid to the 




However, Ricardo’s concept of rent has been the subject of several criticisms. First, 
assuming the demand for agricultural produce is stationary, improvement in fertility of 
marginal lands (e.g. as a result of improved methods of cultivation) can lead to a fall in 
rent. Land fertility is not fixed. Producing capacity varies according to locations and it 
can be improved, for example, by incorporating cover crops and compost. Conversely, 
fertility can be exhausted through unrestricted cultivation. Second, the relationship 
between rent and price asserted in Ricardo’s theory only holds when land is devoted to 
a single use. In real conditions where lands are adapted to some other use, the rent that 
it could have yielded is now part of the cost of production, and it must enter into the 
price of such a product (Mill, 1885). In other words, the rent foregone is an opportunity 
cost, which must be debited in the new production, and thus becomes price-determining 
(Hyde, 1898). Therefore, not only is rent determined by the market price of produce but 
also vice versa.  
Von Thünen’s location theory involves spatial simplification of a concentric 
agricultural land use (von Thünen, 2009 [1826]). In the theory, land is homogenous in 
all respects and land rent is based on distance from the market (town). In the ‘isolated 
state’, a single marketplace is surrounded by farmland. It is self-sufficient and is free 
from external influences. The city’s economy is set up into what he identifies as the 
‘four rings’ of agricultural activity, based on land rent and transportation cost. Type of 
land use depends on transportation cost, which is directly related to distance. The first 
zone located closest to the city centre is where dairying and intensive farming take 
place because these produces require quick transportation to the market. The second 
zone is the location for energy products such as timber and firewood. Their production 
needs to be located as close to the city as possible because of the difficulty of 
transportation. The third zone is where farmers grow extensive field crops such as 
grains, which can last longer and are cheaper to transport. The fourth zone is the 
location for ranching as this activity involves the least intensive land use and the 
cheapest transportation cost. 
The core concept of von Thünen’s model is a trade-off between land rent and 
transport cost (O’Kelly and Bryan, 1996). Land rent is the function of yield from 
agricultural products, market price, production costs, transport costs and distance from 
the market. It is greatest in the first zone and it decreases with distance away from the 




distance from the market. From these underlying assumptions it seems that von Thünen 
neglects the fact that each location in space differs in characteristics—e.g. soil quality, 
irrigation, etc. But, like most location theorists do, he emphasises the importance of 
transport-cost differential over space (Fujita and Thisse, 2013). Despite the simplicity 
of the model, it lays a firm foundation for later theories of land use in contemporary 
contexts such as Isard (1972 [1956]), Alonso (1960, 1964) and Beckmann (1969). 
These theories reinterpreted von Thünen’s town as the city centre or central business 
district (CBD) and adapted its concepts to urban land use. 
Alonso extended von Thünen’s model to various types of land use (housing, 
commercial and industrial), giving land use, rent, intensity of land use, population and 
employment as a function of distance to the CBD. His ‘bid-rent’ model is based on a 
monocentric form of a simplified city, in which a single-mode transportation is possible 
in all directions and the city centre is the only marketplace for all goods and services. 
The city also has uniform tax rates, and there are no institutional restrictions on land 
transactions, with perfect knowledge of land prices at every location (Alonso, 1960). 
The model seeks to explain the interaction between price and demand for land in terms 
of distance from the CBD. He begins the model with a budget constraint function faced 
by an individual, which includes the price and quantity of the composite good and land, 
and the monetary cost of commuting subject to distance from the centre. The budget 
constraint function can be expressed as: 
𝑦 = 𝑝𝑧𝑧 +  𝑃(𝑡)𝑞 +  𝑘(𝑡) (2.1) 
where 𝑦 is income; 𝑝𝑧 is the price of the composite good 𝑧; 𝑃(𝑡) is the price of land; 𝑞 
is the quantity of land; 𝑡 is the distance from the centre of the city; and 𝑘(𝑡) is the 
monetary cost of commuting from distance 𝑡 to the centre of the city. 
It is also assumed that the utility is maximised subject to the budget constraint, 
which is the function of the quantity of composite good, land and distance. As opposed 
to composite good and land, the model treats the distance from the centre as a good 
with negative utility. The utility function can be expressed as: 
𝑢 = 𝑢(𝑧, 𝑞, 𝑡) (2.2) 
The most significant contribution of Alonso’s model is the inclusion of the choice 
of location as part of the consumer choice. The equilibrium condition for an 














where 𝑢𝑡 is the partial derivative of the utility function with respect to the distance from 
the centre of the city (𝑡); and 𝑢𝑧 is the partial derivative of the utility function with 
respect to the composite good (𝑧). And 𝑢𝑡/ 𝑢𝑧, in Alonso’s terms, is the marginal cost 
of spatial movement, which equals: 
𝑢𝑡
𝑢𝑧










From Equation 2.4, it can be seen that, for an individual to be in equilibrium, the 
price of land must decline with distance to the city centre. This is a notable piece of 
deductive reasoning by Alonso. As distance increases, the change in the amount paid 
for land equals the additional cost of distance, which has two main components: the 
monetary cost of distance and the monetary value of its marginal disutility (McDonald, 
2007). Therefore, the marginal benefit must equal the marginal cost in order to 
maintain the equilibrium. Deriving from the equation, the slope of the residential bid 
















Alonso is particularly interested in the effects of income, population growth and 
improvements in transportation on the residential land market. An increase in income 
will increase 𝑞 as land is a normal good (Equation 2.5). This results in a flatter 
residential bid rent function. However, the larger income will also increase the 
monetary value of the disutility of an increase in distance (𝑢𝑡/𝑢𝑧)𝑖, which makes the 
bid rent function steeper. From these observations, it can be concluded that there is a 
negative relationship between price (rent) and distance from the centre, and that income 
has a positive effect and distance has a negative effect on the amount spent on land 
(pq) (Alonso, 1964; McDonald, 2007). Consumer choice is hence based on the balance 
between land and commuting costs, which is the underlying reason for residential 
location. 
Alonso’s model was extended by Richard Muth, who continued to assume a 




conditions on equilibrium land uses and rents. Based on assumptions of a featureless 
urban plain, Muth (1961a) constructed a model consisting of two firms of competitive 
industries, one providing housing services and the other agricultural commodities. 
Production inputs of both firms are land and labour, and their production functions are 
identical and are logarithmically linear as are their demand functions. The prices of 
production output and housing services decline exponentially with distance from the 
centre of the city. This is because transport costs and time increase at a decreasing rate 
with distance from the city centre. Traffic in areas near the centre of the city generally 
moves more slowly than in areas farther away. When the demand for housing increases, 
the city limits move outward, which results in the increase in the price of agricultural 
product as its supply decreases. This implies that both commodities are related. 
In his second article, Muth did not pursue the empirical testing of urban-rural 
boundaries but moved his attention towards the study of urban population densities, in 
which he constructed population density functions for forty-six US cities (Muth, 
1961b). Based on the model in his previous study, he further assumes that the elasticity 
of demand for housing is a constant, given that the real income per-capita is constant. 
In Muth’s scenario, an individual’s saving on housing costs from the change in distance 
(away from the city centre) equals the change in transport costs. This is similar to the 
consumer equilibrium condition proposed by Alonso. Given that all households are 
identical, no matter where their locations are, they must be on the same indifference 
curve in equilibrium. Muth states that the per-capita consumption of housing increases 
with distance, and its level varies by the price elasticity of demand for housing and the 
change in the housing price per unit of distance. Based on Muth’s equilibrium, 
subsequent studies confirm that the observation of inelastic income-constant demand is 
valid (inter alia, Brueckner, 1982; Kim and Mcdonald, 1987; McDonald, 2007). Muth 
(1961b) finally concludes that the gradients of his population density functions become 
flatter as car registrations and the proportion of poor condition central city settlements 
increase, and become steeper as the proportion of manufacturing employment in the 
city centre increases. 
Edwin Mills is another economist who is interested in the effects of production and 
income on the sizes and structures of urban areas. In his early work, Mills (1967) 
constructed a model assuming that land is homogenous and that all production 




the urban area: production of goods, intracity transportation and designated housing. As 
in the models described above, Mills assumes a monocentric urban form. The 
endogenous variables in the model are input and output quantities and prices in the 
three activities, the land rent and the distribution of residences. The exogenous 
variables are the parameters of the three production functions, parameter of the demand 
function for goods, prices of labour and capital, the fraction of the labour force 
employed in the suburbs, the demand for housing per worker, and the rental value of 
land for agricultural purposes (Mills, 1967, p. 206). There are two distance variables in 
the model: one is the distance from the centre to the boundary at CBD (k0) and the 
other is the distance from the centre to the outer edge of the suburbs (k1). 
In essence, the model explains the changes in size and spatial organisation of urban 
areas by deriving land use functions for goods production, transportation and housing. 
The total amount of land available increases proportionately to the distance from the 
centre of the city, but the amount of land available for goods production grows at a 
decreasing rate with distance from the city. The reason is that the growth in the amount 
of land needed for transportation at distance u from the centre of the city is 
proportionate to the number of workers resident at distance u, which increases at a 
faster rate than u. This leads to the problem of traffic congestion, which Mills (1967) 
claims is not inherent in large cities. Congestion comes about because the adjustment of 
the number of workers and the amount of capital per the amount of land used in goods 
production is quicker than the transfer of land used for production to that used for 
transportation. This is consistent with the fact that, for example, the transfer of CBD 
land through land appropriation process from goods production use (by the private 
sector) to transportation use (by the public sector) takes longer than the transfer of land 
within the private sector. 
In later works, Mills (1972) continues to employ a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-
Douglas production function, in which land and capital are used as inputs. In this 
model, the price of capital is exogenous (the same at each distance from the CBD) 
while land and housing prices are endogenous (varying with distance from the CBD). 
In equilibrium, the functions of land rents, housing prices and population density 
follow the exponential form, and the population density is zero at the edge of the urban 
area. There are two main implications of the model. First, the gradient of the population 




would increase demand for housing, encouraging people to move farther from the 
CBD. Second, when there are improvements in transportation (lower costs and faster 
commuting time) the gradient of population density function would become smaller. 
This is due to an increase in transportation to obtain cheaper housing. Thus, both 
changes in income and transportation technology have similar effects on the slope of 
population density function. With some modifications to the model, Mills and Tan 
(1980) found that density gradients for a number of developed and developing 
countries have flattened over long time periods (between 1950 and 1970), which is 
similar to the results of American suburbanisation observed by Mills (1972). 
On the topic of the spatial pattern of residential land use in cities, Muth (1969) 
argues that the output of housing per unit of land and population density would grow 
more rapidly in the suburbs as the demand for housing increases, given the substitution 
elasticity of land for housing is less than one. He also states that the decline in housing 
value per unit of land results in the decline in population density with distance away 
from the CBD. But why, in reality, do cities not become decentralised to the extent that 
the model anticipated? A possible reason is that marginal transport costs, particularly in 
large cities, are higher due to greater traffic congestion (Muth, 1971). Applying Mills' 
(1972) theoretical framework, McDonald (1979) found that, in 1970, population 
density in Chicago was affected by income and household size, but not by land value. 
Land value only has influence on newly constructed buildings.  
The Muth-Mills model was extended by LeRoy and Sonstelie (1983) by allowing 
for additional modes of transportation: fast and slow. The fast mode is automobile and 
the slow mode is walking. It is assumed that households of different income base their 
choices on different sources of benefit. The rich consume more housing and value their 
time more than the poor. The introduction of the automobile as a fast mode of transport 
gives first access to the rich to live further out in suburban locations because they are at 
a comparative advantage. But as the automobile becomes more affordable, the poor 
increasingly suburbanise, which finally causes the rich to be at a comparative 
disadvantage. This results in the rich moving back to the CBD, generating the reversal 
of residential patterns as well as the process of gentrification. According to the model, 
it can be concluded that an increase in the costs associated with car commuting tend to 
discourage gentrification as income elasticity of the marginal cost of car commuting 




Critics of the Muth-Mills model often accuse it of being overly simplistic and not 
representative of the real world. For example, many cities are no longer monocentric, 
and employment is located farther from the old city centre (Glaeser and Kahn, 2001). 
Couch (1980) contends that Muth's (1961b, 1969) models do not sufficiently 
demonstrate how an increase in population can reduce the gradient of population 
density function. He proposes the base-price model, which allows the consumer to 
purchase a range of non-housing goods at different locations as an alternative to Muth’s 
models. It is suggested that costs of travelling to work should be treated as one good 
among many non-housing goods. However, these criticisms miss the point that the 
model’s simplicity is what makes it so widely applicable. Some basic predictions of the 
Muth-Mills model such as that the city size is determined by a market-driven allocation 
of land use (rather than by uncontrolled sprawl) have been proved by Brueckner and 
Fansler (1983) to be valid. Omissions in the Muth-Mills model that seem to be a flaw, 
such as the lack of employment sub-centres, have in fact made the model very versatile 
(Spivey, 2008). 
Several policy implications can be drawn from the theories that have been reviewed 
in this section. Much evidence and analysis indicate that the demand for housing is 
induced by changes in technology and income, and that population density is affected 
by these factors, as is household size. It can be said that suburbanisation is largely the 
result of market allocation. There are also implications for urban problems such as 
traffic congestion, which can be ameliorated with urban policies that are suitable to 
urban forms and land use patterns. The policies should be formulated in a way that can 
accommodate such market-driven demands, and that can keep a balance of 
infrastructure development funds allocation between several modes of transport and 
between urban and suburban areas (Mieszkowski and Mills, 1993). Housing policies 
should be formulated in accordance with the structure of urban transportation systems 
and policymakers should be aware of the commuting demands of residents. The priority 
should be to minimise time and money costs of commuters, which some analysts 
estimate to be about equal (Mills, 2004). 
In the following section the concept of urban geography will be introduced. The 
literature has established a fundamental link between processes of urban development 
and economic changes. Economic forces are often regarded as the dominant influence 




consumption and exchange relations has transformed trade between nation states into a 
global economy (Hall and Barrett, 2018), which has placed urban studies at the centre 
of economic and tax policy debates. The section will then move on to debates around 





2.4  The Formulation of Urban Forms 
Urban form can be defined as ‘the spatial configuration of fixed elements within a 
metropolitan region’ (Anderson et al., 1996, p. 9). In general terms, urban form can be 
considered from two perspectives: density and diversity. Density refers to the degree of 
activity within a particular space, while diversity measures the spatial scale at which 
different land uses interact (Cervero and Kockelman, 1997; Tsai, 2005). There are three 
types of archetypal urban forms that are often referred to: concentric, radial and 
multinucleated. In the concentric city, the CBD is the location with highest 
employment density, number of trip ends and rent (Anderson et al., 1996). Land uses 
are segregated around the CBD according to the maximisation of accessibility value. 
Radial cities have fewer major transport routes than concentric cities, resulting in areas 
of sparse development between transport lines. Multinucleated city has a more 
complex, hierarchical transport system, which means that not all transport lines are 
oriented towards the CBD. There are three common levels from which urban form can 
be viewed: metropolitan area, city and neighbourhood. The classification is crucial 
because some urban form variables only operate at certain levels, while some variables 
may carry different meanings and affect social activities differently when operated at 
different levels (Tsai, 2005). 
Spatial structure is a more comprehensive concept, which can be defined as the 
overall shape of a city, and is comprised of three elements: urban form, urban 
interactions, and a set of organising principles between the two (Bourne, 1982). Urban 
form has an influence on the flow of goods, people and information within a city but 
does not necessarily determine them. In his 1960 book, The Image of the City, Kevin 
Lynch makes a connection between environment and psychology by raising the notion 
of legibility, which refers to the extent to which the cityscape is read by people who 
move through the city and engage in the process of way-finding. He proposes five 
elements: paths, edges, regions, nodes, and landmarks. Paths are the channels of 
movement people use to move throughout the city. Identity, continuity and directional 
quality are the three characteristics of any path. Edges are boundaries and linear breaks 
in continuity such as railroad cuts and shores. Regions are areas characterised by 
common characteristics and have separate visual identities from the rest of the 




junctions. They perform as the convergence of paths. Landmarks are external points of 
orientation, which may vary with individuals’ personal experiences (see Lynch, 1960). 
Contemporary urban forms have been created by the interaction of economic, 
cultural and political factors (Fainstein and Campbell, 2011). Difference between urban 
forms are amplified by social and cultural dissimilarities, which create variation in 
socio-spatial patterns. The spatial difference between North America and Europe is a 
good example. While the designers of European cities tend to value communality and 
place a higher premium on collectively enjoyed spaces, their American counterparts 
often emphasise privatism, for example, opting strongly for gated communities (Ibid.). 
Even though advances in transport technology have made it possible for workers to live 
farther from their workplaces, the degree of spatial deconcentration also depends on the 
stringency of regulation and the tastes of consumers (Fainstein and Campbell, 2011). 
This can be seen in the sharp boundaries of large-scale suburbanisation in the UK that 
result from the greenbelt policy. Compared to North America, there is generally less 
rigid spatial segregation by income in Europe (Musterd and Ostendorf, 1998). This is 
characterised by predominantly attached housing in most European cities. 
Countries outside the nations that had dominated the world economy during the 
twentieth century seem to have greater dissimilarities in terms of the level of economic 
development, cultural diversity and political regimes; and these are reflected in the 
diverse range of urban forms (as well as the ways in which land is evaluated). These 
countries include newly industrialised countries (NICs) such as Brazil and China, 
extremely poor countries in Africa, oil-rich Middle Eastern nations and some recently 
developed countries in Asia. Gugler (1996) identifies three generalisations about urban 
form within these countries. First, many cities have experienced rural-urban migration. 
Cities with low levels of economic development are described as demonstrating 
urbanisation without industrialisation. Second, post-colonial cities can be identified by 
a division between the planned area previously occupied by colonial officers and 
business owners (and now the home of the elite) and the larger unplanned area. Third, a 
variety of different urban forms are found in the NICs, ranging from modern 
skyscrapers cities like Taipei and Seoul to mixed conurbations like Bangkok and 





The contemporary world has been governed largely by hypermobility and global 
communications, resulting in dynamic processes of centralisation and dispersal that 
have taken place across national and regional boundaries, rather than being confined 
within them. Globalisation has reshaped the economic geography of many cities. 
Production has become more specialised as investment continually flows towards 
places with lower labour costs and greater advantages—e.g. relaxed financial 
regulations. Big transnational corporations with high levels of competitiveness have 
benefited from globalisation the most as they have gained access to new production 
sites and made use of resources at lower costs. 
Fainstein and Campbell (2011) describe three broad types of industrialised cities 
that are the outcome of the globalisation processes: declining industrial centres, global 
cities, and expanding and contracting regions. Declining industrial centres result from 
the displacement of mature industries due to competition from other countries. Global 
cities are cosmopolitan and have control over the world financial system (Sassen, 
2011). London, New York and Tokyo are good examples of premiere global cities. 
Expanding and contracting regions are characterised by simultaneous growth and 
decline within a country or a metropolitan area. Expansion is usually experienced by 
cities with good business climate while contracting cities normally have obsolete 
industrial structure and socio-political system (Fainstein and Campbell, 2011). The 
three types of cities have different influences on the housing market as the structure of 
labour and employment differs. In London, for example, Hamnett (2003) argues that 
the nature of the housing market has been affected by changes in industrial, 
occupational and earning structure. Given the change in housing demand and supply, 
there is a growing social polarisation between housing tenures. 
Associated with globalisation is the upsurge in the popularity of neoliberalist 
ideology which advocates individualism, market liberalisation and contraction of the 
state. During the post-war era the world had been governed mainly by the Keynesian 
economic policy regime characterised by the interventionist models. However, between 
the late 1960s and early 1990s, theorists found it increasingly difficult to remain 
technocratic, and policy makers faced more challenges in mediating the growing 
conflicts between different interest groups (Chang and Rowthorn, 1995). For the less 




advanced economies, that is, in the 1980s with pressure from the Bretton Woods 
institutions—i.e. the World Bank and the IMF.  
The neoliberals argue against interventionist policies such as subsidisation and tax 
credit targeting, and thus favour market liberalisation and depoliticisation of the 
economy. Within the neoliberal literature, the Keynesian political regime is regarded as 
undemocratic, characterised by the top-down, national-scale policymaking that places 
intense restrictions on local authorities (Harvey, 2005). Neoliberals claim that 
devolution and outsourcing empower localities to make collaborative decisions within 
the local context. Devolution, in this regard, can be justified by the democratisation of 
the decision-making process (Mayer, 2007).  
Nonetheless, Purcell (2006) raises the issue of the local trap—the tendency to 
assume that the local scale is inherently more democratic than other non-local scales—
to argue that neither devolution nor outsourcing is in itself necessarily a move towards 
greater democracy. He attacks the assumption of the urban democracy literature (inter 
alia, Berry et al., 1993; Fung, 2006) that ‘the more autonomy local people have over 
their local urban area, the more democratic and just decisions about the space will be’ 
(Purcell, 2006, p. 1925). From the scale theory perspective, he asserts that the need for 
cities to remain globally competitive increasingly dictates urban policy decisions and, 
as a result, urban governing institutions have become less democratic as they have gone 
through restructuring processes to better respond to the needs of capital (Ibid.). 
In fact, neoliberal support for devolution and deregulation does not necessarily 
accommodate the making of a just city. As suggested by Florida (2018), land use 
deregulation alone is not enough for the promotion of economic and social benefits 
within the city. Extreme land use deregulation policy would create a version of 
gentrification, increasing the costs of urban lands and driving the growth of luxury 
high-rise construction. He claims that land value taxation (LVT) would help tackle the 
problem of higher land costs through the stimulation of higher-density land use; and 
investment in public transport infrastructure needs to catch up with the increasing 






2.5  Spatialising Justice 
In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls seeks a neutral standpoint from which he 
claims that, under given circumstances, the ideal level of justice is reached when the 
prospects of the least fortunate are as great as they can be. His egalitarian position 
supports the fair distribution of liberty, opportunity, wealth and self-respect. The 
evaluation of fairness should be carried out from behind the ‘veil of ignorance’, where 
individuals are unaware of their status in a society and act fairly in formulating 
essential elements of a just society. In other words, an ideal justice can only be 
established when there is an absence of the circumstances within which it is considered. 
He of course cannot presume total ignorance but rather assumes that we are logical in 
applying the general laws of human psychology and economic behaviour, reflecting the 
universality of his theory—as it does not matter where and when it is applied. Rawls’ 
theory of distributive justice has been criticised for emphasising on static forms of 
social inequality, leaving the processes by which unfair outcomes are produced 
(Harvey and Potter, 2009). 
On the contrary, David Harvey shifts attention towards social processes and their 
relation to the concepts of rights and justice. His early volume, Social Justice and the 
City (1973), could be marked as the beginning of a geographical approach in justice 
studies. He creatively expands the concept of territorial justice first coined by Davies 
(1968) and claims that it can be achieved if: 
(1) The distribution of income should be such that: (a) the needs of the 
population within each territory are met, (b) resources are so allocated to 
maximize interterritorial multiplier effects, and (c) extra resources are 
allocated to help overcome special difficulties stemming from the 
physical and social environment. 
(2) The mechanisms (institutional, organizational, political and economic) 
should be such that the prospects of the least advantaged territory are as 
great as they possibly can be (Harvey, 1973, p. 116). 
In addition, Harvey identifies the relationship between urban space, social justice 
and urbanism. In fact, the crucial point in Harvey’s study is similar to that of Castells’, 
which essentially relates to the ways in which power structures affect urban outcome 




circulates through the financial and property sectors, and how it leads to crises of 
accumulation. As a result of globalisation that causes cities to grow very rapidly, there 
has been ‘a significant reorganisation in the location and distribution of various 
activities in the city system’ (Harvey, 1973, p. 61). The shift of investment across 
spatial boundaries implies a changing location of economic activity, which means a 
changing location of job opportunities as well. He describes this phenomenon as the 
‘spatial fix’. In this regard, injustice arises from rapid disinvestment and 
impoverishment, and of course there are social costs of insecurity and changing 
relations between producers and consumers (Fainstein and Markusen, 1993). 
Similar to Harvey, Soja (2010) argues that inequitable social relations and societal 
development are caused by unjust urban geography. Spatial injustice must be tackled 
by gaining control over the processes that produce spatial inequity. Coalitions of 
disadvantaged groups demanding the right to the city are the means for achieving more 
equitable geography. Accordingly, it is assumed that the involvement of disadvantaged 
groups in policy decisions would yield greater distributive outcomes. This is known as 
‘communicative rationality’ and is sometimes referred to as the collaborative approach 
(see Healey, 2006; Innes, 1995). 
In Justice and the Politics of Difference, Young (1990) deviates from a fixation on 
distributive justice to emphasises the structural forces that create inequalities. She 
argues against the traditional concepts of homogenous communities of identity and 
instead supports pluralism and the heterogenous mixing of social groups. In this regard, 
she claims that justice can be conceptualised as the absence of forms of domination—
i.e. marginalisation, exploitation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence 
(Young, 2000). 
Many geographers use the term ‘uneven development’ to describe the way in which 
capital flowing in and out of spatial boundaries (e.g. city, region, country) constantly 
creates relative poverty and wealth (Smith, 1991). The argument supporting this theory 
has two main dimensions: the production of spatial scales and the production of 
geographical difference (Harvey, 2011). Spatial scale matters because, within a nested 
hierarchy, what makes sense at one scale does not necessarily register at another. 
Spatial scales are constantly redefined, contested and restructured (Swyngedouw, 
1997). Geographical differences have been aggravated by volatile changes resulting 




reconfigured by political-economic and socio-ecological processes…’ (Harvey, 2011, 
p. 361). 
From the planning point of view, Fainstein (2010) asserts that there is often a 
conflict between equity, diversity and democracy. Among these values, she gives 
priority to equity, which can be achieved through certain policies that focus on 
disadvantaged groups—as defined by income or marginality. Central to her idea are the 
policies that promote accessibility (through the reduction of intra-urban transportation 
fares) and democracy (which allows disadvantaged groups to not only participate but 
also to be included in decision-making processes). Like Young (2000), Fainstein 
supports neighbourhood homogeneity and the recognition of difference. Fainstein’s 
view is opposed to that of Harvey and Potter (2009), as she is willing to embrace 
reform through existing systems rather than considering justice as unattainable under 
the regime of capitalism in which the process of capital accumulation prevails. 
Marxist Geographical Perspectives 
Since the late 1960s, western Marxist theory has been broadened beyond simple terms 
of labour-capital relations. Many cities have experienced the development of various 
radical movements, which posed new problems. Much of the discussion about spatial 
justice is based on the theoretical basis developed by two Marxist theorists—Henri 
Lefebvre and Manuel Castells. Lefebvre defines the city as being constituted by social 
relations rather than being merely a space or physical territory that contains buildings 
and population. The city became a constituent of the relations of consumption, 
production and reproduction. He claims that: ‘The urban (space and landscape) remains 
unseen. We still don’t see it. Is it simply that our eye has been shaped (misshaped) by 
the earlier landscape so it can no longer see a new space?’ (Lefebvre, 1970, p. 29). 
Space is a social product infused with the logic of capitalism (such as profit-oriented 
production and labour exploitation). Capitalism has transformed space into a 
commodity in terms of its production (Lefebvre, 1977). 
Furthermore, Lefebvre proposes the concept of ‘the right to the city’ based on his 
proposition of the contract of citizenship (inter alia, Lefebvre, 1991, 1996). Modern 
citizenship appears in the form of a contract between the state and the residents. He 
asserts that the contract has to be radically extended and deepened in order to articulate 




divided into isolated segments by the private property system, which can be compared 
to the division of labour. Therefore, the right to the city is seen as a struggle to 
de-alienate urban space by allowing inhabitants to appropriate space as they see fit. 
Such a process seems to require a revolutionary imagination of utopia comprising the 
persistent acts of resistance and creation. 
Unlike orthodox Marxist theory, Castells regards the city as the site of social 
reproduction rather than the mode of production. He criticises existing theories 
(including Lefebvre’s) as incapable of sustaining scientific analysis because they 
merely elaborate the ideological forms of capitalist society. Emphasising on the 
functional aspect of urbanist ideologies, Castells argues that urban systems involve 
collective consumption as a means of reproduction process, which is specific to spatial 
units (Castells, 1977). Cities are the place in which residents can use their labour to 
acquire collective goods to make up for their deficiencies. Castells rests his argument 
on social movements as the principle force for change within the context of structuralist 
theory rather than social classes or political parties. Underlying his argument is the 
theory of grass roots movements in which labourers struggle for improved collective 
consumption, cultural expression and political self-determination (Castells, 1983). 
While the city’s role in production is minimised, the role of social movements is 





2.6  Contemporary Urban Problems 
Since the early 1980s, we have seen the emergence of the shrinking middle class 
problem in many global cities  (Kuttner, 1983). The major cause is claimed to be the 
combination of deindustrialisation and the shift to the service sectors, leading to the 
polarisation of the occupational class structure between highly skilled professional and 
managerial workers at the top and unskilled service workers at the bottom (Noyelle, 
1983). The changing employment structure has spurred growing clusters of particular 
occupations within cities and the growth of these clusters has taken place at the expense 
of unskilled manufacturing class employment. 
Friedmann and Wolff (1982) identify three types of clusters that have emerged in 
world cities—metropolises with certain levels of economic (and perhaps political) 
power such as New York, Tokyo, Sao Paolo and Bangkok. The first type is the cluster 
of business services which employ highly skilled, transnational elites and ancillary 
staff. The second type of cluster tends to serve the first, which consists of real estate 
and construction activities, restaurants, hotels, shops and personal and domestic 
services. The last type of cluster is similar to the second one but focuses more on the 
tourism industry. The inevitable impact of this spatial shift in the employment structure 
are the changes in economic and social composition. 
Polarisation is a form of inequality that has arisen from the change in the 
organisation of work, which leads to the shift in the job supply and income structure. 
Sassen (1991) claims that the vast supply in low-paid jobs required by high-income 
professionals and the downgrading of the manufacturing sector are the two main 
developments in global cities that have contributed to economic polarisation. Sassen 
uses the term ‘new class alignment’ to describe the growth of high- and low-income 
strata of workers (Sassen, 1991, p. 13). The changing socio-economic structure of 
global cities has been the major culprit in the gentrification and residential segregation 
problems.  
Gentrification is one of many pressing urban issues in today’s world. It can be 
broadly defined as ‘the transformation of a working class or vacant area of the central 
city into middle-class residential and/or commercial use’ (Lees et al., 2008, p. xv). The 
term was coined by Ruth Glass back in 1964 to describe the transformation of working 




residential areas where more affluent and educated people increasingly prefer to move 
in. In fact, the term was coined to signify the worrying trend, as Glass mentions in her 
essay: ‘…[London] may soon be faced with an embarrass de richesse in her central 
area—and this will prove to be a problem, too’ (Glass, 1964, p. 141). 
In the 1960s and 1970s, gentrification occurred through the moving of affluent and 
educated people to formerly upmarket neighbourhoods and the moving of artists and 
creatives to formerly industrial districts. Gentrification has largely been driven by back-
to-the-city movement of young educated people, particularly in big cities in the US and 
the UK (Florida, 2018). Gentrification of this kind has been driven by large-scale 
public and private investments, which make amenities in the cities more attractive to 
gentrifiers than the suburbs. There were also significant changes in lifestyle of these 
young people who, in Gregory Lipton’s words, ‘decrease the relative desirability of 
single-family, suburban homes’ (Lipton, 1977, p. 146). They tended to have postponed 
marriage and have fewer children as they live in a new dream defined in urban terms. 
Another explanation is that the rehabilitation of inner-city buildings was seen to be 
more economically viable (Smith, 1979). The costs of purchasing (and renovating) old 
but structurally sound properties in cities were less than the costs of new houses in 
suburbs and commuting to work. 
The housing market and social geography have of course been reshaped by the 
gentrification process, which is taken to have more negative outcomes for the lower-
income group (Hamnett, 2003). One of the most pressing problems is displacement, 
which implies disadvantages for lower income households in their right to the city. This 
phenomenon can be clearly depicted by Harvey's (1973) analogy of a theatre where the 
seats are allocated by the ability to pay. The highest income group has priority to 
choose the best seats, and the last group to choose is the low-income households who 
are left with uncomfortable seats and restricted views. One of the driving forces behind 
displacement is rising housing prices/rents. The outflow of the less advantaged people 
is troubling and likely to cause growing inequality as they are pushed out of the urban 
core where better job opportunities and amenities are located.  
Gentrification captures not only class shift but also class inequalities and injustices 
created by capitalist urban residential markets and public housing policies. The rising 
housing expense burden for low-income households is the direct outcome of the 




homelessness. The displacement of lower income groups from gentrified areas is a 
highly debated problem. It is evident that households who have been displaced are 
mostly renters. Martin and Beck (2016) found a positive correlation between rising 
costs of property tax in gentrifying neighbourhoods and the increase in involuntary 
moves of renters, and the negative effects on renters are by far higher than on 
homeowners. Especially in the long run, the decisions to move of homeowners are 
virtually not affected by gentrification nor property taxes because their housing costs 
are locked in and they tend to be more financially stable (Florida, 2017). Accordingly, 
owners tend to be more attached to the neighbourhoods they live in and are not exposed 
to the threat of eviction unless they can no longer afford their mortgages.  
Not only is gentrification limited to the form of working-class displacement, it 
affects residents of different races as well. As gentrifiers move into an area, some racial 
groups who have become minority begin to move out because either they can no longer 
afford to live or have lost the sense of belonging to the community. In a study of racial 
boundaries in the 100 largest US cities, Tannen (2016) found that old racial boundaries 
moved and spread outward as more suburban whites moved back to urban areas, but the 
neighbourhoods did not desegregate. Between 2000 and 2010 in Philadelphia, for 
example, overall there are increasing black residents, but pockets of white residents had 
emerged quickly. He finally came to a conclusion that ‘gentrification has not been 
diffuse, but instead occurred on the specific blocks along the boundary’ (Tannen, 2016, 
p. 28). 
In contrary, Freeman (2009) claims that, in the US, racial diversity increased in his 
study area during the study period between 1970 and 2000, even though it was also 
evident that cities in general were becoming more diverse as well. He asserts that 
segregation by race is an indirect effect of gentrification. In this regard, education 
seems to play a key role in the determination of the way different racial groups are 
affected by gentrification. For instance, it is found that black professionals have 
successfully settled in New York’s Harlem because they embody many of the value of 
‘middle-class America’—i.e. education, property ownership, work ethic and 
self-reliance (Taylor, 1992). Therefore, it seems to be class position and lifestyle rather 
than racial difference that set some minority groups apart. However, in a few situations, 
a spatial mismatch tends to also be contributed by residential segregation by race. 




opportunities are spatially inaccessible to them (Holzer, 1991). Accordingly, while 
segregation by class is likely to make political boundaries to coincide with class 
specific enclave, it appears that segregation by race tends to redefine job opportunity 
boundaries. 
Although gentrification has been driven by much larger forces—e.g. public/private 
investments, economic boom and globalisation—rather than mere individual desires, it 
tends to be limited in particular areas of cities, including economically successful or 
‘superstar’ cities. In a study of New York city’s fifty-five sub-boroughs, only 27 per 
cent of all sub-boroughs is identified as gentrifying neighbourhoods, while non-
gentrifying neighbourhoods made up 13 per cent and the rest (60 per cent) is 
catagorised as higher-income areas (Austensen et al., 2016). Changes in household and 
urban spatial structures have interacted with the level of housing supply in certain 
areas. The end result is an uneven geographical development of gentrification effects 
that go beyond individuals’ controls. This problem is unavoidable in the capitalist 
economy due to the working of market mechanism and the delay in urban policies’ 
effects. In this regard, it is important that public fiscal instruments, such as property 
tax, are able to capture changes in prices/rents and help redistribute income and urban 




2.7  Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on general concepts of taxation and urban 
geography/justice. It highlights the role of taxation within wider economic policy 
contexts, and to describe key concepts related to city economies. The primary focus has 
been placed on the difference between direct and indirect taxes and how they can be 
working together in the actual economic settings. While indirect taxes (such as 
consumption and sale taxes) are believed to have less impact on income inequality, the 
literature suggests that this believe may not hold. What is more important is the balance 
between the two types of taxes and how well they can perform.  
Two criteria emerged in the evaluation of tax systems: equity and efficiency. Equity 
in taxation is based on the benefit principle and the ability to pay principle. While both 
principles should be used in the determination of the equity of a tax system, it appears 
that the ability to pay principle is more viable in practice. As we will see later in this 
thesis, property tax systems are evaluated in terms of horizontal and vertical equity, 
which are the two dimensions of the ability to pay principle. It is also important to 
consider negative impact of taxation, especially the deadweight loss. This can be 
caused by both the demand and supply sides, and by either individuals or firms. The 
degree to which deadweight loss arises depends on the elasticity of demand and supply 
of certain goods as well as tax rate. More elastic demand and supply for a good and 
higher tax rate normally lead to larger deadweight loss. 
In section 2.3, I reviewed urban economic theories dating back to Ricardo’s and von 
Thünen’s agricultural land rent theories. Even though these theories are based on 
settings that may not be wholly consistent with the modern world, their implications for 
subsequent land use theories are very profound. We have seen that the Alonso-Muth-
Mills theories are based on the fundamental concepts of Ricardo and von Thünen. 
Alonso constructed a self-consistent theory that shed light on housing, which was a 
much neglected area at the time. However, not many policy conclusions could be 
drawn from Alonso’s model until further empirical testings were performed by Muth 
and Mills. Their extensive empirical research has generated significant developments 
on Alonso’s theory. Their theories have succeeded in explaining the behaviour of 





In the proceeding sections we have seen that both the type and level of urban forms 
are crucial in the analysis of city economies. Type of urban forms determines the 
locational settings of the CBD, urban transport system, and other important activities in 
the urban area. All of these factors have influenced property prices differently. The 
literature also suggests that urban form must be viewed from different levels as some 
variables only valid at certain levels. Urban structure is another important concept that 
tends to vary from country to country. The city is constituted of not only physical 
attributes but also the relations of consumption, production and reproduction. Key 
theories have emerged from two schools: Keynesian and Neoliberals. While Keynesian 
theorists favour top-down policy making at national scale, the Neoliberals support 
devolution and depoliticisation of local governments.  
Central to the topic of spatial justice are the concepts of social process, social 
relations, consumption and production. Spatial injustice arises when there is an absence 
of organisations that can facilitate the uneven distribution of resources in the city 
system. Location matters as spatial boundaries can cause uneven development, as 
capital flow more freely across boundaries. Marxist theorists view city as a site of 
(re)production; therefore, within the capitalism system of private property, residents 
should be allowed to appropriate their own spaces. In this regard, based on urbanist 
ideologies, Castells argues that that collective consumption is a means for social 
reproduction. The city is the site of reproduction rather than the mode of production. 
Furthermore, economic globalisation is a powerful force that has shaped not only 
urban structure but also social class composition within the city. As I have shown the 
case of the housing market that has been greatly affected by occupational polarisation, 
it has particularly raised the concern for the effectiveness of the fiscal instrument that 
can be used to tackle the problem. Property tax is regarded as the key fiscal instrument 
that has great potentials in improving social inequality and this will be discussed in 
detail in the following chapter. 
Contemporary urban problems were presented to draw attention to urban 
inequalities, with particular reference to gentrification. The explanations for 
gentrification fall into two categories: economic and cultural (see Smith, 1979). The 
economic aspect of gentrification arises from higher commuting and housing costs of 
suburban living that triggered the rehabilitation of inner-city areas. During the back-to-




choose where they lived and were unlikely to be displaced. Low income groups were 
more exposed to eviction risks and have less housing options. The cultural explanation 
for gentrification relates to changing lifestyle that was enough to decrease the 
desirability for suburban homes and increase the demand for inner-city properties. This 
led to an emphasis on the value of consumption as the underlying force behind central 
city land use decisions (Ley, 1978). 
In the next chapter, I will narrow the analytical framework down to the topic of 
property taxation. All aspects of property taxation including base, rate and 
administration will be thoroughly discussed. A large part of the chapter will be devoted 
to the evaluation of property tax as well as property assessment systems. Finally, the 





Chapter 3  Property Taxation 
In the previous chapter we looked at the workings of tax systems through an economic 
lens. The topics that I have reviewed so far are a growing area of tax research. We have 
looked at fiscal and urban economics, including efficiency and equity aspects of 
taxation in relation to urban structure and spatial justice. This chapter narrows down the 
discussion to property taxation, an area which is closely related to the concepts of urban 
geography discussed in the previous chapter. The main aim of this chapter is to 
establish the link between property tax level and incidence with respect to the nature of 
the tax system. 
Section 3.1 explains the distinct characteristics of property tax using the 
categorisation proposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Section 3.2 
investigates the role of property tax as a local tax. The subsequent sections (3.3-3.5) 
consider the concepts of the tax base, tax rate and tax administration, which are the 
three pillars of most property tax systems. Section 3.6 brings the justification for 
property tax incidence into focus and discusses the determination of fairness in 
property tax systems. It also describes ad valorem tax theory and discusses criteria by 
which property tax can be evaluated. Section 3.7 describes key factors that play an 
important role in the housing market, and the final section (3.8) presents two case 
studies of property tax reform attempts and proposes some reform strategies for 
property tax. 
Since there has been very little empirical research carried out on the reformed 
property tax system in Thailand, and no study of its property assessment performance, 
this chapter will review the systems in various countries, in order to identify potential 
solutions for property tax reform in Thailand. The residential property market is the 
focus of this thesis, but other property markets are also analysed to understand the 





3.1  Property Tax Classification 
In principle, property tax is often categorised as a wealth tax. In practice, however, the 
classification is quite obscure. Property tax is an income/investment taxes when 
collected from owners of rental housings (landlord/landlady), or a consumption tax 
when levied on the owner-occupied housings. Therefore, property tax can have a wide 
range of effects on the economy and on society, which is why we must consider both 
economic and social perspectives. 
It is evident from the guidelines for tax classification made by the IMF and the 
OECD (Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 respectively) that taxes are classified mainly according 
to the bases on which they are levied. The only difference between the two 
classifications is that the IMF views social security contributions as another class of 
government revenue separate from taxes. 
The main theme of this thesis concerns the IMF’s class 1131 (or the OECD’s class 
4100), recurrent taxes on immovable property, which is defined by the IMF as:  
…Taxes levied regularly on the use or ownership of immovable 
property, which includes land, buildings, and other structures. The 
taxes can be levied on proprietors, tenants, or both. The amount of 
the taxes is usually a percentage of an assessed property value that is 
based on a notional rental income, sale price, capitalized yield, or 
other characteristics, such as size or location. Unlike recurrent taxes 
on net wealth (1132), liabilities incurred on the property are usually 
not taken into account in assessment of these taxes. (IMF, 2014, 
p. 93). 
In this regard, property tax is considered a direct tax, which can be 
adjusted to the individual characteristics of the taxpayer (Atkinson, 1977). 
This is particularly the case with recurrent taxes on immovable property, in 
which either owners or occupiers of taxable properties are the final bearers of 
property tax burdens. Property taxes imposed on property transaction—e.g. 
SDLT in the UK and Real Estate Transfer Tax in Germany—are considered 




bearers. This type of transactional property tax is, however, not the primary 
focus in this thesis. 
Table 3.1 Extract of the IMF classification of taxes 
Codes Tax Types 
11 Taxes 
   111    Taxes on income, profits and capital gains 
   112    Taxes on payroll and workforce 
   113    Taxes on property 
       1131        Recurrent taxes on immovable property 
       1132        Recurrent taxes on net wealth 
       1133        Estate, inheritance, and gift taxes 
       1135        Capital levies 
       1136        Other recurrent taxes on property 
   114    Taxes on goods and services 
   115    Taxes on international trade and transactions 
   116    Other taxes 
12 Social contributions 
   121 Social security contributions 
13 Grants 
14 Other revenue 




Table 3.2 Extract from the OECD classification of taxes 
Codes Tax Types 
1000 Taxes on income, profits and capital gains 
2000 Social security contributions 
3000 Taxes on payroll and workforce 
4000 Taxes on property 
     4100      Recurrent taxes on immovable property 
        4110         Households 
        4120         Other 
     4200      Recurrent taxes on net wealth 
     4300      Estate, inheritance and gift taxes 
     4400      Taxes on financial and capital transactions 
     4500      Other non-recurrent taxes on property 
5000 Taxes on goods and services 
6000 Other taxes 






3.2  Property Tax as a Local Tax 
Local governments in many countries have been pressured to increase their self-
collected revenues, particularly from property taxes. Sandford (2000) points out that 
good local taxes should meet the following criteria: evenly distributed and localised tax 
base; low administration costs (economical to operate at a small scale); having the 
potential to create high and reliable yield; and having the ability to control local 
disparities of wealth and promote local accountability. It seems that property tax has 
the potential to meet all the above criteria as, in most cases, properties are a major 
source of personal wealth and their locations are fixed. Therefore, it is more justifiable 
for local governments to increase taxes on wealth compared to other taxable sources.  
Moreover, property tax is generally considered by economists as a good tax in terms 
of difficulty of evasion and promotion of local autonomy, which as a result can 
promote accountability at local levels (Slack and Bird, 2014). The levying of taxes on 
immovable property makes it difficult to avoid and easy to administer due to explicit 
tax bases. However, the role of property tax as a source of national revenue is quite 
limited. Bird and Slack (2004a) found that property tax is at best a minor revenue 
source for national governments in most countries, albeit more important in developed 
countries (OECD countries) than in developing and transition countries. Conversely, 
property tax is a more important source of revenue for local governments in developing 
and transition countries than in developed countries. Their findings suggest that there is 
more room for property tax to improve in terms of revenue generation—if we believe 
that wealth is an appropriate taxable source in order to improve social inequality by 
increasing income distribution. 
Because property combines a number of facets, each of which requires different tax 
treatments, the question of how to tax property is a complex one. A house, for example, 
sits on land, the value of which can generate economic rent that, on economic 
efficiency grounds, should be taxed. But the house can be treated as either a 
consumption or investment or both, each of which is normally taxed differently. 
Regarding the design of property tax, Mirrlees et al. (2011, p. 369) suggest that the 





• Land, whether used for business or residential property, can be 
taxed at an arbitrarily high rate on economic efficiency 
grounds. 
• Business property is an input into the production process and, 
on efficiency grounds, should not be taxed. 
• Owner-occupied housing combines the features of an 
investment and a consumption good, and we should consider its 
taxation from both these points of view. 
• Rental housing is an investment good from the point of view of 
the owner and a consumption good from the view of the renter. 
Overall, there is a presumption in favour of taxing it at a similar 
level to owner-occupied housing. 
Although property taxes in most countries are locally collected, the importance of 
property tax as a local financial source is limited due to legal restrictions. Property tax 
is often subject to national legislation, which cannot serve local financial needs. As 
shown in Table 3.3, most local governments have limited control over the 
determination of property tax rates. Even when they have full control over tax rates, the 
power to decide tax structure is typically exercised by central governments. It can be 
argued on equity grounds that all properties in a country, particularly of the same class, 
should be treated similarly. Therefore, in principle, it makes more sense to have 
property tax structure decided by central governments. In practice, however, each 
locality has different circumstances and financial needs, which is the reason why local 
governments should have more control over property tax rates and structures. More 
accountability for tax decisions is placed at the local level when tax rates are set 




Table 3.3 Reliance on property taxes by local governments 
Country Type of property tax Tax base Basis of assessment 






OECD      
Australia State land tax; municipal rates Land or land and improvements Market value; rental value; or combination Yes, with limits on annual 
increase in revenues 
37.71 
Canada Property tax Land and improvements (sometimes 
machinery included) 
Market value Yes, restrictions apply in 
some provinces 
53.3 
Germany Land tax Land and improvements; farm properties also 
include machinery and livestock 
Market value (rental income/construction 
costs); area in former GDR 




Japan Fixed property tax Land, houses, buildings, and tangible business 
assets 
Market value Nationally set standard and 
maximum rates 
25.5 
United Kingdom Council tax (local tax on residential 
property); business rates (central tax on 
non-residential property) 
Land and improvements; some plant and 
machinery 
Market value for residential; rental value 
for non-residential 
Residential tax only; tax 
ratios for bands set 
centrally 
33.02 
Central and Eastern Europe      
Hungary Building tax; plot tax; communal tax Unimproved value (plot tax); buildings 
(building tax) 
Area or adjusted market value Yes, within legal limits 13.63 
Latvia Real estate tax Land and buildings Market value No, but local governments 
can grant relief 
18.24 
Poland Urban real estate tax; agricultural tax; 
forest tax 
Land, buildings and structures Area Yes, subject to prescribed 
minimum and maximum 
rates 
9.7 
Russia Land tax; individual property tax; 
enterprise assets tax 
Land for land tax; structures for property tax; 
assets for enterprise property tax 
Area; inventory value of structures; value 
of assets 
Yes, within narrow range 
set by senior governments 
7.0 
Ukraine Land payments and taxes Land Area No 9.3 
Latin America      
Argentina Property tax Land and buildings Market value Yes 35.05 
Chile Property tax Land and improvements Area by location for land; construction 
value for buildings 
No 35.16 
Columbia Unified property tax Land and buildings Market value Yes, subject to central 
government limits 
35.07 




Nicaragua Property tax Land, buildings and permanent improvements Cadastral value No 6.4 
Asia      
China Urban and township land use tax; house 
property tax; urban real estate tax; farm 
land occupation tax 
Occupied lands; land and improvements Area; market value or rental value No 4.9 
India Property tax Land and improvements Most annual rental value; limited use if 
area and market value 
Yes, subject to state 
restrictions 
7.0-41.09 
Indonesia Land and building tax Land and buildings Market value No, but can change 
assessment deduction 
10.7 
Philippines Real property tax Land, buildings, improvements and machinery Market value Yes, subject to minimum 
and maximum rates 
13.4 
Thailand Land and building tax Land and improvements Market value for land; replacement cost 
for buildings 
No 8.010 
Africa      
Guinea Rental value tax on housing; local 
business taxes 
Land and buildings Rental value No 32.0 
Kenya Property rates Land/improvements Area; market value; or combination Yes 15.0 
South Africa Rates on property Land/improvements Market value Yes 21.0 
Tanzania Local building tax; national land rents Buildings, structures or limited development Market value; or replacement cost (if 
market value not available) 
Yes 4.0 
Tunisia Rental value tax on housing; tax on 
vacant land; local business tax 
Land and improvements (rental housing tax); 
land (tax on vacant land) 
Area; rental value No 32.4 
Source: Adapted from Bird and Slack (2004b) 
Notes: 
1  Includes only local taxation and not the state tax on land. 
2  Includes the local council tax and the local share of national non-domestic rates. 
3  Includes other local taxes such as a tourism tax. 
4  Percentage of local taxes. 
5  This refers only to the municipal tax. There is also a property tax at the provincial level. 
6  The property tax is a national tax earmarked for local governments; 40 per cent of revenues remain with municipalities where property is located. 
7  Property taxes as a percentage of total Columbian local taxes. 
8  Percentage of municipal taxes. 
9  The range depends on the state. 




The determination of tax rate is also subject to the extent to which local 
governments finance their services. There is a link between the benefits of the proposed 
public services and the costs of providing them. Local governments should have the 
authority to determine property tax rates if they finance these services themselves, as 
they have an accurate perception of the costs and can make informed decisions. 
Particularly where central government controls the tax base, it is important for local 
governments to be able to set tax rates. To avoid distortions, however, there should be 
limits on tax rates (Bird and Slack, 2004b). A minimum tax rate is needed to avoid tax 
competition among jurisdictions as wealthier local governments, as well as those with 
wider tax bases, may reduce rates to attract business. A maximum tax rate is needed to 
avoid distortions from tax-exporting, which occurs when tax burden is borne by 
unintended payers. For example, local governments may levy higher tax rates on 
businesses because they believe that the ultimate tax burden is borne by non-residents 
(Boadway and Kitchen, 1999). 
Regarding tax base, both land and developments are taxed in most countries. An 
important question is, as it is efficient to tax only land at the highest level, why most 
countries still tax both land and improvements? This can be explained by the 
difficulties that arise when trying to tax only land value. Especially in urban areas 
where the majority of land has been developed, it is impossible to extract the value of 
specific improvements from the overall property value. At best, one solution is to 
estimate replacement building costs and subtract them from the overall property values, 
which yields estimated land value. The missing components from the equation are the 
locational values that attach to both land and improvements. Even when precise costs 
for every detail of a property—e.g. floor tiles, granite kitchen tops, attic insulation—
can be determined, it is still impossible to define ‘market value’ of land as separate 
from improvements because properties are always sold as a whole. Therefore, taxing 
both land and improvements seems to be a more convenient, and less time consuming, 
option for local governments. 
Furthermore, it is found that, in most countries, property classes are treated 
differently. Single-family residential owner-occupied and agricultural properties are 
favoured, and are subject to tax reductions/exemptions or low rates, while non-
residential properties are taxed at higher rates (Bird and Slack, 2004b; Gibb and 




valued houses are often exempted, and sometimes household circumstances are used as 
criteria for tax concessions/reductions. Agricultural land is normally treated on 
favourable terms, and is sometimes taxed at lower rates than residential properties or 
even exempted from tax, as in some African countries. Favourable treatment of 
agricultural land is due to social and political considerations, and with a view to 
preserving it from conversion to urban use. However, Maurer and Paugam (2000) argue 
that the tax differential is often not large enough to compensate for the much higher 
prices that would be paid for the conversion to urban use. Non-residential properties 
largely include commercial and industrial properties, which are often taxed at higher 
rates. In fact, there is little economic rationale to tax non-residential properties higher 
as it distorts land use decisions, especially on new developments. Ideally, similar rates 
on all types of properties would ensure that land development choice is based on the 




3.3  Property Tax Base 
Property tax bases are typically estimated from either land value, market (capital) 
value, rental value or by area-based measures (Gibb and Christie, 2015). Market and 
rental values are the predominant methods used across most Latin American, Asian and 
OECD countries. The market assessment method generally involves comparison of 
direct sales, in which the values of subject properties are derived from the market 
values of similar properties known as comparables. In general term, market value is the 
exchange price of a property if it is to be sold in an arm’s length transaction and in the 
open market. Apart from the above qualities, comparables must be comprehensive 
(including a number of comparables rather than a single transaction), recent, verifiable 
and consistent with local market practice (RICS, 2012). Comparables are selected and 
adjusted for certain property characteristics—as there is no property that is exactly 
identical to another. The primary criticism of this sales comparison method is that it is 
subjective in terms of comparable sales selection and adjustment types. 
Cost and income approaches are alternative common methods for estimating market 
value. Cost approach comprises two main components: estimations of land value (from 
vacant land sales) and building value (from construction costs). The approach is 
suitable for newly built or special use properties, for which comparable evidence is 
difficult to find. The income approach is normally preferable when subject properties 
are commercial. In applying the income approach, the appraiser calculates the net 
income (total income less expenses) and divides it by the yield rate (annual rental 
income divided by acquisition cost of the property). This method is particularly 
applicable to investment rental properties and the assessment result is more accurate 
when the subject property is occupied to full capacity (Wyatt, 2013). 
In area-based measures, taxes are levied per areal unit of building or usable space 
(or both) according to assessment rate and size of the property. The assessment base of 
this measure is indirectly influenced by market values through the application of 
adjustment factors, which normally derived from outdated sales. The measure is still 
used in some less developed countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Africa (e.g. 
Ukraine, Tunisia and Kenya), where available property transaction data is less accurate 





For residential properties, there are several alternative assessment methods such as 
hedonic and repeat-sales. The hedonic method defines value as a mathematical function 
of housing characteristics by employing multiple regression technique to estimate the 
contribution of each characteristic to the total property value. This method requires 
detailed information on property characteristics, which are diverse from property to 
property and subject to constant changes. Even when data on property characteristics 
are sufficiently available, it is difficult for the hedonic model to capture some factors 
affecting housing price such as distinct neighbourhood characteristics or certain 
environmental factors (Calhoun, 2001). Since many of these factors are difficult to 
quantify, manipulation by a human assessor is often necessary, rendering hedonic 
models subjective. 
The repeat-sales method also employs multiple regression technique to estimate 
repeat-sales indices. The method was first proposed by Bailey et al. (1963), who used 
data from the amount of tax stamps (and adjusted on the basis of information contained 
in the warranty deed) to construct the price index. The method was extended by Case 
and Shiller (1989) to account for differences in the sampling distributions of price 
changes over time between repeated transactions. Their weighted repeat sales (WRS) 
model uses generalised least squares regression to account for heteroscedasticity. Case-
Shiller home price indices have been computed for 20 cities in the US and used by 
Standard and Poor’s (Standard and Poor’s, 2009).  
An advantage of the repeat-sales method is that it is less data intensive than the 
hedonic method: it only needs price, sale date and property address to perform 
regression. However, the problems with the standard repeat-sales model are that the 
number of resale units is sometimes low and there are difficulties in determining net 
depreciation—despite the method proposed by Shimizu et al., 2010). To remedy this, a 
stochastic model may be used to help explain price changes of housings that have been 
sold repeatedly—using the estimation based on pooled data across the same period of 





Land versus land and improvements 
LVT is a classic concept in the history of taxation. Its long pedigree dates back to 1809 
when David Ricardo proposed ‘the law of rent’, in which he argued that: 
A Land-Tax, levied in proportion to the rent of land, and varying with 
every variation of rent, is in effect a tax on rent; and as such as tax will 
not apply to that land which yields no rent, nor to the produce of that 
capital which is employed on the land with a view to profit merely, and 
which never pays rent; it will not in any way affect the price of raw 
produce, but will fall wholly on the landlords. In no respect would such 
a tax differ from a tax on rent. But if a land tax be imposed on all 
cultivated land, however moderate that tax may be, it will be a tax on 
produce, and will therefore raise the price of produce (Ricardo, 1911, 
p. 96). 
As land is in fixed supply, especially under certain planning restrictions, it is not 
responsive to price change. Only landowners are liable to a tax on land value, of which 
the burden cannot be shifted to others. In this regard, two types of LVT should be 
clearly defined. First, vacant land should be taxed to encourage developments of 
highest and best use. It can be assessed by market comparison method if there are 
sufficient number of sales available. The assessment is straightforward as there are no 
building costs involved in the process. Second is the tax imposed on site value of 
developed land, which presents a challenge for assessment because urban property 
sales combine both values of site and improvements. An estimate of site value is 
usually made by employing market and cost approaches. Increases in site value tax are 
capitalised into lower property value; therefore, landowners are liable to higher tax than 
is the case with a tax on both land and improvements (Bird and Slack, 2004b).  
However, apart from assessment difficulties, narrower tax base is another issue 
related to LVT. Assuming fixed and similar tax rates, a tax on site value tends to 
generate lower revenues compared to a tax imposed on the whole property. To 
compensate for a smaller tax base, tax rates need to be increased in order to produce 
comparable revenues for LVT. Higher rates create greater distortions and are politically 
unpopular. For this reason, it is easier to impose lower tax rates on both land and 




3.4  Property Tax Rate 
Other than tax base, tax rate is another important determinant of tax burden. Even when 
assessment systems can produce accurate tax bases, the amount of tax liability depends 
largely on the tax rate indicated for each property. Property tax rates are usually 
determined by central governments but, in some cases, they may be set locally. In 
countries like Hungary and Columbia, local governments are granted discretionary 
powers over tax rates within certain limits determined by central governments; while in 
Argentina and Kenya, local governments are granted absolute discretionary powers 
(Bird and Slack, 2004a). 
When property tax rates are determined locally, local governments can estimate 
their expenditure requirements and set tax rates accordingly after subtracting non-
property tax revenues available. In England, for example, where all domestic properties 
are placed in within Bands A-H according to their national assessed values as of 1991, 
local authorities estimate revenue requirements from the council tax by subtracting any 
subsidies and revenues available from the central government and other sources. The 
amount of the council tax requirement is then set for Band D (middle range) so that the 
revenues raised from all properties across all bands add up to the level of the revenues 
required. Therefore, the percentage of the council tax across all bands are 
proportionately the same each year but the amounts of tax paid may be different. 
Different rates may be imposed for different types of property—i.e. residential, 
commercial, industrial, agricultural and vacant land. Alternatively, the differentiation of 
property tax among different types of property may be done through the assignment of 
different assessment levels (as ratios of assessments), as in the Philippines. In such a 
system, a uniform tax rate can be applied but properties are assessed at different ratios, 
e.g. residential property is taxed at 20 per cent of market value while commercial 
property is taxed at 50 per cent of market value (Guevara, 2004). On benefit grounds, it 
can be argued that different classes of property benefit from local public services 
differently. Non-residential properties should be taxed at a lower rate than residential 
properties because owners of the former often provide more of their own services—e.g. 
security and garbage collection—than the latter (Slack, 2011). 
On efficiency grounds, however, it can be argued that property tax should be 




very responsive to a tax increase. Therefore, residential properties should be taxed at 
higher rates as business capital tends to be more mobile than residential capital. 
However, in practice, differential tax rates do not necessarily reflect either benefits 
received or supply elasticity of property owners/users as, in many countries, business-
related share of government spending is less than business-related share of tax revenue, 
and residential properties are often taxed at lower rates (Kitchen and Slack, 1993; 
Oakland and Testa, 1995). 
Another important question is whether property tax should be levied at flat or 
graduated rates. On equity grounds, it is reasonable to have progressive tax rates in 
order to achieve the income distribution objective. In some tax systems, progressive tax 
rates have emerged in the form of tax exemptions or reliefs for low-value properties. In 
other instances, tax rates increase with property values. Peculiar cases, such as the 
previous Thai system, involve the application of progressive, flat and regressive rates to 
council tax (see Section 4.4.1.2). However, it is surprising that progressive rates are 
applied to low-value properties while regressive rates are applied to high-value 
properties. 
Differentiated tax rates are normally imposed according to property classes, but, in 
some cases, they are imposed on land as separate from improvements. In Taiwan, for 
example, a split-rate property tax treats land more favourably than improvements (Lin, 
2010). Economic arguments for such a system are a reduction of the deadweight loss 
and more intensive use of capital and labour, as they are substituted for land when the 
tax is introduced (Cohen and Coughlin, 2005). This results in more productive use of 
land parcels and an increase in output in the metropolitan area. It is also found that a 
switch to LVT leads to denser patterns of land development and a reduction in urban 




3.5  Property Tax Administration 
Tax administration refers to tax policy and the process by which it is administered. 
How well property tax is administered not only affects revenue but also determines its 
equity and efficiency (Bird and Slack, 2004b). There are three key steps in the process 
of property taxation (Ibid., p. 41): 
(1) Property identification 
(2) Preparation of tax roll 
(3) Tax bills issuance, tax collection, and arrears management 
In the first step, subject properties and their owners must be identified. This step 
involves the preparation of fiscal cadastral maps, which give information about 
property description, boundaries, past market and assessed values, etc. The second step 
involves the preparation of property assessments and appeals. This is when surveys 
usually take place to verify and update property data. In the final step that involves the 
issue of property tax notices/bills and collection, it is important to have well-established 
and functional enforcement and appeal systems to ensure maximum tax collections and 
to serve as error-correction mechanisms. All of these functions are normally performed 
by central/local government agencies. Although some functions may be outsourced to 
private contractors, Strauss and Sullivan (1998) found that the use of county rather than 
private assessors resulted in more uniform residential assessments. 
Although, in principle, good administration can improve the efficiency and equity 
of a tax system, it is usually absent in practice. As pointed out by Bahl and Martinez-
Vazquez (2008, p. 42), ‘the major problem with property tax is that it is difficult to 
administer and costly if administered well’. Given the long and detailed process of 
property tax administration, property tax tends to have high administrative costs 
compared to revenue yielded, especially if not managed properly. Poor tax 
administration would normally result in non-uniform assessment ratio and low 
collection rate. It may also lead to property tax inequity particularly when the same 
classes of property are treated differently. More importantly, when public confidence in 





3.6  Principles of Taxation Revisited 
When measured against tax principles proposed by Smith (1776) property tax can 
easily comply with the requirement for certainty because of its immoveable tax base 
(see Section 2.2). Property tax can generate predictable revenue because it is usually 
levied on assessed value, which tends to be more stable than market value. Even though 
in theory assessed value should closely match market value, property tax reassessments 
usually take time, and are politically unpopular (Policy Exchange, 2013). In England 
and Thailand, for example, council tax is still based on the 1991 and 1978 market 
values respectively (Council Tax Act, 1965; VOA, 2016). Therefore, revenues from 
property tax do not normally fluctuate with cyclical swings in economic activities 
including real estate markets. 
Furthermore, property tax meets the requirement for convenience in two distinct 
ways. First, there are many methods by which property tax can be paid, such as via the 
internet, telephone, standing order, etc. Second, the timing of property tax payments is 
convenient for taxpayers as, in many systems, the total sum of taxes on occupancy is 
payable in monthly installments to help spread the costs. Also, taxes on transfer such as 
SDLT and Inheritance Tax (IHT) are normally collected at the time of transfer, making 
tax payments very simple. 
Nonetheless, difficulties arise when we consider equity and efficiency in property 
taxation. To comply with the equity principle, property assessments must be accurate. 
Accuracy of assessments is typically measured by how close they are to market prices. 
In theory, if assessed values perfectly reflect fluctuating market prices, equity and 
certainty principles seem contradictory as it is unlikely that revenue from property tax 
is stable. In practice, this situation can hardly happen because property tax is based on 
estimation and any change is largely dependent on the frequency of reassessment. Bird 
and Slack (2004b) found that, in 25 case study countries, reassessments mostly take 
place every one to ten years, but in a minority of countries, there is no predefined 
assessment cycle. The frequency of reassessment does not only depend on the level of 
economic development or the size of countries, it also depends on national and local 
politics. 
In order to keep assessments up to date, expertise of assessors and sufficient 




infrequent assessments are caused by a lack of knowledgeable staff and assessment 
tools (Guevara, 2004; Tassonyi, 2004). A lack of qualified assessors is in part caused 
by an absence of coherent assessment systems. Ideally, there should be local 
government assessing agencies located in every province or taxing jurisdiction, but this 
requires a considerable amount of public finance, which may not be worth the 
collectable tax amount. Comprehensive and detailed property assessments normally 
require a lot of manpower and training, especially in surveying. Computer-assisted 
assessment systems can help reduce assessment time, but without accurate and up-to-
date information they cannot give reliable results. 
Accordingly, assessment systems can be improved based on the three following 
observations. First, a strict legal system is essential for achieving accurate reporting of 
sale prices. The involvement of solicitors in facilitating property transactions results in 
reliable sale prices, which seems to be missing in many developing countries including 
Thailand. Second, there must be a good record keeping system for property transactions 
so that sale data are properly archived for future tax assessment purposes. Third, 
integration of different government agencies is the key to keeping assessments up-to-
date (Bird and Slack, 2004b). For example, when a property is sold and the information 
is recorded in the land registry, notification should be sent to property valuation 
agencies and local governments; or, when a building permit is granted, local 
governments should notify other government agencies responsible for maintaining the 
property tax roll. These government agencies should share the same property data base.  
While most of these solutions are difficult to achieve in practice, many countries 
have adopted banding assessment systems as an alternative to discrete value assessment 
on each property. The banded approach has been used to ameliorate the unpopularity of 
property taxes by grouping assessed values into a few ranges. This results in quicker 
and cheaper assessment processes, which make the assessors’ task easier. The approach 
can also reduce the volume of appeal challenges because banding generates much less 
precise assessments (McCluskey et al., 2002). Compared with discrete value 
assessment, it could be said that the banded approach requires less property information 
and training for assessors. However, there are drawbacks to the banded structure. A 
dilemma of banding determination is that it tends to cause property tax inequity if the 
value range is too wide, or to cause more appeal challenges if the value rage is too 




reassessment, the banding becomes tainted with inaccuracy because certain types of 
residential properties increase—or decrease—in value when compared with others in 
the same geographical locus (RICS, 1998). Therefore, frequent assessment updates are 
mandatory regardless of banding characteristics. 
3.6.1  Concepts of Fairness and Equity in Property Taxation 
Fairness in taxation is a controversial issue that directly relates to the historical, cultural 
and social background of the taxpayer (Vlassenko, 2001). Traditionally, the terms 
“fairness” and “equity” are often used synonymously. In property taxation, however, 
the distinction between these two terms should be made clearly. Woolery (1989) 
suggests that ‘fairness’ pertains to the legislation upon which the tax is promulgated, 
whereas ‘equity’ refers to the administration of the property tax system. In other words, 
equity, or more specifically, assessment equity, is a measure of how well property tax is 
administered in terms of assessment and appeal processes, where fairness is measured 
by how well property tax is structured in the legislation. The IAAO (2010) claims that 
property tax equity can be achieved through the enforcement of assessment standards. 
From vertical equity perspective, it is crucial to have progressively distributed tax 
burdens. In property tax, progressivity is largely determined by tax rate. Under a strict 
economic definition, Mirrlees et al. (2011, p. 24) assert that a tax is said to be 
progressive when average tax rate rises as tax base rises. This means property tax is 
progressive when average rate rises as property value rises. However, a property tax 
system can hardly be deemed equitable if tax rates increase based on inaccurate 
property assessed prices—i.e. obsolete or wrongly assessed tax bases. Therefore, in 
order to prove progressivity in a property tax system, it is essential that we verify that 
assessed prices are accurate and able to reflect market values. If assessed prices are 
accurate then we can assume that progressive tax rates would yield vertically equitable 
outcomes, and the same concept can be applied to horizontal equity perspective as well. 
Assessment level is a key concept in the literature on property tax studies. It refers 
to ‘the common or overall ratio of assessed values to market values’ (IAAO, 2013a). 
The meaning of the term ‘overall ratio’ itself is vague, especially when the context 
under discussion is not clear. In property taxation, overall ratio normally refers to the 
common (or average) level of assessments in the entire taxing district (Cheng, 1970). It 




property is appropriate or not. There are two instances where assessment level is 
particularly relevant. First is the evaluation of assessment quality and equity, often 
done by comparing assessment levels between taxing jurisdictions (inter alia, Beal et 
al., 2017; Krupa, 2014; Lin, 2010; Payton, 2012). Second is the use of assessment level 
in property tax abatement cases to determine the appropriate level of tax 
reductions/exemptions (see Cheng, 1970, p. 51). 
There are three concepts concerning the quality of property tax systems that should 
first be clearly defined: assessment equity, assessment uniformity and assessment bias. 
Assessment equity is the degree to which assessment to sales ratios—A/S Ratios for 
short—of all properties are constant on the day of assessment. There is perfect 
assessment equity when the A/S ratios of all properties are equal, regardless of the 
value of the ratio (Paglin and Fogarty, 1972). Assessment uniformity and assessment 
bias are interrelated concepts. Assessment uniformity means each property has to be 
treated equally—i.e. to be assessed by the same standard and having the same 
assessment ratio (IAAO, 1990). Assessment bias refers to circumstances when different 
classes of property have different A/S ratios (IAAO, 1990, 2013b). 
Vertical and horizontal inequities are two components of assessment inequities that 
have emerged in the literature. Vertical (assessment) inequity arises when assessment 
levels of higher-value properties are different from those of lower-value properties 
(IAAO, 2013a). Vertical inequity can be either regressive or progressive. Regressive 
vertical inequity occurs when higher-value properties are underassessed relative to 
lower-value properties, and vice versa for progressive vertical inequity. Horizontal 
inequity arises when owners of properties with similar values pay different taxes 
(De Cesare and Ruddock, 1998). In property taxation, the measurement of horizontal 
inequity does not take into account the income of property owners. Only market value, 
and sometimes property type, are used as criteria to compare tax liability. Therefore, 
from both perspectives of inequity, people with low active income who own high-value 
properties (asset rich, cash poor) are deemed to have high ability to pay within this 
analytical framework. 
Depending on the tax system, it may be more appropriate to take into account tax 
exemptions in the evaluation of property tax burden. Assessment level is certainly a 
good indicator of property tax liability, but it may not be completely accurate. Some 




personal status—e.g. number of children, occupations, and number of occupiers. 
Property tax exemptions can cause a marked difference in tax liability for people who 
own properties of similar values. Tax exemptions may be in the form of reduced tax 
rate or as a percentage of the reduction from total tax liability. Tax exemptions can be 
calculated in comparison with the assessment level. A lower assessment level (below 
one) would indicate an inclination towards lower tax liability as well as properties with 
extensive exemptions. However, the analysis of tax exemptions should be carried out 
when there is detailed data on personal circumstances. This will help justify the 
different levels of tax burden that fall on different groups of taxpayers. 
In the following section we dig deeper into the topic of property tax (in)equity and 
the criteria by which property tax systems can be evaluated. Property tax incidence is a 
concept that relates to the benefit and ability to pay principles. In this regard, property 
assessment remains the focal point of discussion. 
3.6.2  Debates on tax incidence 
The collection of recurrent taxes on property is often justified by the fact that local 
governments supply goods and services, ranging from those that are often regarded as 
public goods such as electricity and water, to those that are pure public goods by nature 
such as roads, police and libraries. In other words, property tax may be considered a 
quasi-charge for public services provided by local governments, which is reflected in 
the value of property. Local taxpayers are inevitably tied to the use of local services. 
The connection between types of services provided by local governments and the 
benefits to residents and property values justify the collection of the property tax 
(Fischel, 2001). 
Three strands of thought regarding property tax incidence have appeared in the 
literature: the traditional view, which asserts that property tax burdens borne by 
consumers fully translate to higher house prices; the benefit view, which argues that 
property tax is literally a user fees or payments for local public goods and services; and 
the capital view, which claims that the distortionary effects of property tax cause 
inefficient allocation of capital. 
The traditional view was first articulated by Simon (1943), and expanded upon by 
Netzer (1966). Using the partial equilibrium approach to analyse the housing market, 




of higher house prices. Assuming that the national return to capital is fixed, local 
capital in the long run can freely move between jurisdictions until after-tax return to 
capital equates to its national counterpart. This conclusion is opposed to the theory 
posited by Seligman (1910) that tax on value is separable into landowner’s and 
renter’s/occupier’s components while tax on gross rental is not. This, however, depends 
on the elasticity of demand for housing. If the demand for housing is inelastic then 
property tax burden is divided between landowner and occupier/renter in the ratio of 
the site value to improvement value (Pierson, 1912). 
More recently, debates have moved away from pure economic principles and 
towards practical aspects of property tax. Scholars who take the benefit view follow the 
renowned local government model of Tiebout (1956). He proposes that public service 
expenditures equate to the property tax paid by residents. Efficiency of local public 
services provision can be achieved if consumer-voters are fully mobile (voting ‘with 
their feet’ for alternative combinations of public services and tax levels) and there is 
competition between local governments. Under such assumptions, taxpayers tend to 
favour property taxes to other taxes because they can see explicitly how the property 
tax translates to the benefits received in return. 
Tiebout’s model was later extended by Hamilton (1975), who applied further 
restrictions in terms of zoning (land use restrictions). The model sorts individuals into 
local jurisdictions which are homogenous with respect to house values. Given definite 
housing and public service requirements, individuals usually match their demands by 
purchasing homes at the minimum value established by zoning constrains. The key 
assumption is that there is no subsidisation of public services to neighbour communities 
(by allowing people to pay more than minimum house value). This being the case, the 
model implies, people will move to the community that perfectly matches their 
demands for housing and public services, assuming absolute mobility of residents. 
Subsequently, Hamilton (1976) improved his model to better fit real life scenarios 
where house values in communities are heterogeneous regarding housing consumption. 
However, he assumes that homogenous communities still existed, which implies that it 
is unlikely for individuals to receive lower benefits than any property taxes paid. 
Hamilton asserts that, in long run equilibrium, property taxes would be perfectly 
capitalised into property values. This is the case where a relatively expensive home 




difference between property tax and benefits received. 
In their studies of the commercial and industrial property markets, Fischel (1975) 
and White (1975) confirm the existence of zoning and fiscal capitalisation posited by 
Hamilton (1975), and comprehensively includes land use regulations in their analyses. 
They argue that, in the long run, firms are mobile and will move until the marginal 
value of public services is equal to their tax payments in a jurisdiction. Fischel (1985) 
also points out that nearly every American municipality of any size has been clearly 
divided into zones, in which certain activities are allowed and some are prohibited. 
Although zoning laws cannot legally specify minimum values of new housing 
developments (in order to prevent adverse fiscal impact on existing residents), the 
matrix of lot-size, quantity and quality standards could indirectly determine the 
minimum value. 
On the contrary, the competing capital view—or the ‘new view’—considers 
property tax a distortionary tax that discourages improvements and causes 
underutilisation of land. As argued by Mieszkowski (1972), and subsequently 
confirmed by Zodrow (2001), assuming fixed capital stocks, capitals tend to be driven 
out from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions as a result of property tax 
differentials. In contrast to the benefits view, tax incidence in the capital tax view is 
relatively progressive because of the profit tax effect borne by local residents. The 
imposition of the property tax causes the outflow of capital, which leads to the rise of 
tax burden on local factor owners and local consumers. This implies that local residents 
tend to bear the full tax burden, which makes property tax progressive and 
redistributive. 
Mieszkowski and Zodrow (1989) criticise the model developed by Hamilton 
(1975), which was later extended by White (1975) and Fischel (1985), that zoning is 
too crude, either to limit the type of firms or residents that can enter each jurisdiction, 
or to impose minimum property requirement. Fischel (2001) argues that the critics 
underestimate the ability of local governments and communities to solve the free rider 
problem through exaction processes (see also Altshuler et al., 1993; Been, 1991). If 
zoning worked perfectly it would indeed be able to specify the taxable property for 
each new development, and, each new construction would ‘pay its own way in 
municipal costs’ (Fischel, 2001, p. 159). Exactions are usually in the form of side 




deficits resulting from new developments that fail to meet minimum tax base. In order 
to achieve this, however, local governments must have very precise tax data base and 
are able to accurately estimate future expenses. 
3.6.3  Evaluating the Property Tax System 
Tax systems can be evaluated based on a number of criteria depending on the objective 
of the tax. The types and designs of a tax affects the economy, markets and people’s 
behaviour in many ways. It is important to look at the actual purposes of a particular 
tax when assessing it. As a fiscal instrument, taxation can serve several policy 
objectives, which include allocation function, distribution function and stabilisation 
function (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989). All three functions should be analysed in 
order to estimate how well a property tax system works. However, if we are only 
interested in particular functions of the tax, it is also possible to analyse these functions 
separately. This largely depends on the availability of data and the time horizon. 
Each of the property tax functions are different in nature and require different 
evaluation approaches. In evaluating the allocative effect of property tax, there are two 
important questions that we must consider. First, how much the effective supply of 
property (including land) increases as a result of property tax? This concerns the levy 
of property tax on certain types of properties such as vacant and under-occupied 
properties, which should be taxed at a higher rate in order to eradicate excessive wealth 
accumulation, price volatility and economic rent. The second question is how much 
property tax is capitalised into property price? In this case, the property price 
mechanism operates under the assumption that the supply of property is inelastic, 
which means that an increase in property tax will decrease demand and lower prices, 
and vice versa (Sirmans et al., 2008). Therefore, we will consider property tax as a 
fiscal instrument that aims to regulate prices of certain properties in the market such as 
under-occupied properties and housing for people on low incomes. 
The distributive effect of property tax can be measured by how much income and 
wealth are transferred between different income or social groups. While it is quite 
difficult to track income and wealth transfer at a macro level, we can assume that local 
governments are capable at performing their jobs—by translating tax revenue to 
required local services—and instead estimate the level of actual revenue collected in 




Linn (1980) proposes a pioneering method of determining the level and growth of 
property tax revenues. In his model, the factors contributing to revenue performance 
are collection effect (as represented by collection ratio), statutory tax rate, tax 
exemptions and assessment practice (as represented by assessment ratio). 
Lastly, taxes on property stabilise the property market through their effects on price. 
Property tax performs as a user cost (or cost of ownership), which, if levied at 
progressive rates and appropriate level, can reduce price volatility in the property 
market in the long run. If the user cost is high enough, it will regulate the rate of return 
from property and thus keep growth in property price at a normal level. By comparing 
the UK with Denmark during the post-1996 period, Muellbauer (2005) claims that what 
helped Denmark avoid macroeconomic imbalances—excess house price and 
consumption growth, overvalued exchange rate, etc.—was its progressive property tax 
with market-related assessments, which was missing in the UK at the time. What 
causes imbalances in the economy as well as price volatility in the property market is 
the lack of a property tax that can maintain the user cost at a positive level over a long 
period. Econometric models that differentiate fundamental- from bubble-driven 
property price changes can be used to estimate the stabilisation performance of 
property tax (inter alia, Abraham and Hendershott, 1996; Muellbauer and Murphy, 
1997). Fundamental-driven changes can be estimated from factors such as earned 
income, interest rates and housing stock relative to population number (Muellbauer and 
Murphy, 1997). 
Even though the allocation and stabilisation functions directly concern the fairness 
of property tax, it is not possible to evaluate their effects in the short run, particularly at 
the early stage of a new tax implementation as is the case with Thailand. Therefore, this 
thesis focuses on the distribution function of property tax, which can be evaluated from 
the ability of the tax to finance local governments. As mentioned earlier, this can be 
done by analysing the capability of local governments to collect property tax, which 
includes these factors: tax receipts, tax liability, assessed values of taxed properties, and 
assessed and market values of taxable properties. But before we look any deeper into 
this, we should first consider ad valorem tax theories to understand the logic of how 
property tax is derived. 
As pointed out by Moore (2008), two strands of ad valorem tax theory arise from 




tax view, which considers property tax as an allocation mechanism for the costs of local 
services. Each property in a taxing jurisdiction should share in the costs proportionate 
to its value. In the normative theory, tax rate is defined as (Fischel, 2001; Merriman, 
1987; Moore, 2006; Netzer, 1966; Oldman and Aaron, 1965): 
𝑅𝑇𝐹𝑞  = 𝐿𝐹 𝐴𝑞⁄  (3.1) 
where 𝑅𝑇𝐹𝑞 is the required tax rate; 𝐿𝐹  is the aggregate levy for fund needed (F); and 
𝐴𝑞 is the aggregate assessed value for taxing unit q. 
Equation 3.1 is a simplified version of tax rate setting, which neglects certain rules 
and regulations as required by property tax legislation. Property tax for an individual 
property can be expressed as: 
𝑇𝑖  =  ∑ 𝑅𝑇𝐹
𝐹=1,ℎ
 × 𝐴𝑖 (3.2) 
where 𝑇𝑖 is the amount of property tax of the i
th property; 𝑅𝑇𝐹 is tax rate; and 𝐴𝑖 is 
assessed value (sometimes called assessed market value estimate) of the ith property. 
The descriptive theory of real property taxation adds more complexity to the 
normative theory to better reflect how property tax actually operates. The model for the 
theory can be expressed as (Bartle and Krane, 2004; Moore, 2008; Oates, 1999; Rosen, 
1992; Zodrow, 2001): 
𝐴𝑛 =  ∑ 𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖
𝑖=1,𝑛
 (3.3) 
where 𝐴𝑛 is aggregate net assessed value for all 𝑛 properties in the jurisdiction; and 
𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖 is net assessed value of property 𝑖, which can be expressed as: 
𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖 = [𝑀𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖] + ∑ (𝐸𝑖 + 𝐼𝐸)
𝑖,𝑗=1,𝑚
 (3.4) 
where 𝑀𝑖 is the actual market value of the i
th property; 𝑒𝑖 is the error term that accounts 
for errors from random factors, incorrect property descriptive data and assessment 
models; 𝐸𝑖 is the property tax exemption for the i
th property; and 𝐼𝐸  is the error in 




3.6.3.1  Evaluating distribution performance of property tax 
Property tax performance can be empirically measured against a set of legal and 
administrative factors—i.e. tax rate, tax base (valuation), collection capacity and 

















where 𝑇𝐶 is the tax revenue collected; 𝑀𝑉 is the market value of all taxable properties 
(tax base); 𝑇𝐿 is the statutory tax liability; 𝐴𝑉𝑇 is the assessed values of taxed 
properties; and 𝐴𝑉𝐴 is the assessed values of all properties. 
From Equation 3.5, the formula of the total tax revenue collected (actual tax 
receipts) can be expressed as: 












) 𝑀𝑉 (3.6) 
In words, Equation 3.6 translates into: 
Actual tax receipts = Collection ratio × Statutory tax rate × Coverage ratio × 
Assessment ratio × Tax base at market value 
Therefore, by dividing both sides of Equation 3.6 by the statutory tax base and tax 
base at market value, we will get the ratio of actual to potential tax receipts (Lewis, 

















Equation 3.7 shows the formulation of the ratio of actual to potential tax receipts, 
which is used by Lewis (2003) as a measure of administrative performance of property 
tax. In words, the equation translates into: 
Ratio of actual to potential tax receipts = Collection ratio × Coverage ratio 
×Assessment ratio 
Lewis (2003) compares results from urban and rural areas in Indonesia to find the 
cause of the under-performing property tax system. He found that valuations are the 




1997 of about 0.6. On average, the coverage and assessment ratios in the rural areas are 
lower than those in the urban areas, but the local governments in the rural areas could 
collect a higher proportion of tax receipts to total tax base. 
In Equation 3.7, the collection ratio is calculated from the values of actual tax 
collected over the total assessed values of property tax rolls. The ratio represents how 
efficient local governments are in raising revenue from property tax, which largely 
depends on billings, payments and enforcement. The coverage ratio is calculated from 
the assessed values of taxed and untaxed properties. It represents how much actual 
property tax base (assessments) can cover potential tax base (market values of all 
taxable properties), which has a direct influence on the quality of property tax rolls. 
Higher ratios mean the tax base is larger and better utilised. Lastly, the assessment ratio 
reflects how accurate the assessed values are compared to the market values. More 
accurate assessments would result in a higher ratio, with a ratio of one indicating that 
assessed values perfectly represent market values. Any ratios over one reflect over-
assessments and any ratios below one reflect under-assessments. 
A common cause of outdated and inaccurate assessments is that they are based on 
stocks of estimated values rather than on market prices derived from a flow of actual 
property transactions. Consequently, there have been growing concerns over the 
fairness of property tax. A major contributor to the problem is infrequent formal 
assessment of real property. Property assessment by market comparison approach is 
widely used in many countries because it acknowledges changes in national/local 
economies and distribution of property-related wealth (IAAO, 2010). As previously 
mentioned, property reassessment is politically unpopular and can be as challenging as 
tax introduction itself. The following section reviews studies that evaluate market-
based property tax systems in comparison with non-market ones. 
3.6.4  Assessment Performance: Market v/s Non-market Assessments 
An important distinction between the property tax and other taxes is the process by 
which tax base is determined. Property tax is largely based on assessed values. Two 
main assessment systems, market and non-market, have long been at the centre of the 
debates. Market value assessment estimates the market price that would be struck 
between a buyer and a seller under arm’s length negotiations. Assessed price can be 




income that the subject property can generate. Nonmarket value assessment refers to 
methods based on factors other than actual transaction prices such as property sizes, 
ages and other qualitative attributes of the subject property. 
Several studies have revealed that inequitable tax burdens are the result of 
deviations from full market value assessment approaches (Bowman and Butcher, 1986; 
Bowman and Mikesell, 1978; O’Sullivan et al., 1994; Sjoquist and Pandey, 2001). It 
has also been found that economic distortions within and among jurisdictions are the 
result of inequitable tax burdens caused by nonmarket assessment approaches such as 
the index-based approach, which is also widely used in property mortgage security 
valuations. This approach makes it possible for many countries to frequently update 
their property tax assessment database using multipliers calculated from a number of 
property sales. Properties are grouped into zones according to their location, types of 
use and other important characteristics. Each zone is then assigned with one multiplier, 
which determines how much assessed price can increase (or decrease). 
Most inter-jurisdictional studies have attempted to reveal spatial distribution of 
property tax burdens. In Taipei, an evaluation of the split-rate property tax system—in 
which land is taxed at a higher rate than improvements—reveals that spatial inequity is 
caused by the failure to reflect certain location-associated price-determining factors in 
assessment rules (Lin, 2010). Valuation practices have a significant influence on tax 
burdens, and assessment errors tend to create a gap between market forces and existing 
property tax legislations. 
Statistical analysis of the Israeli property tax system by Horne and Felsenstein 
(2010) suggests that the most important predictive variable of property tax is property 
sales value, followed by expenditure per capita. However, the weakest component of 
the assessment process is differential rates, which, it is claimed, are not diverse enough 
to reflect the immense range of property values. By expanding the differential rates 
within the same tax criteria, the relation between property value and expenditure has 
been improved. 
Moreover, there are several studies of the English council tax that attempt to 
estimate the fairness of property tax by determining the relationship between household 
income levels and property values. Contrary to the arguments presented by Kenway 
and Palmer (1999) and Muellbauer and Cameron (2000), Davies et al. (2007) found 




value, meaning that the Council Tax is vertically equitable and progressive, with the 
exception of higher tax burdens in the lower income group (£0-£100 to £200-£300 per 
week) and among couples and non-pensioners. 
In his intra-jurisdictional study, Payton (2012) found that inequity caused by market 
value assessment standards was somewhat similar to that caused by nonmarket 
assessment systems. He bases his argument on unexplained assessment errors that are 
closely associated with poor performance by assessors. In a study of value-based 
assessment systems by Krupa (2014), it was found that both horizontal and vertical 
equity can be maintained under conditions in which the property market is stable and 
liquid enough, and assessors have adequate skills to precisely derive actual market 
values. 
In addition, by comparing two cities, Shanghai and Chongqing, Bai et al. (2014) 
identify the opposite effects of property tax on housing prices. Their ordinary least 
squares (OLS) model puts more weight on the control cities than the treatment cities. 
The study shows that the property tax lowered home prices in Shanghai by 11 to 15 per 
cent, but spill-over effects from high-end to low-end property has caused property 
prices in Chongqing to increase by 10 to 12 per cent (Ibid.). 
3.6.5  The challenges of property tax reassessment 
While many methods for conceptualising property values exist, most countries do not 
frequently reassess property for taxation purposes. Property market value is the most 
appropriate basis for taxation but, as we have seen, spatial and qualitative criteria have 
taken its place. Accurate initial assessment (at the point of property tax introduction) 
alone is not enough to make property tax fair and efficient; periodic reassessments are 
essential as well. 
Apart from being politically unpopular, there are several problems that hinder 
frequent property reassessments. In Hungary and the Philippines, for example, 
problems concerning reassessment stem from lack of knowledge, expertise and 
resources in making sales comparisons. Also, the lack of integration between 
government agencies, particularly in cadastral and registry systems, is the main cause 
of obsolete assessments in many countries (Bird and Slack, 2004a). Literature suggests 




during housing (and perhaps economic) crises; and the interim adjustment by non-ad 





3.7  The Determinants of Housing Prices 
Countless studies, especially hedonic ones, have attempted to determine the 
relationships between certain variables that have positive and negative impact on 
housing prices in urban areas. Prominent variables that have positive correlation with 
housing prices include urban rail transport (Bae et al., 2003; Jenks, 2003; Nelson, 1992; 
Richardson and Jensen, 2008; Vichiensan et al., 2011), open and green space (Bark et 
al., 2011; Cho et al., 2009; Conway et al., 2010; Zou, 2015), school performance and 
proximity to school (Davidoff and Leigh, 2008; Des Rosiers et al., 2001; Ferrari and 
Green, 2013; Zahirovic-Herbert and Turnbull, 2008) and proximity to CBD (Adair et 
al., 1996; Chen and Hao, 2008; Xiao et al., 2016; Zou, 2015). Variables that have 
negative correlation with housing prices include spatial fragmentation of land use 
activities (Kuethe, 2012), and proximity to environmentally intrusive factors such as 
airport, incineration plant, or cell phone base stations (Brandt and Maennig, 2012; 
Cohen and Coughlin, 2008; Zhao et al., 2016). 
Housing value, like many other commodities, is determined by the value of its 
characteristics, which follows Lancaster's (1966) theory of consumer demand. Housing 
characteristics differ from those of other goods in that they are location specific. Their 
characteristics are shaped by the surrounding physical environment (Kuethe, 2012). 
This is probably why there has been a substantial body of research on the determination 
of the price impact of various land use activities on nearby properties. Munroe (2007) 
demonstrates that a variety of spatial factors that collectively influence property values 
are reflected in land markets. Therefore, it is more appropriate to assume that house 
price modelling should account for a large number of land use activities rather than just 
one or a few. In the remainder of this section, we will see that many of the variables 
cannot be conceived as having entirely positive or negative influence on housing prices. 
Other important considerations include various social, economic and geographical 
factors such as neighbourhood type and spatial dependence of random variables. 
Influence of these factors varies from city to city, and from country to country. A single 
variable may have different effects on different types of housing located in the same 
area. 
The presence of an urban rail transit system improves accessibility to properties. 
Impact of rail transit systems on housing values have been measured by innumerable 




systems have a positive impact on house prices and that homeowners directly benefit 
from improvement in transportation in terms of the decrease in commuting time and 
costs (Bajic, 1983; Vichiensan et al., 2011). However, the effects seem to vary in a 
number of ways. Focusing on neighbourhood level, Nelson (1992) found that elevated 
heavy-rail stations have a positive price impact on single-family homes in lower-
income neighbourhoods, but have negative effects in higher-income residential zones. 
The effects of an elevated rail service on housing price can be explained by a simple 
benefit-cost analysis, in which, for example, Nelson (1992) claims that noise, traffic, 
and other forms of nuisance associated with the elevated rail development offset the 
accessibility benefits in higher-income areas. In a study of Bangkok mobility systems, 
Richardson and Jensen (2008) argue that the BTS Sky Train is an iconic transit system 
that allows people to move seamlessly above the dangerous, polluted and congested 
city. This leads to an establishment of time value and a breakdown in the relationship 
between home and workplace (Richardson and Jensen, 2008). Empirical research 
shows that the Sky Train has a remarkably positive impact on residential property 
values but the price is less sensitive in high density business areas (Vichiensan and 
Miyamoto, 2010b; Wissink et al., 2005). 
Gatzlaff and Smith (1993) and Forrest et al. (1996) similarly conclude that 
announcements of new urban rail systems and proximity to rail transit stations have a 
weak relationship with house price growth. House price patterns do not seem to change 
much before and after rail developments. In contrast, Bae et al. (2003) assert that the 
subway line 5 in Seoul had significant positive effects on house prices but only prior to 
the opening, which confirms the impact of price speculation in the housing market. It 
was the Korean government’s policy of spreading public investments further from the 
CBD, aiming to expand benefits to the wider population, which has enhanced not only 
accessibility but has also increased employment and income distribution. A similar 
conclusion is drawn by So et al. (1997), whose study of Hong Kong housing markets 
reveals a strong positive relationship between house prices and service frequency of 
public transport, especially for middle income households. There are also a number of 
studies that attempt to quantify the effects of urban rail transport lines in terms of 
increased housing values and proximity to stations (Hess and Almeida, 2007; 




rail transport lines, which largely depend on land use types and frequency of trains or 
other characteristics of the lines. 
There is extensive literature that suggests that location and neighbourhood 
characteristics are significant determinants of house prices (inter alia, Cervero and 
Duncan, 2002; Diao and Ferreira, 2010; Vichiensan and Miyamoto, 2010a; Vichiensan 
et al., 2011). The direct definition of the term ‘location’ refers to the specific placement 
of a property. However, since a property’s location is fixed, what actually defines 
location are elements of the surroundings such as transport facilities, recreational 
centres and schools. These elements can be considered as neighbourhood 
characteristics. The quality of a location may be represented by variables such as 
distance to transport infrastructure (McDonald and McMillen, 1990), distance to the 
CBD (Dowall, 1992; Forrest et al., 1996), distance to schools, parks or other green 
spaces, and land use zoning (Lin and Hwang, 2004). Some studies chose region-
specific variables such as flooding (Aluko, 2011) or demographic attributes such as 
population density and median income (Brueckner and Kim, 2003; Malaitham et al., 
2013) as representative attributes of locational effects on property values. 
Open and green spaces have a significant positive impact on house prices in many 
ways, depending on the type and location of housing. It should first be clarified that the 
two terms should not be used interchangeably. Open space is ‘any open piece of land 
that is undeveloped—has no buildings or other built structures—and is accessible to the 
public’ (EPA, 2017). Examples of open space are green space, schoolyards, 
playgrounds, public seating areas, public plazas and vacant lots (Ibid.). Open spaces 
serve a wide range of needs, including recreation, aesthetics, wildlife habitat, and 
stormwater storage and filtration (Cho et al., 2009). By distinguishing between fixed 
(e.g. public parks and golf courses) and adjustable (e.g. agricultural land and vacant 
properties) land uses associated with open spaces, Smith et al., (2002) found that the 
adjustable type of open space tends to be more sensitive to market forces, and thus 
affected more by residential location choices. Most studies similarly concluded that 
homebuyers are willing to pay premiums for proximity to green space (Bark et al., 
2011; Conway et al., 2010), and prices of smaller residential units or apartments are 
more sensitive to such proximity, particularly to large parks (Czembrowski and 




value of proximity to greenway and parks increased over time, while the value of 
proximity to golf courses fell. 
Schools are also a major influence on house prices, and studies have explored 
numerous aspects of this relationship. Des Rosiers et al. (2001) confirm the importance 
of size and proximity of primary schools to house values, and determined the optimal 
school size to be in the 300-450 pupil range and the optimal distance to be between 300 
and 500 metres. Davidoff and Leigh (2008) and Ferrari and Green (2013) similarly 
found the strong influence of both primary and secondary school performance on house 
prices, which is also in line with school tuition costs. Additional aspects of house prices 
were tested by Zahirovic-Herbert and Turnbull (2008) who found that not only housing 
selling price but also housing marketability—as reflected by selling time or liquidity—
are affected by changes in school quality. Decreasing school quality tends to result in 
lower marketability of housings in the vicinity. The findings imply that families with 
school-age children make more than one decision when it comes to home purchasing. 
Apart from the decision about housing investment, they also have to consider, at the 
least, the long-term costs of education embedded in house prices, which Zahirovic-
Herbert and Turnbull (2008) referred to as human capital investment. 
Living in close proximity to the CBD means residents gain from greater 
accessibility to employment opportunities. This is reflected in shorter commuting time 
as suggested by the Alonso-Muth-Mills theory. As residents move farther from the 
centre, they face higher commuting costs, which vary according to the slope of the bid-
rent curve. A number of the aforementioned studies on the influence of urban rail 
transport have confirmed the increasing importance of the proximity to stations 
especially for housings closer to the CBD. Two empirical hedonic studies in China 
confirmed the theory. Chen and Hao (2008) asserts that housing prices in Shanghai 
vary according to price gradient, the pattern of which varies substantially in different 
directions from the CBD. In Chengdu, Zou (2015) discovered that housing prices 
decrease with distance from the CBD and walking distance from underground stations. 
He also noted the positive impact of larger floor space, good decoration and green 
space on prices. The findings are interesting in that larger floor space implies greater 
distance from the CBD, and this could confirm the bid-rent theory that housing prices 
drop at a decreasing rate with distance from the CBD—or it may be that certain 




this regard, the housing market may be considered a set of distinctive submarkets 
arising from structural and locational attributes (Adair et al., 1996). Zou's (2015) 
findings also suggest that property tax rates for units with a larger floor space should be 
higher than those for a smaller one. 
Attributes considered to have negative impact on housing prices largely concern 
neighbourhood, area or urban form. Urban sprawl is often referred to as a negative 
attribute, but this may not be completely valid. In a hedonic price analysis, Kuethe 
(2012) found that spatial fragmentation and neighbourhood land use diversity in the 
city of Milwaukee have various impact on housing prices. At low levels of spatial 
fragmentation, there is a positive return to size of housings, yet housing values tend to 
be positively associated with spatial fragmentation at high levels. Other attributes 
considered to have definite negative impact on housing prices include proximity to 
places causing externalities and environmental hazards. Studies have attempted to 
quantitatively measure effective distance and price change as a result of negative 
impact. Cohen and Coughlin (2008) estimated that houses located in areas affected by 
airport noise pollution—as defined by a day-night sound level of 70-75 decibels—are 
normally sold 20.8 per cent less than unaffected houses. In a study of the negative 
effects of incineration plants in Hangzhou, China, Zhao et al. (2016) claim that the 
percentage decrease in initial listing prices of houses located within three kilometres of 
the plants is up to 25.9 per cent. The results are based on over 500 high-rise residential 
units. Similar measurements were performed by Brandt and Maennig (2012) on the 
proximity to cell phone base stations. They found that, in Hamburg, houses located 





3.8  Reforming Property Tax 
Property tax reform is often politically unpopular, but it is much needed in many 
countries. Many property tax systems have not been reformed for several decades, not 
because such a process is unnecessary but because it is difficult to carry out. What we 
will see in this section is the experience of some emerging economies in property tax 
reform attempts, from which analysis and recommendations are drawn. The reasons for 
undertaking property tax reform seem to vary from country to country, depending on 
the structure of property tax systems. Common rationales for reform are the 
requirements for higher tax yield, higher assessment accuracy and improvements in 
administration. (Bahl et al., 2010; Dillinger, 1991; Rosengard, 2012). However, several 
characteristics of property tax that are desirable in theory have often proved difficult to 
achieve in practice. This presents a profound dilemma for the reform of property tax, 
which Rosengard (2012, p. 2) calls ‘the tax everyone loves to hate’, and claims that: 
• While the high number of statutory taxpayers creates a large 
tax base, a good thing in theory, it can be a political and 
administrative nightmare in practice; 
• While the tax’s high visibility is good for government 
transparency and accountability, heightened taxpayer 
awareness also tends to intensify taxpayer resistance; 
• While computer-assisted mass appraisal and other 
applications of appropriate technology increase 
administrative efficiency and effectiveness, property 
valuation nevertheless still has a contentious subjective 
component; 
• While the tax is seen as fair in general, there is no direct 
relationship between tax liability and ability to pay the tax, 
which leaves some taxpayers ‘asset rich but cash poor’;  
• While the tax supports local government autonomy, it can 
also worsen regional disparities in wealth, as the ‘rich get 
richer and the poor get poorer’; 
• While citizens might accept the tax in principle, there is still 




proceedings, sometimes seen as a threat to the sanctity of the 
home. 
Property tax reform can take various forms: legal, assessment, rate, administrative, 
or a comprehensive overhaul covering all aspects of the tax. In general, however, 
reform can be categorised into two main approaches: data-led and collection-led (see 
Figure 3.1). The data-led approach focuses on the improvement of the property tax 
roll—i.e. identification and valuation, while the collection-led approach emphasises 
more on the administrative functions of the property tax system—i.e. assessment, 
billing, collection and enforcement (Rosengard, 2012). The latter approach is, however, 
claimed to be more successful in many countries, especially in emerging economies, 
because it encourages the facilitation of voluntary compliance (Franzsen and 
McCluskey, 2005; Kelly, 1995), and is less prone to be front-loaded with many 
financial and political costs (Rosengard, 2012). 
 
Figure 3.1 Approaches to property tax reform (Source: Rosengard, 2012, p. 11) 
Moreover, it should be noted that, in this context, there is a clear distinction 
between ‘valuation’ and ‘assessment’. The valuation function, as part of the data-led 
approach, concerns the preparation of property tax rolls. This mainly includes official 
property records—i.e. cadastre, taxable status, valuation date, etc.—based on either 
jurisdictional or national assessment rules or both. In Thailand, for example, property 
tax rolls are based on national assessed values and rules, but are maintained by local 




are derived. Specifically, it is an approximation of property values to form a base for 
property taxation. The tax base is used by other functions including valuation and 
billing. 
However, the structure of the data- and collection-led approaches must not be 
confused with the structure of property tax systems. The process flow of property tax 
systems differs from the diagram shown in Figure 3.1 in terms of sequences. Although 
it may appear that the valuation function is based on the assessment function, in reality 
they reciprocally benefit each other. Particularly in a centralised system, the assessment 
of property requires detailed and accurate valuations (property data records), and the 
accuracy of property tax valuations largely depends on the accuracy of assessments. 
The scope of the valuation function is in fact broader than that of the assessment 
function as it translates tax laws and regulations into actual implementation of tax rates, 
and calculates taxable values by incorporating them with assessments (tax base). The 
valuation function also includes the survey of property information such as land use, 
building type, road width, etc. Apart from property identification, all other functions 
rest upon the valuation and assessment functions. 
3.8.1  A tale of two cities 
Despite many challenges, property tax reform has in fact been a global phenomenon 
during the past three decades. In Asia, some of the early property tax reform attempts 
took place in the Philippines in 1972 and in Indonesia in 1986. In the Philippines, the 
Real and Property Tax Administration Project (RPTA) marks an important initiative for 
sustainable improvements in property tax administration through the application of 
low-cost mapping and assessment techniques. According to Dillinger (1988), the 
Philippines’ solution for obsolete and inaccurate tax bases was the adoption of 
minimum standards for mapping and assessment. This involved the delineation of land 
parcels to a degree that could permit subsequent identification and to obtain area data 
needed for assessment. A simple mass appraisal technique was used to derive 
assessments from a small number of property characteristics. 
The new system allowed the Philippine government to minimise the use of costly 
resources—i.e. experienced assessors, engineers and other technical personnel—by 
using local assessors/staff, newly engineering graduates and casual labour (Ibid.). 
Property tax revenue increased from 178 million pesos in 1972 to 270 and 385 million 




revenues increased from 13 per cent in 1972 to 17 and 20 per cent in 1973 and 1974 
(Rosengard, 1997, p. 73). The reform effort was deemed successful in utilising low cost 
tools to achieve higher yield of local revenue through the improvement of property 
assessments and coverage. However, there has been a failure to sustain this level of 
revenue performance in the long run. The importance of property tax as a local revenue 
source reduced continuously from 23 per cent in the 1980s to 18 per cent in 1990 and 
13 per cent in 2000 (Guevara, 2004). The proportion of real property tax to total tax 
revenue also decreased from 2.6 per cent in 1999 to 2.1 per cent in 2007 (OECD, 
2020). 
In Indonesia, an overhaul of the property tax system began with the introduction of 
the Land and Building Tax (Pajak Bumi dan Bangunan, or PBB) in 1986, as part of a 
comprehensive tax reform, to replace a complex tax system called Ipeda. The Ipeda 
system suffered from obsolete tax rolls based on ad hoc updating of property data, and 
disjointed property tax legislation consisting of seven different land tax ordinances with 
different and overlapping tax bases (Booth, 1974). Ipeda consolidated too many types 
of taxes ranging from agricultural produce to improved and unimproved land, making it 
a very complicated tax to administer and also generating equity and efficiency 
problems (Government of Indonesia, 1985). 
The implementation of the Land and Building Tax (PBB) simplified the property 
tax system and broadened the tax base by curtailing inappropriate tax exemptions 
(Kelly, 1993). Immediately following the legal reform was a major administrative 
reform in 1988, which aimed at strengthening collection and enforcement. The reform 
resulted in a significant increase in property tax revenue from 16 per cent between 1984 
and 1987 to 20 per cent between 1987 and 1990 (annually in absolute terms), but since 
then the growth rate reduced gradually to 8.5 per cent annually between 1996 and 1999 
(Kelly, 1993, 2003). The increase in revenue mostly went to provincial government 
(level 1) rather than regional (sometimes referred to as local) government (level 2). It 
was evident that the proportion of provincial government’s property tax revenue to total 
revenue increased from 2.1 per cent in 1987 to 10.8 per cent in 1999, while that of local 
governments remained the same at just above 10 per cent during the same period 
(Kelly, 2003). This enabled provincial governments to rely less on central government 





The key difference between the two cases was that Indonesia adopted the 
collection-led approach while the Philippines was inclined more towards the data-led 
approach. What insights can we draw regarding which is the more effective approach, 
particularly for emerging economies? The growth in property tax revenue after the 
reform in Indonesia was indeed remarkable but evidence suggests that it was largely 
spurred by a rapid growth in the mining and urban sectors, from which property tax 
was collected by a small number of sub-national governments (Lewis, 2003). The 
revenue contribution of mining and urban sectors increased from 8 and 10 per cent of 
total revenues in 1969 to 55 and 22 per cent in 1991, while the revenue contributed by 
the rural sector declined from 75 per cent in 1969 to only 13 per cent in 1991 (Kelly, 
2003, p. 1). The sectoral shift and the change in valuation system for mining-related 
properties have caused a spatial concentration of property tax revenues in Indonesia. 
Furthermore, after the property tax reform in Indonesia, authority over major tax 
bases was retained by central and sub-national governments. Regional governments 
had, and still have, limited power over major and new tax bases, which means their 
property tax revenues vary significantly. Kelly (1993, p. 91) asserts that in 1990 an 
average collection per property in two of the largest cities—Jakarta and Surabaya—was 
73,793 rupiahs, compared with an average of between 2,616 and 9,200 rupiahs per 
property for all other Indonesian cities. This reflects the problem of narrow and uneven 
geographical distribution of tax base. The collection-led strategy was mostly effective 
in areas where the payment point system (SISTEP)4 was in place. The reform had 
almost no effect on the revenue structure of the regional governments, who still rely 
heavily on grants from the central government—i.e. almost 80 per cent of their total 
revenues (Kelly, 2003). A key takeaway from both cases is that a partial property tax 
reform can hardly generate sustainable revenue yield for the lowest tiers of government 
in the long run. Also necessary are the devolution of property tax, limitation of the 
central grant transfer system and improvement in transparency and public 
understanding. 
 
4 The payment point system or SISTEP is a collection system designed to simplify and facilitate property 
tax payment with pre-designated banks located near the tax object serving as payment points; uniform 
due date; pre-printed matching bills and receipts; stramlined records and reports; and a computer-
generated delinquency list with which to initiate credible enforcement proceedings (Kelly, 1993; 




There is much discussion on the underuse of property tax potential (Dye and 
England, 2010; Engelmann et al., 2015; Government of the Philipines, 2019; 
McCluskey and Trinh, 2013). The devolution of property tax has been widely claimed 
to be a fundamental factor for a sustainable increase in local revenue generation. 
Engelmann et al. (2015) confirm that land and building tax revenues in Indonesia grew 
significantly between 2011 and 2013 when the decentralization of property tax 
collection took place, from 8.83 to 27.23 per cent annually (nominal). The basic 
conditions for maximising the capacity of recurrent property tax are the strength of 
human resources and ICT infrastructure (Engelmann et al., 2015; Gomez, 2010), the 
accuracy of property data and assessment, and a valuation system that is less rigid and 
more accountable (Government of the Philipines, 2019; Youngman and Malme, 2001). 
If these conditions are met it is likely that the devolution of property tax will strengthen 
local governments in terms of property tax collection. 
3.8.2  Recommendations for reform 
Potential results of a successful property tax reform are an increase in local revenue, an 
improvement in fiscal performance, and a reduction in inequities, as well as 
administrative and compliance costs in the tax system (Slack and Bird, 2014). 
However, in practice, it is unusual for property tax reform policies to achieve all of the 
above results. As we saw in the cases of Indonesia and the Philippines, no policy 
decision was able to improve the property tax system in all aspects. Policymakers are 
always faced with difficult choices of: which functions of the property tax system 
require the most attention; what is the appropriate sequence of policies; and when to 
implement each policy? The major causes of reform failure are limited resources and 
political resistance. For these reasons, the determination of appropriate reform 




Table 3.4 Strategies for property tax reform 
Issues and problems Promising approaches Problematic approaches 
Salience: Improvement in local services Property tax capping 
Property tax is highly visible Increase payment options Assessment limits 
Liquidity constraints: Tax deferrals for disadvantaged groups Property tax capping 
Tax burdens do not reflect the ability to pay Phase-in Assessment limits 
Perceived regressivity: Property tax credits Banding assessment system 
Higher tax on low-income householders Tax deferrals Assessment limits 
Volatility: More frequent reassessment Property tax capping 
Potentially large swing in tax burdens Communication in understandable form Assessment limits 
Presumptive tax: Efficient and accessible appeal process Self-assessment system 
Tax base is inherently arbitrary Phase-in Classified property tax rates 
Inelasticity: Improvement in tax zoning Banding assessment system 
Limited tax base (for local governments) More frequent reassessment  
Source: Adapted from Slack and Bird (2014, p. 22) 
As shown in Table 3.4, strategies for property tax reform can be divided into two 
main categories: economic and political. Economic reasons for reform stem from the 
inefficiency and inequity of property tax, which concerns tax structure. In this regard, 
the two important aspects are tax base and rate, as they directly affect local revenue and 
the distribution of tax burdens. For example, if tax base is defined by political 
boundaries, each local government tends to have access to a limited number of taxable 
properties, which may vary by type and value. One option for reform is to change tax 
zoning from a politically defined one to a system better suited to the size of tax base. 
Inequities in property tax systems can be improved by more frequent reassessment and 
appropriate design of tax rate structure. The more accurate the tax base, the more tax 
rate structure can work as it is intended to—i.e. progressive tax rates cause more 
progressive tax liability if imposed on accurately assessed prices than on regressive 
ones. 
Political reasons for property tax reform often concern the visibility of property tax, 
which causes resistance from taxpayers and difficulties in improving the tax system. A 
key reform strategy is that local governments must ensure that tax revenue is efficiently 
spent, and that local expenditure is transparent. If the link between property tax and 
local benefits can be established, it is less likely that taxpayers will avoid payments. 
Moreover, local governments can increase payment options for property tax—e.g. 
online banking, direct debit, deduction at source, etc.—to make it more convenient for 
taxpayers. Improved payment methods will increase tax revenue and decrease 




3.9  Conclusion 
The range of literature reviewed so far has covered the functions of the property tax 
system and key concepts of equity in property taxation. The fact that the property tax 
systems are difficult to administer in practice and inherently unfair is perhaps 
inevitable, but the efforts to improve the systems can still benefit from the formulation 
of new theories and policies. This thesis has reviewed the evaluations of the property 
assessment system, the analyses of uneven distribution of tax incidence and inequities 
produced by anomalies in property tax systems. It has also reviewed the cases of the 
Philippines and Indonesia, which employed contrary approaches in property tax reform. 
Most of the literature has established firm foundations for the analysis of property tax 
in terms of ways to improve assessment processes, and the development of effective tax 
designs and tax administration. However, this research aims to contributes further by 
identifying the relationship between property assessment problems and spatial patterns 
of urban developments, particularly in areas where complex and diverse land uses are 
ubiquitous like Bangkok. 
There are two important grounds on which property tax system can be evaluated: 
equity and efficiency. On the equity ground, tax incidence can be justified by the 
benefit and the ability to pay principle. On the efficiency ground, a tax system should 
be designed and operated in a way that minimises administration costs and economic 
distortions. However, the design of the property tax structure is complex due to certain 
characteristics of the property themselves. Properties can be either wealth, investment 
or production factors, depending on how they are utilised. As property tax is collected 
from the stock of estimated values, there needs to be standardised, fair systems of value 
assessment in place. Therefore, this thesis mainly focuses on the equity aspect of the 
property tax system. The ability to pay principle mentioned in Chapter 2 has been at the 
centre of the analysis in this chapter. The criteria for the ability to pay is, however, not 
the income of property owners but the market value of property. 
Regarding the analysis of property tax incidence, there are three issues that need to 
be considered carefully. First, to justify geographic and demographic distributions of 
property tax burdens, we should establish a clear understanding of the relationship 
between property values, household characteristics and urban development patterns. 
Second, assessment quality is a pressing issue that has direct impact on fairness and 




analytical frameworks in this regard. Vertical inequities arise when tax liability for 
owners of higher priced properties are lower than those of lower priced properties, 
which is often the case with under-assessed properties and in the absence of progressive 
tax rates. Horizontal inequities arise when owners of properties with similar values 
have different tax liability. The primary cause for this problem is assessment 
inaccuracy. Lastly, the identification of assessment bias at neighbourhood levels can 
contribute to the rectification of common inaccuracies in assessment systems. Property 
assessment accuracy matters because it directly affects tax liability of property 
owners/occupiers. The literature suggests that the analysis should be carried out 
comprehensively at both global and local levels for the results to be meaningful. If 
assessment problems can be detected at neighbourhood levels, it is more likely that 
assessment systems can improve faster. 
Tax reform is inevitable in any attempt to make property tax systems more efficient 
and equitable. Property tax reform in practice has been proved difficult in many 
countries as it is often politically unpopular. There are good economic and political 
reasons for reform, each of which requires different strategies. As the two examples 
showed, when property tax reforms are carried out properly, the results are very 
significant improvements in revenue generation and tax base expansion. Property tax 
reforms may be data- or collection-led, and the literature indicated that the latter 
approach is more efficient as in the case of Indonesia. In essence, for appropriate 
reform strategies to be formulated, it is important that local governments are aware of 
the nature of the tax base in their jurisdictions—i.e. property type and value 
compositions—and make every effort to ensure that tax administration is transparent. 
Economic reasons for tax reform are largely associated with the improvements of tax 
assessments. Without an accurate tax base, it is difficult to achieve progressive 
distribution of tax burdens even though tax rates are progressive. 
In the following chapter we will introduce the case study area of Bangkok and 
discuss the political and tax systems in Thailand. Bangkok is the capital of Thailand 
and it is by far the biggest and most populated city in the country. Its urban structure 






Chapter 4  Case Study Area 
This chapter provides the background to the empirical study of this research. The first 
section discusses the structure of local authorities in Thailand, which are the collectors 
of property tax. Section 4.2 gives an overview of the geographical features of Bangkok 
and the patterns of urban transport infrastructures. Section 4.3 explains the structure of 
the tax system in Thailand, followed by a narrative on property tax evolution in 
Thailand from Section 4.4 to 4.5. Finally, in Section 4.6, the chapter concludes with 
analysis of the assessment practice in Thailand, which forms a fundamental part of the 
Land and Building Tax base. 
In discussing Thailand’s property tax system, this thesis focuses on the residential 
property market in Bangkok, which represents the ubiquitous spread of various patterns 
of land use and neighbourhood quality. Under the previous property tax system in 
Thailand, residential properties were liable to two types of recurrent property taxes: the 
Building and Land Tax and the Council Tax—which some writers refer to as ‘Land 
Development Tax’. Building and Land Tax is imposed on the actual rental value of 
investment properties (rental housing) and covers the values of both land and 
improvements. The tax was collected annually at the rate of 12.5 per cent of the gross 
rental value. The Council Tax is based on assessed value of land (also known as 
‘medium value’) without any account being taken of improvements thereon. The new 
tax, called Land and Building Tax, has been used in place of the two recurrent property 
taxes. It is specifically designed to be more comprehensive in terms of tax base, in 
which all types of land uses will be included, and to be more complex in terms of tax 





4.1  Public administration in Thailand 
Thailand is organised into 76 provinces and two special administrative regions (BMA 
and Pattaya City). Prior to a reorganisation in 1999, Thailand maintained a centralised 
administrative system in which the government was divided into three management 
levels: central, provincial, and local administration. However, after the implementation 
of the 1997 Constitution and the 1999 Decentralisation Act, Thailand saw a major 
structural change to local government, which resulted in a two-tier public 
administration system that consists of central and overlapped structures of local 
governments. 
At the local level, there are two seemingly parallel systems: provincial and local 
administrations (see Figure 4.1). At the lower administrative level, the two systems 
differ in terms of management, as the local administration has more autonomy than the 
provincial administration. At the executive level, however, the administrative power of 
both systems seem to be strictly limited by the central government through governing 
bodies of the Ministry of Interior (Department of Local Administration, 2016). As of 
2016, there are 14,557 local authorities, of which the number of local administration 
exceeds that of provincial administration because the sub-district administrative 


































Table 4.1 Local authority in Thailand 
Local Administration  
Provincial administrative organisations (PAOs) 76 
Municipalities 2,440 
Sub-district administrative organisations (SAOs) 5,335 
Special administrative regions 2 
Total 7,853 









Source: Department of Local Administration (2016) 
In the provincial administration system, the central government has branch offices 
at provincial, district and sub-district level. Provincial governors are appointed by the 
cabinet to serve as representatives of the central government. The district and sub-
district offices are administered by appointed representatives (from the Ministry of 
Interior) who are responsible for the delivery of centrally administered services and the 
provision of certain functions such as disaster management and local economic 
development. However, they do not have authority over property tax administration. 
In the local administration system, each province has one provincial administrative 
organisation (PAO) and a number of municipalities and sub-district administrative 
organisations (SAOs) depending on their population size/density and revenue raising 
capacity. Municipalities are generally bigger and more densely populated than SAOs, 
and usually located in the town centre of each region. All of these local authorities have 
directly elected councils and executive committees, and indirectly elected council 
chairs. Additionally, BMA and Pattaya City are the two special administrative regions 
that have their governors elected every four years. 
According to the Decentralisation Act 1999, local administrative organisations 
(LAOs) play an important role in delivering local services (over 150 functions). LAOs 
operate under either a one-tier system (BMA and Pattaya city council) or a two-tier 
system (PAOs, municipalities and SAOs). At every tier, there is a division of the 
legislative function from the executive function. At all levels (provincial, municipality 
and sub-district), every local authority has a panel of councilors who are responsible for 
enacting bylaws and electing a chief executive. This distinction has given the local 
authorities in the one- and two-tier systems more administrative power and autonomy 




However, the coexistence of PAOs and LAOs leads to costly administration and 
inefficient management (World Bank, 2012). In practice, relations between provincial 
and local government are complex and confusing due to the overlapping supervising 
and financing roles of both institutions. For instance, despite LAOs having the 
authority to plan their own budget, an approval from the provincial government is still 
required. However, the case of BMA is dissimilar in that it is a special administrative 





4.2  The Geography of Bangkok 
Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) refers to BMA and its surrounding provinces: 
Pathum Thani, Samut Prakan, Samut Sakhon, Nontaburi and Nakhon Pathom. 
‘Bangkok’ in this study refers to BMA, which is governed by Bangkok Metropolitan 
Administration (shown in Figure 4.2 and 4.3). Bangkok is the capital and the most 
populous city of Thailand. The city encompasses a total area of 1,583 square 
kilometres. The main topographical feature of Bangkok is the Chao Phraya River which 
crosses the city from the north to the southeast. The east side of the river is called ‘Phra 
Nakhon’ and the west side is called ‘Thon Buri’. 
Bangkok Metropolitan Administration is a special administrative organisation that 
overlooks 50 boroughs of Bangkok (BMA). The largest borough is Nongjok (number 3 
in Figure 4.2), which lies to the east of Bangkok covering an area of 236.26 square 
kilometres, and the smallest borough is Sampanthawong (number 13 in Figure 4.2), 
which lies at the heart of the old town on the east bank of the river covering an area of 
1.42 square kilometres. Bangkok has long been the centre of what Gugler (1996) 
describes as ‘temporary migration’. People from other provinces and neighbouring 
countries migrate to Bangkok for employment opportunities but still have strong bonds 
with their families back home, which makes Bangkok one of the busiest cities in 
Southeast Asia. Various types of land use and complex residential zones within 
Bangkok make it an ideal case for testing spatial distribution of housing prices. 
The east bank of the river is, for the most part, more developed than the west bank. 
The CBD, major shopping centres, and most political and important institutions are all 
located in the east side of Bangkok. Most of them are concentrated in the six following 
boroughs: Phra Nakhon, Pom Prap Sattru Phai, Samphanthawong, Pathum Wan, Bang 
Rak and Sathorn (number 1, 8, 13, 7, 4 and 28 in Figure 4.2 respectively). There are 
two international airports. Opened in 1914, Don Mueang is Bangkok’s first 
international airport situated in the northern suburbs of BMA. The airport is on the 




Suvarnabhumi International Airport (situated to the southeast of Bangkok in Samut 





Figure 4.2 Location of Bangkok (BMA) and its boroughs (Source: BMA, 2017b) 




In the past, Bangkok was a canal and river city. Waterways had been the main 
means of transport until the early 1850s when the government implemented 
modernisation programmes which emphasised expanding the road network (Bae and 
Suthiranart, 2003). Since 1960, as a result of continuous rural-urban migration, 
inexorable rise in car ownership and fragmented configuration of the road network, 
Bangkok has faced with serious traffic congestion. Canals were filled to facilitate 
further expansion of the road network. Between 1980 and 1990, when canal filling 
could no longer help reduce traffic congestion, the government approved the 
construction of the expressway system. During the sixth National Economic and Social 
Development Plan (1987-91), more than half of public investment in solutions for 
traffic and transportation problems was spent on the construction of the expressway 
system (NESDB, 1987). 
While sizeable funds had been invested in road infrastructure, urban rail transport 
did not receive much attention from the government (before the late 1990s). Prior to 
that period, State Railway of Thailand (SRT) had operated on very few routes and 
stations, and the trains ran infrequently. In 2000, the first two lines of Bangkok Mass 
Transit System (BTS) or ‘sky train’ were introduced (part of the dark and light green 
lines in Figure 4.4). The BTS is a faster, more frequent and more punctual elevated 
urban rail service. In 2006, the first line of underground train (Metropolitan Rapid 
Transit—MRT) began to operate (part of the blue line). Together, these three city rail 
transport routes are 34.5 kilometres long, and run from the centre to the north (Phya 
Thai, Chatuchak and Bang Sue), to the south (Phra Khanong and Bang Na), and to the 
west just across the river (Klong San). In 2010, the Airport line began to operate, which 
linked Suvarnabhumi Airport and several eastern suburbs to the heart of Bangkok 
(Phya Thai station). It takes 30 minutes (6 stops) to travel from Suvarnabhumi Airport 
to downtown, compared to 45-60 minutes travel time by car. The four lines give access 
to and between commercial downtown areas and a few suburbs, but have neglected 
significantly populated residential areas of Bangkok. 
Later in 2016, part of the purple line was opened to cover another 23 kilometres (16 
stations), connecting the old town area (Hua Lamphong and Chinatown) to the northern 
borough of Bang Sue. The rest of the urban rail transport lines shown in the map are 




connects to Don Mueang Airport, and some elements are still in the pipeline (the 
yellow and brown lines, not shown in the map). 
 
Table 4.2 shows detailed characteristics of all 50 boroughs of BMA. Overall, the 
smallest borough, Samphanthawong, with an area of 1.39 square kilometres, is the most 
densely developed area. The development density in Samphanthawong is 5,302 units 
per square kilometres, which is 35 per cent higher than that of the second most densely 
developed borough, Pom Prap Sattru Phai, with the figure of 3,450 units per square 
kilometres. 20 out of the 50 boroughs have a property density higher than BMA’s 
average of 1,997 units per square kilometre, and 15 of those are located on the east side 
of the river. Pom Prap Sattru Phai and Samphanthawong are also the most densely 
populated boroughs, with a population density of just over 20,000 residents per square 
kilometre. At the other extreme, the least densely developed and populated boroughs 
are Nong Chok and Lad Krabang, both of which are located on the eastern fringe of the 
city. The number of property units in Nong Chok, for example, is only 8 per cent of 
that in Samphanthawong. 
  























Bang Bon  35.86   104,768   11   8   2,922   51,629   5,302  
Bang Kapi  27.59   148,645   28   11   5,388   55,946   3,450  
Bang Khae  47.89   192,276   47   12   4,015   87,394   3,220  
Bang Khen  40.96   188,252   74   5   4,596   80,440   3,159  
Bang Kho Leam  8.31   96,422   29   7   11,600   22,910   3,029  
Bang Khun Thian  122.21   161,642   49   16   1,323   96,650   2,991  
Bang Na  18.95   97,039   40   7   5,121   31,775   2,965  
Bang Plat  11.80   100,319   46   11   8,498   27,619   2,913  
Bang Rak  4.01   46,087   16   5   11,486   12,922   2,845  
Bang Sue  12.89   135,001   50   7   10,477   36,662   2,756  
Bangkok Noi  12.32   120,032   43   15   9,740   33,568   2,724  
Bangkok Yai  6.30   73,864   34   6   11,728   18,836   2,587  
Bueng Kum  23.40   146,197   41   8   6,246   60,545   2,536  
Chatuchak  32.66   161,409   41   7   4,943   55,058   2,495  
Chom Thong  23.17   158,646   53   11   6,848   51,674   2,435  
Din Dang  8.47   131,847   22   3   15,574   26,746   2,340  
Don Mueang  36.69   166,210   81   6   4,530   58,269   2,244  
Dusit  11.33   108,815   45   9   9,604   8,893   2,230  
Huai Khwang  16.32   77,720   25   3   4,762   27,201   2,202  
Khan Na Yao  25.38   87,169   39   2   3,434   42,172   2,028  
Klong Sam Wa  120.18   165,352   73   18   1,376   102,160   1,964  
Klong San  5.97   77,471   44   7   12,986   17,687   1,948  
Klong Toei  13.24   110,481   41   4   8,344   17,369   1,921  
Lad Krabang  128.63   160,850   60   20   1,251   83,074   1,908  
Ladprao  21.27   122,180   32   6   5,745   53,070   1,825  
Lak Si  22.67   111,120   73   6   4,902   43,552   1,779  
Min Buri  61.12   136,236   62   13   2,229   58,786   1,758  
Nong Chok  240.45   154,371   87   37   642   107,208   1,753  
Nong Kheam  36.20   148,298   71   6   4,096   61,343   1,744  
Parthum Wan  8.03   54,996   16   8   6,846   5,880   1,694  
Phasi Charoen  19.18   130,493   54   13   6,803   43,050   1,686  
Phra Khanong  13.58   94,482   45   4   6,958   33,064   1,677  
Phra Nakhon  5.36   58,771   21   11   10,963   11,804   1,667  
Phya Thai  9.21   73,533   29   1   7,980   16,151   1,662  
Pom Prap Sattru Phai  2.50   52,093   15   4   20,803   8,639   1,634  
Prawet  53.73   158,457   41   16   2,949   77,667   1,588  
Rat Burana  12.33   87,841   28   6   7,122   21,681   1,568  
Ratchathewi  7.17   72,900   25   4   10,171   12,500   1,539  
Sai Mai  43.61   185,987   69   9   4,265   77,596   1,487  
Samphanthawong  1.39   28,001   19   3   20,102   7,385   1,446  
Saphan Sung  28.07   88,918   28   6   3,168   44,017   1,440  
Sathorn  7.26   86,214   25   2   11,877   21,147   1,312  
Suanluang  24.11   115,419   46   8   4,786   45,998   1,167  
Taling Chan  35.77   106,786   43   16   2,986   53,193   962  
Thawi Watthana  51.73   75,460   13   6   1,459   60,372   850  
Thon Buri  8.46   121,539   45   17   14,363   25,632   791  
Thung Kru  32.95   115,823   30   8   3,515   50,706   785  
Vadhana  13.00   80,847   17   8   6,221   25,315   732  
Wang Thong Lang  17.08   115,083   19   3   6,740   43,312   646  
Yannawa  12.50   82,481   22   6   6,596   20,429   446  
Total 1,583.26   5,674,843   2,007   435    - 2,136,696  - 




4.3  Overview of the Tax System in Thailand 
The Thai government’s tax receipts were £60.51 billion in the 2017 fiscal year 
(October 2016 - September 2017), which is equivalent to about 20 per cent of the GDP. 
The majority of tax revenue is collected by the Revenue Department, which accounts 
for about 69 per cent of the total government receipts. Value added tax (VAT), 
corporation tax and income tax are the top three contributors of the government 
revenues. The revenues collected by the Excise and Customs Department altogether 
contribute another 20 per cent to the total receipt. The rest of the revenue comes from 
fees levied by other departments, as well as from state enterprises (see Table 4.3). 
In general, the government relies on very few types of tax. Figure 4.5 shows the top 
three contributors of tax revenue from 1997 to 2017, all of which were collected by the 
Revenue Department. First collected in 1992, VAT has gained in importance over time 
despite the relatively low fixed rate of 7 per cent. In 2017, VAT accounted for nearly 
one-third of the total revenue, a similar proportion to that collectively contributed by 
corporation tax and personal income tax. The gap between corporation tax and personal 
income tax revenue has widened significantly as a result of narrow personal income tax 
bases as well as an extensive use of tax credits to stimulate domestic consumption. 
In terms of tax distributions, the majority of the receipts from VAT, personal 
income tax and corporation tax are contributed by taxpayers in Bangkok. Between 1997 
and 2017, taxes collected from businesses and individuals in Bangkok comprise about 
65 per cent of the total income tax receipts, which leaves the portion of only about one-
third of receipts contributed by taxpayers from the rest of the country (Department of 
Revenue, 2017). 
The local taxes account for about two per cent of the total government receipts. All 
of these taxes are collected by LAOs (including special administrative organisations). 
At the provincial level, PAOs levy taxes on petrol stations, hotels, fishery and tobacco 
sales, and impose fees/charges on alcohol licenses, gambling licenses, mineral and 
petroleum royalties and parks and recreation fees. At the city and town levels, PCCs 
and SAOs levy Property and Land Tax, Council Tax, Signboard Tax, Slaughter Tax, 
Swallow Bird’s Nest Duty, and impose fees/charges on parking and several licenses. 
Decentralisation reforms have failed to establish a system that can promote local tax 




legislation. Therefore, on the revenue side, LAOs have been subsidised a large share of 
their income by the central government. Between 2015 and 2017, the amount of central 
government subsidy was about 36 per cent of the total income of local governments; 
and about £5.4 billion, or 11 per cent of the central government’s receipts, was spent as 




Table 4.3 Sources of Thai government revenue, fiscal year 2017 (Oct 2016-Sep2017) 
Tax Types  Revenue (£million
5
)  Percentage of total revenue 
Revenue Department   
Value added tax 16,491.28 27.25% 
Corporation income tax 13,127.54 21.69% 
Income tax 7,002.15 11.57% 
Petroleum revenue tax 875.14 1.45% 
Specific business tax 1,136.32 1.88% 
Revenue stamp 289.78 0.48% 
Other taxes 11.04 0.02% 
Excise Department  
 
Fuel duties 4,473.02 7.39% 
Tobacco duties 1,524.51 2.52% 
Alcohol duties 1,392.38 2.30% 
Beer duties 1,937.69 3.20% 
Vehicle excise duty 2,271.02 3.75% 
Beverage duties 345.22 0.57% 
Electronic device duties 0.11 - 
Motorcycle duties 76.38 0.13% 
Battery duties 54.11 0.09% 
Other duties 29.64 0.05% 
Customs Department  
 
Import customs 2,048.36 3.39% 
Export customs 1.98 - 
Other customs revenue 74.29 0.12% 
Other Receipts  
 
Other departments 3,513.71 5.81% 
Treasury department 230.78 0.38% 
Revenue from state enterprises 3,605.91 5.96% 
Total Receipts 60,512.37 100% 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2018) 
 
 
5 45 baht = £1 

























4.4  Property Taxation in Thailand 
In Thailand, property tax consists of two distinct areas: taxes on occupancy and taxes 
on transfers. Taxes on occupancy include Building and Land Tax and Council Tax, 
both levied by local governments (LAOs) at centrally determined bases and rates. 
Taxes on transfers include SDLT and IHT, which are collected by the central 
government (Department of Revenue). 
Taxes on occupancy are an essential part of locally collected tax bills. However, 
due to the lack of appropriate enforcement systems and extensive tax exemptions, they 
are incapable of sufficiently financing local governments. Building and Land Tax is 
collected from the rental value of all types of investment properties, which include not 
only residential but also industrial and commercial properties. The tax is collected at a 
flat rate of 12.5 per cent. First introduced in 1965, the Council Tax has been collected 
from occupied land, whether it is owner-occupied or not. Under a regressive structure, 
a number of different tax rates are applied depending on the banding of 1978 
assessments. 
Moreover, there are two types of taxes paid upon transfer. First, the SDLT is a non-
progressive tax collected from property transactions. The single flat rate of two per cent 
is payable on the entire transaction price. Second, the IHT, established in 2015, is 
charged on asset transfers that exceed the total value of 100 million baht (about £2.22 
million). Though IHT is designed to target real estate transfer, any bequest of financial 
assets and vehicles must be included in the tax calculation as well. 
4.4.1  Taxes on Occupancy 
In Thailand, taxes on occupancy are recurrent and based on both land and 
improvements. There is no clear differentiation between residential and non-residential 
properties. The only distinction is between rental and owner-occupied properties. 
Rental properties are liable to Building and Land Tax and owner-occupied properties 
are liable to Council Tax. These two taxes on occupancy are central to the discussion in 
this thesis. 
4.4.1.1  Building and Land Tax 
All of the LAOs except PAOs are in charge of the collection of Building and Land Tax 




and industrial buildings and the land appurtenant thereto. Exemptions are applied to 
owner-occupied houses, royal palaces, government and state enterprise property, 
religious property and buildings that are unoccupied for one year or longer.  
Tax base is calculated from either actual or imputed rental value of the taxable 
property by self-declaration system. Under the Building and Land Tax, imputed rent is 
called annual value, which is established by the Ministry of Interior as a prescribed 
percentage of the capital value of the property (Varanyuwatana, 2004). Local 
authorities are responsible for tax audit—e.g. building type determination and annual 
value estimation. Tax rate is proportional, specified at the flat rate of 12.5 per cent of 
the gross rental income or annual value (before expenses). The rate is reduced to one-
third of the annual value for factories to which machinery is attached. 
Criticism of this tax often focuses on the imposition of high tax rate on the gross 
rental income, which is also liable to personal income tax and corporation tax 
(Ngamarunchote et al., 2012). The tax structure should have substantially contributed 
to the tax receipts, but the current tax base is not wide enough to raise sufficient 
revenue for local governments. In addition, the legislation does not clearly describe the 
types of buildings that are liable to the tax. This loophole causes interpretation 
problems and encourages corruption. For instance, most LAOs often underestimate 
payable taxes to gain, or at least to keep, their popularity for upcoming elections. In 
practice, LAOs have very little incentive to maximise their tax receipts due to the huge 
sum of subsidies they receive from the central government every year. 
4.4.1.2  Council Tax 
The Council Tax in Thailand is a form of LVT. Taxable property comprises not only 
land but also mountains and water basins. All individuals and corporations who are in 
possession of lands are liable to pay the tax. Subject to certain geographical areas, lands 
used for residential and agricultural purposes are exempted from the tax, as is 
government and religious land. Exemption for residential property varies by density of 
population in the area: the more densely populated the area is, the fewer exemptions are 
applied. For example, in some central districts of Bangkok, residential property with an 
area of 400 square metres or less is excluded from the tax while in suburban districts 




Based on an assessment of 1978 market values, Council Tax is collected from land 
values without any improvements thereon taken into account. All types of private lands 
are assigned to one of thirty-four bands, with the lowest value properties assigned to 
band 1 and the highest value properties assigned to band 34. However, tax exemptions 
are applied to the majority of land parcels throughout the country, which causes the tax 
base to be very narrow. The exemptions are applied according to the size of taxable 
land based on minimum areas, which are larger than an average land parcel size in 
Bangkok. Another problem lies with regressive tax rates since properties in the five 
highest bands are liable to lower tax rates than those in the middle bands. As shown in 
Figure 4.6, properties in bands 7-29 are liable to the highest rate of 0.5 per cent while 
higher value properties in bands 30-34 are liable to much lower rates. 
Not only does the Council Tax fail to reflect actual worth of properties but also 
performs as a poor source of revenue for local authorities. The outdated assessment and 
value bands cannot be changed according to local governments’ needs. In 2017, only 
two per cent of LAOs’ total revenue came from the Council Tax while the subsidy from 
central government accounted for over 63 per cent. In addition, the narrow council tax 
base creates economic distortions and undermines the accountability of local authorities 
to their residents. The extensive exemptions of council tax were initially designed to 
limit tax burden on the poor but these have not been revised since the Council Tax Act 
came into effect in 1965. 
 
Figure 4.6 Council Tax rates as a percentage of 1978 assessment 



























4.4.2  Taxes on Transfer 
Although not directly relevant to this study, the property taxes on transfer in Thailand 
are still worth mentioning briefly. The two following taxes serve as important fiscal 
and political instruments for the government. However, they do not generate consistent 
income compared to other taxes and fees. 
4.4.2.1  Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT) 
The SDLT is a one-time transaction tax imposed at a fixed rate of two per cent of the 
transaction price, plus an additional one per cent for mortgage transactions. Revenue 
from the SDLT is unstable for two main reasons. First, the government is prone to use 
the SDLT as an economic stimulus via tax rate cut. The residential rate has been 
occasionally reduced to 0.01 per cent to stimulate demand in the owner-occupied 
housing market. The other reason is that the tax revenue depends on the number and 
value of property transactions each year, which tend to vary according to economic 
cycle. 
In addition, there is no system to regulate declarations of actual buying/selling 
prices as transactions are usually completed without the involvement of 
solicitors/agencies. In this regard, the official assessments have been carried out by a 
government agency called the PVB to serve as minimum values for tax assessment. In 
Bangkok, every private property has its assessed price prepared in advance and 
reassessment is carried out every four years (the same assessed prices referred to in this 
study). 
4.4.2.2  Inheritance Tax (IHT) 
First implemented in January 2016, the IHT is levied on three main types of assets: real 
estate, financial and vehicular. Any transfer of assets exceeding 100 million baht (£2.2 
million) is liable to the collection of the IHT at a flat rate of 5 per cent (for related 
individuals) and 10 per cent (for unrelated individuals) of the transfer amount that 
exceeds the minimum value. Any transfers below the minimum value are exempt from 
tax. The transfer between married couples is entirely excluded from the IHT. For the 
transfer of property and land, the IHT shares the same assessment database as the 
SDLT, which contains values that are arguably much lower than market values. 




rising inequality. The minimum taxable value was set very high with a single flat rate 




4.5  Attempts at Property Tax Reform in Thailand 
Thailand adopts two assessment systems: value-based and cost-based. The property 
assessment database provided by the PVB consists of two parts: land values and 
average building construction costs. Assessed land values are calculated using market 
price comparison approach while building assessments are based on cost approach. 
Nonetheless, both values are just rough estimates and lack accuracy for two important 
reasons. 
First, market sale data contain property value as a whole (including land and 
building) but the land assessment process requires the building values to be deducted 
from the total transaction values. The building values are calculated using mean 
building costs adapted from those of the Engineering Association of Thailand, which 
are the costs required in order to construct new buildings subtracted by depreciations (if 
any). Second, the assessed building values are calculated from average construction 
costs of several building types. The value is then added to the land value to yield the 
taxable value of the whole property. 
The second reason is that, in Thailand, legislation relating to the Council Tax and 
the Building and Land Tax has not been updated for 80 years. The two taxes are 
incapable of generating consistent and sufficient revenues for local governments 
because of outdated tax rates and bases. Therefore, local governments have to rely 
heavily on central government’s subsidy, which in turn limits their level of autonomy. 
In 2017, only around 17 per cent of BMA’s revenue was financed by the property taxes 
(Fiscal Policy Office, 2017). Moreover, the SDLT is not a stable income source due to 
cuts in tax rates and fluctuating volumes of property transactions, and local 
governments have no control over the collection or allocation of the tax. 
Accordingly, there have been many attempts at property tax reform which have 
aimed to create a new type of property tax on occupancy that could better serve as a 
revenue generator for local governments and as a more efficient fiscal instrument to 
tackle income distribution problems. The most prominent reform effort occurred in 
1994 when the Democrat government proposed the first land and building tax Bill. The 
Bill has been revised several times during the past twenty years. In 2015, the junta 
proposed a new Land and Building Tax Bill, which was passed by the House of Lords 




4.5.1  Land and Building Tax 
The Land and Building Tax seeks to eliminate the shortcomings of the previous 
recurrent occupancy taxes. It is specifically designed to strengthen local governments 
by generating higher self-collected revenues, and encourage more efficient land use by 
taxing vacant, underutilised lands at the highest rate. The Land and Building Tax Bill 
had gone through further amendments over the past five years than it ever has before. 
The final Bill was eventually approved by the Cabinet in March 2017, and in March 
2019 the act was introduced and will come into effect on 1st August 2020. 
According to the Land and Building Tax act, both land and improvement are taxed 
based on the assessments of the PVB. As previously mentioned, land is assessed by 
market comparison method while buildings are assessed by cost method (from average 
construction costs). The total property assessed value is simply the sum of these two 
assessments. The assessment processes have not involved property rental values as they 
require more time and manpower to gather.  
The Land and Building Tax rates vary by property class and type of land use. 
Undeveloped land is taxed at the highest rate of 1.2 per cent, subject to 0.3 per cent 
increase every three years until reaching a 3 per cent ceiling. Commercial and industrial 
properties are similarly treated, being taxed at the same rate of 1.2 per cent. Residential 
properties are taxed at 0.3 per cent and agricultural lands are taxed at the lowest rate of 
0.15 per cent. However, a tax relief scheme will be applied during the first two years of 
the introduction of the tax, in which tax rates of all classes of property are differentiated 
according to assessed value ranges. 
In addition, there is also a three-year tax reduction scheme, becoming effective 
between 2020 and 2022, to target payers of the two previous property taxes (the 
Building and Land Tax and the Council Tax). In this tax relief scheme, if the amount of 
the Land and Building Tax payable is more than the amount previously paid for either 
of the previous two property taxes, property owners only need to pay the previous 
amounts plus 25 per cent of the difference in 2020, 50 per cent in 2021, and 75 per cent 
in 2022. There are also permanent tax exemptions applied to residential and agricultural 





Table 4.4 Land and Building Tax rates in Thailand 
Property class Tax base Assessed value (Thai baht) Tax rate Exemption/Reduction 
Vacant land Land Calendar year: 2020-22  Tax relief scheme 
applied during 2020-22, 
then in the third 
consecutive year of no 
development a single 
rate of 1.2% applied 
and will be increase by 
0.3% every three years 
until reaching 3% 
ceiling. 
Not over 50m 0.30% 
Over 50m – 200m 0.40% 
Over 200m – 1,000m 0.50% 
Over 1,000m – 5,000m 0.60% 
Over 5,000m 0.70% 
Calendar year: 2023 
onwards 
Rate for each value range 






Calendar year: 2020-22  None 
Not over 50m 0.30% 
Over 50m – 200m 0.40% 
Over 200m – 1,000m 0.50% 
Over 1,000m – 5,000m 0.60% 
Over 5,000m 0.70% 
Calendar year: 2023 
onwards 






Calendar year: 2020-22  - Owner-occupied 
homes (lands and 
improvements) with 
assessed values not 
over 50m baht are 
exempted from the tax. 
- Owner-occupied 
improvements with 
assessed values not 
over 10m baht are 
exempted from the tax. 
Not over 25m 0.03% 
Over 25m - 50m 0.05% 
Over 50m 0.10% 
Calendar year: 2023 
onwards 




Calendar year: 2020-22  
Not over 40m 0.02% 
Over 40m - 60m 0.03% 
Over 60m - 90m 0.05% 
Over 90m 0.10% 
Calendar year: 2023 
onwards 







Calendar year: 2020-22  None 
Not over 50m 0.02% 
Over 50m - 75m 0.03% 
Over 75m – 100m 0.05% 
Over 100m 0.10% 
Calendar year: 2023 
onwards 
Single rate applied 
0.30% 
Agricultural Land and 
improvement 
Calendar year: 2020-22  Agricultural lands with 
value not greater than 
50m baht  
Not over 75m 0.01% 
Over 75m – 100m 0.03% 
Over 100m – 500m 0.05% 
Over 500m – 1,000m 0.07% 
Over 1,000m 0.10% 
Calendar year: 2023 
onwards 
Single rate applied 
0.15% 






The property tax systems in Thailand are illustrated in Figure 4.7. Land and 
building assessed price provided by the PVB is used in both the Land and Building Tax 
and the SDLT. The assessed price was originally used only for the SDLT, but after the 
recent property tax reform the government decided to use the same base for the Land 
and Building Tax as well. Therefore, two different types of property tax, one relating to 
transactions and the other to occupancy, use the same tax base. It could be said that the 
tax base is an estimate value as there is massive political incentive to mitigate effects 
brought about by the property tax. Despite being based on the same assessment, the 
Land and Building Tax and the SDLT are calculated using different rates and by 
different authorities. While the Land Registry is responsible for the SDLT collection, 
local governments are responsible for the Land and Building Tax collection. Revenue 
raised from the Land and Building tax can be kept locally but revenue from the SDLT 
must be sent to the central government. It should also be noted that the appeal 
mechanism of the Land and Building Tax is separate from that of the SDLT. 
The government has estimated that the total revenue from the Land and Building 
Tax in 2020-21 will be 40 billion baht (£1 billion), which is lower than previously 
expected at 70 billion baht (£1.7 billion) due to extensive tax relief schemes (Matichon, 
2019). Another reason for low estimated tax revenue is that the building assessed price 
is lower than the market price due to the cost approach employed by the PVB (Bangkok 
Biz News, 2019). These two reasons are the main concern for the workings of the Land 
and Building Tax. This reduced estimate has caused concern that the tax will fall short 
of achieving its revenue generation and wealth distribution objectives. 




A major criticism of the Land and Building Tax is that the exempted value of 50 
million baht (about £1.11 million) for owner-occupied housings and agricultural lands 
is too high. It is estimated that there are only 15,700 out of 21.3 million householders 
who own land with values over 50 million baht, and only 5,000 householders own over 
50 million baht worth of residential properties (Poapongsakorn, 2017). This means over 
99 per cent of households are completely exempted from the Land and Building Tax. 
The exemption is part of the Land and Building Tax Act, which is difficult to amend. 
At least two problems arise as a result of the exemption. One is the disincentive for 
local governments to collect their own revenue. Even though the revenue from the 
Land and Building Tax is estimated to be more than that from the two previous 
property taxes combined, it is not certain which local governments have large enough 
tax base to finance their expenditures. The other problem concerns the narrow tax base 
itself as it can hardly promote local accountability in any way. From the benefit point 
of view, it is unlikely that voters will be aware of the costs of local public services 
when they are not liable for the tax. In general, a higher number of taxpayers leads to 





4.6  Property Assessment Practice in Thailand 
In Thailand, property assessments for taxation are provided by the PVB, a government 
agency overseen by the Department of Treasury, Ministry of Finance. The assessed 
price prepared by the PVB that was originally used for the collection of SDLT is now 
used for the collection of Land and Building Tax as well. The PVB has adopted the 
mass valuation process, in which assessed prices are prepared in advance for every 
private property (both domestic and non-domestic) in the country. Assessed prices of 
properties on the same street (within certain blocks) are calculated from a single 
assessed value unique to that street unit. This is called street value, and is derived from 
transactions on the same or adjacent/similar streets. The PVB’s guidelines consider 
land and building as distinct component (PVB, 2009). Therefore, there are two 
assessment lists, one for each component. The assessment process consists of the 
following steps (see also Appendix B): 
(1) Data preparation 
(2) Property survey 
(3) Data analysis 
(4) Assessed prices determination 
(5) Assessment list and cadastral map preparation 
There are two approaches used in the assessment process: market and cost. Market 
approach is used to assess land (without any developments thereon) while cost 
approach is used to assess improvement (building). These two approaches are used 
separately for two purposes. First, the market approach is specifically used for vacant 
or undeveloped land assessment. This means that only transaction data for land is 
included in the market assessment process without accounting for building thereon. 
Second, the cost approach is used to calculate building costs of sale data for developed 
lands to derive pure/vacant land value. This is because, as mentioned before, assessors 
must apply the market approach to compare only values of lands after deducting the 
building costs. The cost approach is also used to calculate total assessed value. This is 
because there are two components of the assessed prices: land value and building cost. 
In order to calculate the value of a detached house, for example, its assessed land value 
must be combined with assessed building costs in order to derive total assessed value. 




4.6.1  Land assessment 
Land assessment is carried out using the market approach, meaning land values are 
derived from and compared with land transaction prices, excluding building thereon. 
Property sale data used by the PVB, however, contains both undeveloped and 
developed lands. Vacant (undeveloped) land data is prioritised over that of developed 
land. But the amount of undeveloped land data is not sufficient for the valuation 
process, meaning developed land transactions have also been used in many instances. 
In the latter case, building costs are deducted from the total transaction prices, 
accounting for depreciation, to yield vacant land values (see Appendix A). Land 
assessed prices are based on transactions that occurred several years before the assessed 
prices came into effect. For example, the assessed prices for the assessment cycle 2016-
19 (effective from 1st January 2016 to 31st December 2019) had been prepared using 
property sale data from 2012-2015. Therefore, assessed prices generally lag one to 
seven years behind market prices. 
According to the PVB’s land assessment manual, there are two main factors that 
play an important role in determining assessed value of land: parcel shape and depth 
(PVB, 2009). Typically, rectangular-shaped land parcels are considered to have the 
most potential, which means that they receive full assessed value. Irregular-shaped land 
parcels—i.e. flag- (hexagon) and triangular-shaped—are considered inferior in 
potential. Flag-shaped land with parcel width between two and eight metres on the road 
access side receives 75 per cent of normal assessed value, and that with a width less 
than two metres receives 65 per cent of normal assessed value. Flag-shaped land with a 
width over eight metres is considered to have full potential and receives normal 
assessed value. Triangular-shaped land receives 65 per cent of normal assessed value if 
road access is on any of its sides, and 35 per cent if access is on a corner. 
Similarly, the depth of land parcel is taken into account in the process of assessed 
price determination. The depth is the distance from the middle point of the side 
adjacent to road access to the middle point of the opposite side. As shown in Table 4.5, 
the land assessment method of the PVB is based on seven different ranges of land 
parcel depth (PVB, 2009). The standard depth of land parcel that can receive full 
assessed price is 40 metres, but assessment regulation allows for a maximum extension 
of 25 per cent of the standard value, which is 50 metres. This means that a parcel 50 




25 per cent rule is applied to all other depth ranges except the seventh. The greater the 
depth of a land parcel, the less value proportionate to normal assessed value it gets. The 
deduction rates of assessed value based on parcel depth are defined by multiplier. For 
example, a rectangular-shaped land parcel with a depth of 120 metres and located on a 
street with an assessed price (street value) of £600 per square metre would be assessed 
at £450 per square metre (75 per cent of the street value).  
Table 4.5 Calculation of land parcel depth in PVB's assessment method 
Range Parcel Depth (Metre) Multiplier (%) 
1 No more than 50 100.00 
2 51-90 87.50 
3 91-130 75.00 
4 131-170 62.50 
5 171-210 53.75 
6 211-250 46.88 
7 Over 250 41.07 
Source: Adapted from PVB (2009) 
As well as the aforementioned factors, the PVB’s land assessment process also 
takes into account land use and negative impact factors in terms of assessment 
reduction. Land use factors include, for example, the use of land as a private road (50 
per cent reduction) and land filled with water deeper than 3 metres (75 per cent 
reduction). Negative impact factors include land with certain legal limitations that 
prevent the development of any type of structure (50 per cent reduction) and land 
affected by close proximity to high voltage electricity lines (70 per cent reduction for 
the area affected). Such areas are rare in practice, but appear in the standard because 
they are based on the decisions of property valuation committees regarding specific 
complaints. 
4.6.2  Building assessment 
Cost approach is used in building valuation. Prior to 2016, the PVB had provided 69 
different types of buildings and three ranges of construction costs for each building 
type based on the quality of building materials. The selection of building type is 
completely subject to assessors’ judgement. Since 2016, the PVB has reduced the 
number of building types to 31 and has cancelled three ranges of building quality and 




Table 4.6). The building assessed values differ from province to province and the ones 
in Bangkok are the highest. After accounting for depreciation factors, building assessed 
values are then added to the vacant land assessed values to yield total assessed values 
of the whole properties. This is, in effect, the reverse of the process for assessing vacant 
land mentioned above. 
Table 4.6 Examples of average building assessed values in Bangkok 
Code Building type Assessed value per m2 (Thai baht) 
100 Detached house 7,500 
200 Townhouse (terraced house) 7,450 
300 Row house (single-storey) 7,200 
400 Shophouse 7,600 
501 Warehouse (area of 300 sqm. or less) 5,500 
502 Warehouse (area over 300 sqm.) 3,400 
505 School 7,500 
506/1 Hotel (5 floors or less) 9,500 
506/2 Hotel (over 5 floors) 9,800 
508 Hospital 9,200 
509/1 Office building (5 floors or less) 7,400 
509/2 Office building (over 5 floors) 8,600 
510 Restaurant 6,750 
511/1 Department store 9,350 
511/2 Commercial building 7,750 
512 Petrol station 5,400 
513 Factory 6,000 
516 Home office 9,150 
518 Garage 5,650 
519 Car park building 5,650 
520/1 Apartment (5 floors or less) 7,800 
520/2 Apartment (over 5 floors) 9,000 
522 Car showroom 5,500 
524 Swimming pool 8,000 
Source: Adapted from PVB (2016a) 
 
It can also be seen in Table 4.6 that the rationale behind average building assessed 
values does not account for building quality factor. There are some inconsistencies in 
the classification of property. When it comes to residential properties, the classification 
is based on housing types—e.g. detached house, townhouse and shophouse; but in 
cases of commercial properties, the classification is based on uses/functions—e.g. 
hotel, office building and department store. This is not consistent with conventional 
property assessment standards. The IAAO's (2017) standard on mass appraisal of real 
property, for instance, suggests that the income approach is the most appropriate 
method in assessing commercial and industrial property, and sales comparison 
approach is an equally effective method when there are sufficient sales data available. 




age—taking into account depreciation factors—and construction materials used. It is 
almost impossible to assess improvements accurately on the basis of mass surveys, in 
which assessors do not, in most cases, enter properties and inspect buildings. Without a 
thorough inspection, building values can hardly be accurately assessed. 
The PVB’s standard assessment approaches can be expressed as: 
𝐴𝑉 = 𝐿𝑉 + 𝐵𝐶 (4.1) 
where 𝐴𝑉 is assessed value; 𝐿𝑉 is land value; and 𝐵𝐶 is building cost. 
𝐿𝑉 = 𝑈𝐿𝑉 × 𝐿𝐴 (4.2) 
𝐵𝐶 = 𝑀𝐵𝐶 × 𝐵𝐴 × (1 − 𝑑) (4.3) 
where 𝑈𝐿𝑉 is an average undeveloped land value; 𝐿𝐴 is land area (square metre); 𝑀𝐵𝐶 
is an average building cost (per square metre); 𝐵𝐴 is building area; and 𝑑 is the 
depreciation factor. 
The PVB provides vacant land values (𝐿𝑉 in Equation 4.2) and average building 
costs (𝑀𝐵𝐶 in Equation 4.3). To get the whole property assessed value, local 
authorities have to combine their property data bases, which contain building areas and 
some other property characteristics, with the one provided by the PVB. In order to 
calculate final assessed value, three property characteristics are required: property type, 
building area and property age. Local authorities are required by law to carry out their 
own surveys to collect and update property data. Therefore, there are many factors that 
can cause variations in assessed values from one locality to another, which range from 






4.7  Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have described local administration and fiscal systems in Thailand and 
explained the geography of Bangkok. Three types of local governments are responsible 
for the collection of Land and Building Tax: Municipalities, SAOs and special 
administrative regions. Bangkok is classified as a special administrative region, which 
has more autonomy than other types of local governments. When the Land and 
Building Tax is implemented, it will have full control over tax collection and 
allocation. However, its power is limited to the administration function, meaning that 
the governor can decide on some appeal requests within certain limits of tax reduction, 
but cannot change tax rates or reassess properties. 
The Land and Building Tax is certainly an improvement on the two previous 
recurrent taxes on occupancy in terms of tax structure and objectives. However, the tax 
relief scheme is problematic because of extensive exemptions on certain types of 
properties. Owner-occupied housing, for example, is exempted for up to 50 million 
baht (about £1.11 million) in assessed value. If we take the benefit tax view, housing is 
the type of property that should be taxed the most. Occupiers of residential properties 
are direct users of local services, meaning the more people who contribute to property 
tax, the more stakeholders in local expenditure there are. In this situation, local 
governments tend to have more accountability. Therefore, the government should 
reduce the range of tax exemptions and recalculate tax rates according to the new tax 
base. 
The revenue from the Land and Building Tax in 2020 will be at best the same as 
those of the previous two occupancy taxes combined. The largest contributors to the tax 
revenue will be businesses and owners of vacant land. Taxing vacant land is 
economically viable and appropriate because it tends to cause less distortions. Taxing 
businesses will cause their costs to rise and will translate into lower competitiveness 
and incentives. This will directly translate into economic distortions, which may take 
the form of changing business behaviours such as disinvestments or layoffs. However, 
the logic of policymakers appears to be different from that suggested by tax theory. 
Reflected in the structure of the Land and Building Tax is the principle that commercial 
properties should be taxed higher than residential properties. The disadvantages of such 
a tax structure are that the relationship between tax contributors and benefit receivers 




Property tax assessment in Thailand is based on two main approaches: market and 
cost. Market approach is used for land value assessment and cost approach is used for 
building assessment. The two components of assessed prices are combined to form 
taxable values. The building costs are more inequitable than assessed land values for 
two reasons. First, the building costs in the list provided by the PVB are not actual 
costs. They are relatively low estimates of construction costs for certain property types. 
Second, the determination of building types is totally subject to local governments’ 
judgement, which may vary from locality to locality. Although the PVB adopts a 
market approach, it is only used for the assessment of land, not the whole property. 
Such a system is prone to errors because there are too many steps in market price 
comparison and the process is not realistic. Accordingly, such a system is unfair 
because there is a tendency to minimise street value to accommodate the continuous 
spatial flow of assessed prices. Therefore, the owners of higher priced properties tend 
to gain from such tax assessment approaches more than the owners of lower priced 
properties. Such a situation tends to lead to a regressive tax structure, which may 
exacerbate the wealth accumulation problem. 
In the next chapter we will reconsider the research questions and discuss the key 
methods used for data analysis. This study uses both spatial and non-spatial methods in 
the analysis of property data. The use of these methods in the research of property 
assessed prices is unprecedented in Thailand. It is expected that the use of spatial 
techniques will reveal some insights into the property assessment system that can help 




Chapter 5  Methodology 
This study employs three main analytical approaches: ratio analysis, spatial 
autocorrelation analysis and GWR. Ratio analysis is used to estimate the degree of 
progressiveness of the assessed price and to identify areas with property assessment 
problems. Local Moran’s I is the spatial autocorrelation analysis technique used in this 
study. The purpose of this approach is to identify clusters and outliers of under- and 
over-assessed properties, which helps determine spatial distribution patterns of 
disparity of assessed and sale prices. The last approach, GWR, is a non-stationary 
technique that includes varying spatial relationships in the models. Variables included 
in GWR models have been derived from the relevant literature. 
The ratio analysis and the spatial autocorrelation approaches are closely related in 
that both are used to identify similar areas/clusters with property assessment inequity. 
In the ratio analysis, properties that do not meet the standards are located using 
property identification number and cadastral map. Therefore, spatial distribution 
patterns of these properties can be compared with the results from spatial 
autocorrelation analysis. However, the spatial autocorrelation analysis can produce 
more meaningful results as it can detect clusters and outliers. GWR is then used to 
obtain insights into the relative impact that each explanatory variable has on both 
assessed and sale prices. 
The first section presents detailed discussions of the research questions in relation to 
relevant research methods. Subsequently, section 5.2 discusses the data used in this 
study. It specifically explains the nature, sources, types and spatial distribution of the 
data. Section 5.3 gives an overview of all the three methods used in this study: ratio 
analysis approach, spatial autocorrelation analysis and GWR. Subsequently, a separate 
discussion of each method is presented from sections 5.4 to 5.6. The chapter concludes 
by acknowledging the limitations of these methods, and measures that can be used to 





5.1  Research Questions Revisited 
In the first chapter I addressed six research questions, most of which concern the equity 
of property tax systems. At the core of inequity problems in property tax systems are 
inaccurate assessments and poor tax administration. Inaccurate assessments are likely 
to generate objection from taxpayers and affect fiscal management of local government 
(Corusy, 1983). Assessment inaccuracy causes inequity in property tax systems through 
under- and over-assessment of tax base, which can be identified by ratio analysis. 
Accurate assessments can strengthen local fiscal stability and borrowing capacity, 
especially in systems where obsolete tax bases exist. Therefore, it seems that property 
assessments are the key to property tax equity as well as local stability. Progressiveness 
in assessed price can also be measured by the ratio analysis approach through the 
comparison of A/S ratios in all value ranges. However, this progressiveness is not the 
same as property tax progressiveness as the latter is largely determined by tax rate. 
How can a property tax system be deemed (in)equitable? This is a very important 
question, which require us to reconsider some common terminology that has emerged 
in the literature. To achieve perfect assessment equity, assessment level (overall A/S 
ratio) must be consistent throughout a taxing district or a specified area. In a political 
jurisdiction with a uniform tax rate and equal A/S ratios for all properties, neither 
horizontal nor vertical inequity would exist, regardless of the value of the ratio (Paglin 
and Fogarty, 1972). In most cases where perfect assessment equity does not exist, 
however, a central tendency of A/S ratios is calculated. Median is frequently a top 
choice for measuring central tendency because it is less sensitive to extreme values, 
which are quite common in mass appraisal. In evaluating property assessments in 
practice, a permissible level of median A/S ratio in a jurisdiction or tax zone should at 
least fall within the IAAO’s standard range of 0.9-1.1, and the overall spatial 
distribution of A/S ratios should be consistent across the area. 
One pragmatic way of determining the level of assessment equity is to look at 
assessment uniformity within and between jurisdictions. Assessment uniformity is 
measured by calculating A/S ratios of all properties in a taxing district and gauging 
their divergence from an average assessment level. This would give us a ‘big picture’ 
of assessment uniformity, especially when the median assessment ratios are compared 
among jurisdictions. We can also perform a more in-depth analysis by mapping the 




to discover patterns of non-uniformity in assessments. For example, exact location of 
inaccurately assessed properties can be identified if A/S ratios of properties along some 
streets are markedly different from the median ratios, particularly in cases where 
assessors adopt street-value assessment approach (see Section 4.6). 
When it comes to the question of whether ‘systemic’ biases exist in the property tax 
system in Thailand and what the spatial distribution patterns of any assessment-sales 
discrepancy look like, we must assume that random inaccuracy can be identified and 
separated. In this case, the spatial autocorrelation analysis is useful in identifying 
clusters of problematic assessments. The hypothesis here is that clusters of A/S ratios, 
especially at borough and street levels, imply systemic assessment biases because 
assessors have been assigned tasks based on geographical areas, of which political 
jurisdictions and streets have been used as main criteria. We must take into account not 
only human errors but also consistent bias in assessment practices. In mass appraisal, it 
is unlikely that properties are assessed solely according to market information—
e.g. recent sale prices, rental values, or improvement costs. Assessments in Thailand in 
particular have been largely based on past assessed prices, with current figures 
deviating little from accepted norms. Abrupt changes in assessments would raise 
questions and are likely to attract more appeals, which would increase workloads for 
assessors. 
The question of whether there are any groups of cohorts—as defined by property 
value—that benefit from the discrepancy of assessed prices directly relates to the 
vertical inequity aspect of the assessment problem. Although information about 
property owners in the data sets provided by the Land Registry have been concealed, it 
is still possible to use property sale price to represent property wealth. Higher property 
sale price reflects higher property wealth, and vice versa. Vertical inequity exists when 
properties with different values have different A/S ratios, which can be determined 
either by straightforward comparisons of A/S ratios of properties controlling for types 
and values (Oldman and Aaron, 1965) or by regression analysis of A/S ratios and sales 
price (Bell, 1984; Cheng, 1970; Clapp, 1990; IAAO, 1978; Kochin and Parks, 1982; 
Paglin and Fogarty, 1972). Both approaches are used in this study.  
This leads to the next research question about important determinants of housing 
assessed price. It is important to examine horizontal inequity in the property tax system 




assessed in the same fashion. When properties with the same market values receive 
different assessments, they may be treated differently by the property tax system, 
especially when they fall on different tax rate thresholds as a result of progressive tax 
rates. If so, the magnitude of assessment inequity is amplified by the structure of the tax 
system. Another concern regarding horizontal inequity is that there might be some 
drastic changes that have positively—or negatively—influenced property prices in 
particular housing submarkets6. The provision of extensive-scale data by the PVB and 
the Land Registry has made it possible to perform GWR analysis to determine 
influential variables of assessed housing values. The results will be compared with the 
assessment standards set by the PVB to determine whether irregularities in assessed 
prices in certain areas have been caused by assessors or the market. 
My final research question is ‘what are the appropriate property assessment 
approaches that can produce more equitable tax liability, and to what extent will this 
help improve the property tax system in terms of a more suitable tax base, rate and 
structure?’. I have generated two additional hypotheses regarding this matter. First, as 
in other types of tax, wider property tax base—minimal tax exemptions/reductions and 
comprehensive assessments—would serve local governments more efficiently in terms 
of revenue generation and co-operation from taxpayers. Given the same amount of 
local revenue requirement, a wider tax base means there is less tax liability for each 
individual compared with narrower tax base, which tends to cause less resistance from 
taxpayers. More taxpayers also mean that more people tend to be aware of the costs of 
local public services, and as a result they have incentive to monitor local government 
spending. 
My second hypothesis is that, assuming a stationary tax rate, higher A/S ratios with 
less variability would cause the property tax system to become more equitable and 
easier to administer. This can be achieved through more frequent reassessments. In ad-
valorem taxation, assessments are the key component that must always be accurately 
maintained in order to allow for other components of tax systems to function 
properly—i.e. tax rate and tax administration. Inaccurate assessments tend to reduce the 
effectiveness of ad-valorem tax policies for this reason. If the types of assessment 
 
6 A housing submarket is defined as “a set of dwellings that are reasonably close substitutes for one another, but 




inaccuracy can be identified, it is likely that we can make more informed decisions on 




5.2  Data 
The data in this study has been collected from various primary sources, all of which are 
public authorities in Thailand. There are two main data providers: the Land Registry 
and the PVB. The Land Registry provided cadastral maps, property records and sale 
data. The PVB provided assessed values for all private properties in Bangkok including 
property characteristics data collected during surveys. I have also obtained assessment 
manuals and have carried out informal interviews with assessors from the PVB. Seven 
members of the PVB were interviewed: four operational staff and three executive staff. 
The operational staff interviewed included assessors and researchers. It is the role of 
assessors to carry out property surveys and determine assessed prices according to the 
standard written and revised by researchers. The three executive-level staff interviewed 
were the director of the PVB, who is responsible for assessment policy, and the 
managers of the property assessment divisions for East and West Bangkok respectively. 
The Land Registry normally keeps records of registry data in paper form. Land 
parcel shapefiles have been digitised from the paper maps and tenure information 
obtained from registry documents. The data set comprises 2.14 million records of all 
properties in Bangkok. Land registry data in Thailand are not open to public inspection. 
Only property owners or persons who have owners’ consent can have access to the 
data. The data used in this study excludes sensitive information such as names and 
identification numbers of property owners. Properties are identified by either the 
registry document number or a unique code consisting of three components of the 
Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) map: sheet, page and parcel numbers. This 
study uses the UTM map’s sheet-page-number code to make the analysis consistent 
with the identification in the assessed price data set obtained from the PVB.  
The PVB typically uses both paper and digital versions of cadastral maps. Digital 
maps are mainly used in the assessment process but paper maps are also needed for 
reference as they are more up-to-date. This is because changes to property registry are 
first made on paper cadastral maps at local land registry offices. The land registry 
shares updated information on cadastral maps and registry documents with the PVB 
quarterly. Therefore, data verification can be done by comparing identical data sets 
obtained from both authorities. Parcels that can be merged by both identification 
number and land area are deemed accurate as they have already been validated by 




seem to have more details about property characteristics (e.g. floor area, road width and 
neighbourhood quality), which have been collected during surveys. 
Apart from the assessment data, the PVB also provided street value data, in the 
form of a summary of all units of assessed value at street level. A unique code is 
assigned to each ‘street unit’, which represents only one assessed street value. The 
assessed ‘street value’ is used to calculate final land values of all properties in a 
particular street. There are specific criteria by which final land values can be assessed, 
based on depth and shape of land parcel. In general, a land parcel with a square shape 
and depth of 40 metres or less receives full value of the street on which it is located. 
Properties with irregular shapes and greater depth normally receive reduced street 
values. The street value data contains four types of land use: residential, agricultural, 
commercial and industrial. As shown in Table 5.1, residential street units—excluding 
condominium—far outnumber those of other types of property largely due to 
assessment practices. When assigning street units, assessors consider the majority of 
property types in each area. Therefore, other than high streets, agricultural zones and 
industrial estates, most areas in Bangkok have been classified as residential uses. 
Table 5.1 Number of units of street value 
Type of land use Number of street units 
Percentage change from 
previous assessment cycle 
Residential 55,111 1.71% 
Agricultural 6,012 13.85% 
Commercial 5,373 6.22% 
Industrial 116 9.68% 







































6226 03 1:1000 1 Piboonsongkram road ST210 1B21 40 Commercial Concrete 18 32 37,500 47 -  150,000 Market price 32,500 40 0.15 
6226 03 1:1000 2 Alley connected to Piboonsongkram road S0501 1B43 40 Commercial Gravel 3 5 11,250 -  6226-03-1000-2 45,000 Maintain price 11,250 40 0.00 
6226 03 1:1000 3 Walk way connected to Piboonsongkram road S0502 1R51 - Residential Concrete 1 1 7,500  - 6226-03-1000-3 30,000 Maintain price 7,500 - 0.00 
6226 03 1:1000 4 Lands without legal access IS01 1I00 - Residential - - - 1,875  - 6226-03-1000-4 7,500 Maintain price 1,875 - 0.00 
6226 04 1:1000 1 Piboonsongkram road ST210 1B21 40 Commercial Concrete 18 32 37,500 47  - 150,000 Market price 32,500 40 0.15 
6226 04 1:1000 2 Alley connected to Piboonsongkram road (terraced houses) S0504 1R41 40 Residential Concrete 6 8 15,250  - 6226-04-1000-2 61,000 Maintain price 15,250 40 0.00 
6226 04 1:1000 3 Alley leading to office buildings S0503 1B41 40 Commercial Concrete 5 6 15,000  - 6226-04-1000-3 60,000 Maintain price 15,000 40 0.00 
6226 04 1:1000 4 Walk way leading to CPAC Ltd. S0506 1R51 - Residential Concrete 1 1 7,500  - 6226-04-1000-4 30,000 Maintain price 7,500 - 0.00 
6226 04 1:1000 5 Walk way adjacent to Government Housing Bank S0505 1R51 - Residential Concrete 1 1 7,500  - 6226-04-1000-5 30,000 Maintain price 7,500 - 0.00 
6226 04 1:1000 6 Lands without legal access IS01 1I00 - Residential - - - 1,875  - 6226-04-1000-6 7,500 Maintain price 1,875 - 0.00 
6228 12 1:1000 1 Piboonsongkram housing project alley S0194 1R41 40 Residential Concrete 6 8 13,750 118  - 55,000 Market price 13,625 40 0.01 
6228 12 1:1000 2 Wongsawang 11 alley (2) S0191 1R41 40 Residential Concrete 4 4 11,250 90  - 45,000 Market price 11,250 40 0.00 
6228 12 1:1000 3 Alley connected to Wongsawang 11 S0183 1R41 40 Residential Concrete 4 4 5,000  - 6228-12-1000-3 20,000 Maintain price 5,000 40 0.00 
6228 12 1:1000 4 Alley connected to Wongsawang 11 (2) S0184 1R43 40 Residential Gravel 3 3 4,500  - 6228-12-1000-4 18,000 Maintain price 4,500 40 0.00 
6228 12 1:1000 5 Walk way connected to Piboonsongkram project S0195 1R51 - Residential Concrete 1 1 3,125  - 6228-12-1000-5 12,500 Maintain price 3,125 - 0.00 
6228 12 1:1000 6 Walk way connected to Serene Park project S0211 1R54 - Residential Earth 1 1 2,500  - 6228-12-1000-6 10,000 Maintain price 2,500 - 0.00 
6228 12 1:1000 7 Serene park project 2 S0186 1H41 - Residential Concrete 9 10 17,000  - 6228-12-1000-7 68,000 Maintain price 17,000 - 0.00 
6228 12 1:1000 8 Lands without legal access IS01 1I00 - Residential - - - 1,875  - 6228-12-1000-8 7,500 Maintain price 1,875 - 0.00 




The street value data set is useful because it represents the rationale behind the 
assessments (see Table 5.2). Each street unit represents certain unique characteristics 
that have been valued by assessors. More importantly, the street ID field in the street 
value data can be linked to the assessment data set, which has made the spatial analysis 
of assessment practices at property level possible. Another useful piece of information 
in the street value data set is the SMG field, which stands for sub-market group. SMG 
has served as a key method for reassessment for almost a decade—over the last two 
assessment cycles. It is a classification technique that reflects, for example, land use 
types, neighbourhood characteristics and basic infrastructure qualities. Therefore, the 
SMG code can be compared with changes in assessed and sale prices to investigate the 
variations of A/S ratios. 
Sample data in this study includes residential property transactions reported 
between 2008 and 2017. There are 69,724 observed properties that have been 
randomly, but proportionately, selected from the main types of housing throughout 
Bangkok. As shown in Figure 5.1, the highest concentration of observed housings can 
be found in the eastern and western suburbs while the data is less concentrated in some 
parts of the city centre and the eastern and south-eastern fringes of the city. This is in 
part a result of Bangkok’s planning policies since the late 1990s, which have imposed 
restrictions on new developments of low-rise housing in the city centre and on the 
development of housing projects in eastern boroughs such as Nong Chok and Lad 
Krabang. 
Figure 5.2 shows a choropleth map of Bangkok’s city plan as defined by land use 
regulations (City Planning Division, 2013). There are six broad types of land use as 
indicated by colours: yellow, orange and brown for residential; red for commercial; 
purple for industrial; green (striped and solid) for agricultural; beige for cultural 
preservation zone; and blue for government use. Most development restrictions have 
been imposed on agricultural use, while the fewest restrictions apply for commercial 
use. With residential use, for instance, colour shades—yellow, orange and brown—
indicate the degree of development restrictions. Darker colours mean higher density 
residential developments are permitted. In this regard, the legislation is similar to the 
green belt policy in the UK, which aims to protect land from development and control 




number of housing observations shown in Figure 5.1. The effects of the city plan are 
also evident in urban development density shown in Figure 6.15. 
 
  
Figure 5.1 Location of observed data 
Figure 5.2 City of Bangkok plan (Source: City Planning Division, 2013) 
Land use zoning 
Yellow: low-density residential zone 
Orange: medium-density residential zone 
Brown: high-density residential zone 
Red: commercial zone 
Purple: industrial zone 




Figure 5.3 shows the main types of housing under observation in this study. 
Terraced houses (also known as ‘townhouses’ in Thailand), typically featuring two to 
three storeys, are popular among low- and medium-income households—except those 
located on prime locations. Most terraced houses in Thailand have small car parks 
inside their gated areas. Shophouses are a vernacular building type commonly seen in 
urban areas of Bangkok. They are mixed-use buildings, typically two to four storeys 
high, characterised by shops on the ground floor opening to the pavement and 
residential units, offices or storage on higher floors. Semi-detached and detached 
houses are commonly found in suburban areas where less development restrictions are 
applied. During the past twenty years, Bangkok has seen more developments of gated 
communities containing terraced, semi-detached and detached houses, of which owners 




The spatial distribution of all types of housing mentioned above—as compared with 
the density of all property types—is shown in Figure 5.4 (a-d). It is immediately 
evident that the most prominent type of housing in Bangkok is detached house. 
Terraced houses are similarly but less densely distributed. As seen in Figure 5.4 (b), 
shophouses are largely located in the inner-city areas and some north and north-western 
(a) Terraced houses (b) Shophouses 
(c) Semi-detached houses (d) Detached houses 




boroughs. Semi-detached houses are widely dispersed but few in number. They are not 
popular because of the shared wall between two properties. In some cases, semi-
detached houses were only built because of certain restrictions of the city plan or 
limited project space, which made it impossible for the development of detached 
houses. 
 
The following sections discuss in detail all analytical approaches in this study. 
There are three measures that form parts of ratio analysis: level of Assessment (LOA), 
coefficient of dispersion (COD) and price-related differential (PRD). Ratio analysis 
results are mapped to present geographical distribution patterns of assessment inequity. 
The results of ratio analysis are used to initially evaluate the quality of assessed price, 
and to identify assessment bias. Univariate local Moran’s analysis is then performed on 
A/S ratios to examine the presence of spatial autocorrelation. Bivariate local Moran’s 
analysis is performed on assessed price in relation to sale price, and vice versa. Finally, 
GWR models are constructed using variables related to housing and neighbourhood 




characteristics. Assessed and sale prices are assigned as dependent variables. It is 
expected that neighbourhood characteristics will have more impact on assessed prices 
than sale prices, while housing characteristics will have limited influence on both 




5.3  Overview of the Methods 
Data analysis in this study is based on three principle methods. First, the analysis 
begins with a non-spatial method of ratio analysis, which consists of three traditional 
measures: LOA, COD and PRD. These measures are widely used by assessment 
standard organisations around the world, e.g. IAAO and RICS. The measures are 
specifically designed to evaluate property assessments in mass appraisal system, in 
which properties are often assessed in large number and within a limited time frame. 
The property assessment system in Thailand is a good example of a mass appraisal 
system, in which properties are assessed every four years. LOA is used to measure 
average level of A/S ratio distribution. COD is used to measure horizontal equity, while 
PRD is used as an indicator of vertical equity. 
The second method is spatial autocorrelation analysis (global and local Moran’s I), 
which is used to determine the spatial patterns of assessed prices. The method allows us 
to understand the presence of spatial bias in the data. In this regard, the use of standard 
non-spatial statistics may give biased results. Therefore, both global and local spatial 
statistics are used in this study. A/S ratio is the only variable used in the analysis. In 
particular, local Moran’s I is used to examine areas with positive and negative spatial 
autocorrelation. Positive spatial autocorrelation includes clusters of high-high and low-
low values, whereas negative spatial autocorrelation includes outliers of high-low and 
low-high values. 
Finally, the analysis results of the two previous methods then lead to the 
introduction of GWR, which accounts for the spatial variation in the distribution of 
attributes. With GWR models, I aim to explain the variation in assessed prices 
throughout the study area by including both intrinsic and extrinsic variables. Intrinsic 
variables are real property characteristics that directly affect property value. Examples 
include property age, number of bedrooms and level of development of the surrounding 
area. Extrinsic variables are external factors that have an influence on property value—
e.g. housing supply, population density and mortgage rate. In practice, factors affecting 
assessed prices may be different from those affecting sale prices, depending on the 






Figure 5.5 shows a process flow diagram of methodological approaches employed 
in this study. It can be seen that the three approaches are used in sequential order. The 
analysis begins with the ratio analysis (of A/S ratio) to measure assessment uniformity 
and equity. After obtaining the results of ratio analysis, global and local Moran’s 
analysis are used to analyse property price at a more complex level. What the method 
tries to achieve is to identify the existence of systemic biases within the assessment 
system, their causes and ways to improve them. The interpretation is based on basic 
cluster and outlier analysis in relation to road networks, urban transport networks, 
important landmarks and other public amenities. The final approach employed is GWR, 
which is also incorporated with OLS for the purpose of model selection. It is expected 
that the results of GWR, which suggest the influence of each variable, will help 
determine appropriate assessment approaches. This will directly affect the quality of 
assessed prices. The results can also help determine an appropriate level of tax rate, but 
this is beyond the scope of the current study as it would require a more comprehensive 









Figure 5.5 Methodological diagram 
- Assessment Uniformity 
- Horizontal Equity 
- Vertical Equity 
- Assessment Progressiveness 
- Spatial distribution of A/S ratios 
- Existence of systemic assessment bias 
- Spatial distribution of clusters and 
outliers of the coverage ratio 
- Identification of variables 
determining housing prices for 
mass appraisal models 
- Recommendations on 
assessment approaches 
- Appropriate tax base 
Literature review: 
- Conceptual framework 
- Policy framework 
- Analytical approaches 
- Determination of variables 
 
Empirical analysis on assessed and sale 
prices, and other property data: 
- Price growth (over 12 years) 
- Spatial variations 




- Research contribution 



















5.4  Assessment Ratio Analysis 
The most common method for evaluating mass property assessments is to compare 
assessed prices with subsequent sale prices. This is normally done by calculating A/S 
ratios. Ideally, A/S ratios should be equal to one, which means that assessed prices can 
perfectly reflect market prices. Any ratios lower than one indicate that properties are 
generally under-assessed, and any ratios greater than one indicate that properties are 
generally over-assessed. However, apart from being directly interpreted, A/S ratios are 
also used as a basis for other analytical approaches. As shown in Table 5.3, there are 
three conventional measures associated with A/S ratios. LOA is a simple measure that 
employs median to find a central tendency of A/S ratios in a taxing jurisdiction. COD is 
used as a preliminary indicator for horizontal inequity, which is expressed as the 
percentage deviation of all properties in a jurisdiction from median A/S ratio. PRD is a 
measure of vertical inequity, which should ideally be equal to one. PRD values that 
deviate from one indicate either assessment progressivity or regressivity, neither of 
which is desirable by most assessment standards7.  
Table 5.3 Criteria for evaluating assessment performance 
Evaluation Criteria Descriptive Analyses 
Level of Assessment (LOA) Median A/S ratio 
Horizontal Equity Coefficient of Dispersion (COD) 
Vertical Equity Price Related Differential (PRD) 
Source: Author’s summary 
 
In ratio studies, quality of property assessments is measured in terms of accuracy. 
Assessment accuracy is defined as ‘the degree to which properties are assessed at 
market value’ (IAAO, 2013b, p. 7), which can be measured by A/S ratios. Market value 
as an economic concept is assumed to be reflected in sale price, which is also referred 
to as market prices in ratio studies. As mentioned in Chapter 3, there are two aspects of 
assessment accuracy: level and uniformity. Assessment level refers to the overall A/S 
ratio of a jurisdiction, often reported in central tendency terms (median or weighted 
mean). The evaluation of assessment level is often made with regard to groups of 
properties, rather than on an individual basis, to reflect the nature of the mass appraisal 
 
7 It should be noted that assessment progressivity and regressivity in this context differ from the concept of 
progressive and regressive tax rates in fiscal economics. Progressivity and regressivity described here directly refer 




system. Assessment uniformity refers to the degree to which properties are assessed at 
a similar proportion to the market value. The results are normally compared among 
different boroughs to establish fairer levels across the whole city. 
5.4.1  Level of Assessment (LOA) 
LOA estimation is based on a central tendency or the median A/S ratio. It is used to 
measure assessment uniformity between jurisdictions. LOA is a product of sorting all 
A/S ratios in a jurisdiction (or stratum) from the lowest to highest value, and reporting 
the middle data point. The mean (average) and weighted mean (value-weighted 
average) can also be used but the median is preferable because it gives equal weight to 
each ratio and is less sensitive to extreme values. The result is a point estimate which 
acts as the only indicator of the whole population. LOA is normally accompanied by 
confidence intervals (typically 95%) in order to indicate the reliability of the sample as 
a predictor of total levels of assessment for the population. An internationally accepted 
standard set by the IAAO allows 10 per cent assessment error on either side of the 
market value, which means that median A/S ratio must lie between 0.90 and 1.10 
(IAAO, 2013b). 
In this study, LOA results are presented by comparing the median A/S ratios for all 
boroughs in Bangkok. The comparison gives the approximate tendency of the 
distribution of assessed and sale price disparity. Further analysis is carried out by 
calculating the proportion of A/S ratios in each borough that meets the IAAO standard. 
The proportion not only indicates the percentage of acceptable ratios but also shows a 
tendency of deviation from the standard in some areas. In this study, A/S ratios in all 
boroughs are generally below the standard range, which indicates that most properties 
are under-assessed. The assessment level is also be analysed in terms of geographical 
distribution by plotting all the under- and over-assessed properties on maps. 
5.4.2  Coefficient of Dispersion (COD) 
COD is a measure of horizontal equity, which can be achieved when properties with 
similar values are taxed at similar rates. COD is an absolute deviation from the median 
in percentage terms. It can be interpreted as an average percentage difference of all A/S 
ratios of the observations from the median A/S ratio. A COD of zero indicates perfect 




A/S ratio. However, in areas where housing types are more diverse—for example, in 
terms of age and design, the standard of 15 percentage range can be applied (IAAO, 











where 𝐴𝑖 is the assessed value of the i
th property; Si is sale price of the i
th  property; and 
MedianA/S is the median of jurisdiction/strata sample 𝐴𝑖/𝑆𝑖. 
COD level largely depends on overall size of a jurisdiction, profile of property 
characteristics and market activities (Ibid.). Size of jurisdiction may affect the profile of 
property characteristics as housing characteristics are likely to be more diverse in larger 
jurisdictions. A high level of market activities means there are more property 
transactions and may result in higher property prices. All of these factors tend to affect 
level of assessment and change in market prices, which of course directly affects COD 
results. 
The purpose of COD in this study is to explore overall geographical distribution 
patterns in the disparity between assessed and sale prices rather than to determine 
whether or not the levels of assessed prices meet the acceptable standard. The results 
are presented by ranking COD levels of all boroughs in Bangkok. COD results are 
mapped to make it easier to relate to geographical areas. 
5.4.3  Price-Related Differential (PRD) 
PRD is an index that measures vertical equity, which can be achieved when taxpayers 
contribute proportionately to their property wealth. In other words, the higher the 
property values are, the higher tax assessment should be levied. PRD is calculated by 
dividing mean A/S ratio with weighted mean A/S ratio. An index level of one would 
indicate perfect vertical equity. A PRD level above one indicates assessment 
regressivity (or it could also imply that lower priced homes tend to be over-assessed), 
and a level below one indicates assessment progressivity (or it could also imply that 
higher priced homes tend to be over-assessed). The IAAO standard suggests that the 
index should lie within a 0.98-1.03 range (IAAO, 2013b). The PRD can be 




















where 𝐴𝑖 is the assessed value of the i
th property; and Si is the sale price of the i
th  
property. 
However, PRD may not be sufficiently reliable when the sample size is small or the 
data contains extreme sale prices. In this case, a useful diagnostic tool is a scatter plot 
of A/S ratios versus assessed or sale prices (Ibid.). In this study, the purpose of using 
PRD is mainly to identify areas with relatively high numbers of over- and under-
assessed properties. It is a quantitative measure used to compare boroughs across 
Bangkok. Similar to LOA and COD, PRD acts as a preliminary indicator for 
assessment biases. PRD levels for all boroughs are compared and presented by table 




5.5  Spatial Autocorrelation Analysis 
The potential for estimating geographical distribution of assessment inequity is 
explored using a spatial autocorrelation analysis. This study uses Moran’s I, which is a 
classic statistical tool that allows for simultaneous observation of both feature locations 
and non-spatial values (Moran, 1950). In simple terms, it is an index of similarity and 
dissimilarity. Using A/S ratios of all observations, the significance of biased assessment 
clustering is based on the z-score, and assessment inaccuracy can be detected by the 
cluster and outlier analysis of A/S ratios. General tests are carried out by the global 
Moran’s statistic to identify the existence of overall clustering. If the global test finds 
no positive autocorrelation, the local test can be used to identify isolated hotspots of 
increased value of the attribute. When the global test8 indicates a significant deviation 
from randomness, the local test can help determine either the study area is homogenous 
or there are local outliers that contribute to a significant global statistic of positive 
spatial autocorrelation (Rogerson, 2015). 
In this study, the spatial autocorrelation analysis is used because there may be 
geographical bias in the property price data—i.e. certain areas may share higher or 
lower A/S ratios compared to others, or large clusters of abnormal levels of A/S ratios 
may exist in certain parts of the case study area. Local Moran’s I can help identify such 
areas by comparing the values in each locality with those of its neighbouring areas. 
Once locations of positive/negative spatial autocorrelation are identified, the results can 
be compared with the spatial distribution of the levels of assessment throughout the 
study area. These groups of clusters and outliers can be interpreted in a number of ways 
depending on the relative levels of assessed and sale prices in each particular area. 
The detection of geographic clusters can be classified into three primary areas 
(Besag and Newell, 1991). First, ‘general tests’ are used to detect overall patterns for a 
map consisting of point locations. They provide a test for the null hypothesis that there 
is no underlying pattern (or random pattern). Second are “focused tests”, often used 
when there is a priori idea of cluster location. They may be used, for example, to find a 
link between specific subway stations and clusters of relatively high assessed housing 
values. Finally, if there is no preconceived idea of where clusters locate, ‘tests for the 
detection of clustering’ are used to uncover the size and location of any possible 
 




clusters. The global Moran’s statistic can be expressed as follows: 
𝐼 = [
n
















where n is the number of regions; and 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is a weight matrix that represents spatial 
proximity between region i and j (Moran, 1950). 
The global Moran’s coefficient distinguishes compactness from sprawl. It is a single 
average value, ranging from -1 to +1, which applies to the entire data set. High values 
(close to +1) indicates a strong spatial pattern, while low values (close to -1) indicates a 
strong decentralised, sprawling form. In the case of positive spatial autocorrelation, 
high values tend to locate near one another, and vice versa. Finally, values near zero 
indicate a lack of spatial pattern. Values of -1 or +1 are unlikely to occur because of the 
low probability that the data will be perfectly spatially autocorrelated. Therefore, in 
practice, a value of +0.3 or more, or of -0.3 or less, is an indication of strong spatial 
autocorrelation (O’Sullivan and Unwin, 2010). 
However, the global Moran’s statistic does not suggest the location of clusters as it 
is intended to provide a test of the null hypothesis that the A/S ratios are randomly 
distributed among the data points in the study area. If we can reject the null hypothesis, 
local Moran’s statistic can be used to identify specific locations of outliers and clusters. 
Instead of summarising values of A/S ratio over an entire data area, local Moran’s 
statistic calculates only the A/S ratios in the same locality as each data point. Two types 
of local Moran’s statistics emerge in the literature: univariate and bivariate. The 
univariate local Moran’s statistic can be expressed as: 
𝐼𝑖 =  𝑧𝑖 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑧𝑗
𝑗
(5.4) 
where 𝑧𝑖 is the standardised value of the A/S ratio of area i; 𝑧𝑗 is the standardised value 
of the A/S ratio of area j; and 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is the spatial weight matrix that reflects the degree of 





In the univariate local Moran’s analysis, an A/S ratio is calculated for each property 
(i) to be compared with neighbouring properties (j) through weight matrix (w) within a 
specified distance threshold (d). A/S ratio is used to calculate the local Moran’s index 
because it is a widely accepted measure for property assessment and sale price 
discrepancy, which is especially useful in determining spatial inequity when comparing 
different geographical areas. The bivariate local Moran’s statistic can be expressed as: 
𝐼𝑥𝑦






𝑖  is the standardised value of the variable x of area i; 𝑧𝑦
𝑗
 is the standardised 
value of the variable y of area j; and 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is the spatial weight matrix (Anselin et al., 
2002). 
The bivariate local Moran’s statistical analysis adopts similar principles to the 
univariate analysis, but has been developed to examine spatial correlation between two 
variables. The bivariate local Moran’s statistic tests for the correlation between one 
variable (x) and the spatial lag of another variable (y) (Anselin et al., 2002). However, 
the bivariate analysis does not take into account the inherent correlation between the 
two variables at the same locations (between xi and yi). Instead, what the test 
emphasises is the spatial correlation between xi and ∑j wijyj. 
The bivariate local Moran’s statistic can potentially be adopted to test for spatial 
relationship between A/S ratios and housing density. If the value of A/S ratios is 
correlated with the spatial lag that pertains to the housing density variable, we can 
examine the patterns of level of assessment distribution in relation to the level of 
housing development. In this thesis, however, only the univariate local Moran’s 
statistic is applicable because the A/S ratio and housing density variables exhibit strong 
and consistent spatial correlation. Therefore, only the A/S ratio variable is used as it 
serves as a proxy for the housing density variable. The data are tested for statistical 
significance and represented by choropleth mapping at four different scales: borough, 
sub-district, 1-kilometre grid and 500-metre grid. The representation in different areal 





The results that are particularly relevant in this study are those indicating negative 
spatial autocorrelation or outliers of high-low and low-high values. High-low (or low-
high) outliers indicate that areas of potentially over-assessed (or under-assessed) 
properties are surrounded by neighbourhoods of under-assessed (or over-assessed) 
properties. These two results are likely to indicate systemic errors in assessments. 
However, a positive spatial autocorrelation is also important for the identification of 
particularly large areas of assessment uniformity, which may be caused by a sudden 
increase in assessed prices compared with the previous assessment cycle. Parcel-level 
observation is then required to find geographical distribution patterns of test results, 
potentially by analysing them along with road networks. This analytical method is 
consistent with the assessment practices adopted by the PVB that tend to group 
property transactions on certain streets or within certain neighbourhoods together in the 




5.6  Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR) 
GWR is a spatial variant of regression modelling. It is a non-stationary technique that 
takes into account geographical distortions of data. In other words, GWR is a local 
statistic used to model spatially varying relationships between variables. Based on the 
local Moran’s analysis that identifies spatial heterogeneity in the data, spatial non-
stationarity can be examined by GWR modelling. A local model must be estimated at 
each data point in the study area so that the observed data are spatially weighted 
according to their proximity to the location. Like other local statistical approaches, 
nearby data points are weighted more heavily than those from more distant locations 
(O’Sullivan & Unwin, 2010). A general form of the GWR model can be expressed as 
(Fotheringham et al., 1998, 2002): 
𝑦𝑖 =  𝛽𝑖0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
 +  𝜀𝑖 (5.6) 
where 𝑦𝑖 is the dependent variable at location i; 𝑥𝑖𝑗 is the j
th independent variable at 
location i; 𝛽𝑖0 is the intercept parameter at location i; 𝛽𝑖𝑗 is the local regression 
coefficient for the jth independent variable at location i; m is the number of independent 
variables; and 𝜀𝑖 is the random error at location i. 
GWR allows β coefficients to vary spatially, which can offset any imbalance of 
spatial heterogeneity. The model estimates a local-specific coefficient for every 
independent variable. Each set of local regression coefficients is estimated by weighted 
least square, in which a weighting scheme Wi is applied to each squared difference 
(Brunsdon et al., 1996). The matrix for the estimation of local coefficients can be 




where ?̂?𝑖 = (𝛽𝑖𝑜, … , 𝛽𝑖𝑚)
𝑡 is the vector of 𝑚+1 local regression coefficients; 𝑥 is the 
matrix of the independent variables; 𝑦 is the dependent variable vector; and 𝑤𝑖 is the 
diagonal matrix denoting the geographical weighting of each observed data for 





When determining the regression weight for each local model, a kernel function is 
applied (Fotheringham et al., 2002). In this study, the weighting scheme is calculated 
with a Gaussian kernel function, which can be defined as: 









where 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is the distance between observation point 𝑗 and regression point 𝑖; and b is 
the kernel bandwidth, which can be specified either by a fixed distance (i.e. fixed 
bandwidth) or by a fixed number of neighbouring observations (i.e. adaptive 
bandwidth). If there is a significant variation in the data set, an adaptive variable 
bandwidth is usually applied. During model calibration, an optimum bandwidth is 
specified by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), which accounts for model 
parsimony (Akaike, 1973). Unlike the cross-validation (CV) score, the AIC also 
accounts for model complexity in the goodness-of-fit diagnosis. 
 
Table 5.4 Descriptions of variables and data sources 
Variable Source Measure 
Assessed price PVB  Baht 
Sale price LR Baht 
Housing age LR No. of years 
Living area (building area) LR m2 
Land area LR m2 
Population density Calculate using GIS No. of resident/ km2 
Property density Calculate using GIS No. of property/km2 
Housing sale density Calculate using GIS No. of properties/km2 
Distance to main roads Calculate using GIS m 
Distance to urban rail transport stations  Calculate using GIS m 
Employment accessibility (distance to CBD) Calculate using GIS km (to CBD) 
Note: PVB = Property Valuation Bureau; LR = Land Registry; km = kilometre and m = metre 
Variables included in GWR models are shown in Table 5.4. There are two groups of 
independent variables: one is related to land use features and the other is related to 
neighbourhood characteristics. Land use features are represented by housing age, living 
area and land area. Neighbourhood characteristics are represented by population 
density, property density, housing sale volume density, distance to rail transport 
stations (nearest access points) and employment accessibility. Assessed price is the 




Locations of urban rail transport stations (including those under construction) are 
identified and mapped for the estimation of approximate distance from observed data 
points to nearest station access points. Locations of several routes and stations in the 
pipeline are not yet finalised but approximate locations of their stations can be 
determined. ‘Siam BTS station’ is assigned as the centre point of Bangkok’s CBD as it 
is currently the busiest location for public transports and commercial activity. A 
Euclidean distance metric is used in this study. 
Given the nature of the housing market, GWR is widely judged to be the most 
appropriate approach for the analysis. In many housing market studies, it is often 
assumed that there is spatial heterogeneity in the relationship between house price and 
hedonic independent variables (Lu et al., 2014). Several comparative studies on 
housing market and property appraisal (Bitter et al., 2007; Huang et al., 2010; 
McCluskey et al., 2013) suggest that GWR is superior to other approaches—e.g. 
artificial neural network and traditional multiple regression analysis—in terms of 
model performance and accuracy. GWR is also capable of identifying housing 
submarkets in large study areas (Borst and McCluskey, 2011), which is crucial for the 
improvement of model accuracy, especially in areas where housing types are diverse 




5.7  Limitations and Concerns 
Accuracy of sale price data 
A primary concern is the accuracy of property sale data provided by the Land Registry. 
Some reported sale prices may be lower than actual transaction prices because of the 
incentive to avoid SDLT. A lack of well-established tracking systems has given rise to 
informal property transaction channels. In a worst-case scenario, property sale price 
may be registered as low as assessed price, which the law mandated as a minimum 
taxable value for the SDLT. However, this problem can be addressed by verifying the 
Land Registry’s sale data with the PVB’s survey data. The sale data set provided by the 
PVB has been verified by surveyors, who have approached property owners directly to 
enquire about asking prices. The two data sets are merged using property ID 
comprising UTM number, page number and parcel number. 
The size of bandwidth in GWR models 
The choice of bandwidth—or decay function—has a massive influence on the results of 
GWR. A narrow bandwidth will lead to high variances in the estimators and, 
conversely, a wide bandwidth will lead to results that are similar to a global model 
because it allows for minimal distance decay (Fotheringham et al., 2000). The study 
demonstrates that, in Equation 5.8, as b tends to infinity, the weights are getting close 
to one so the estimated parameters become uniform, which makes GWR similar to 
OLS. To determine an appropriate bandwidth size, an adaptive bandwidth is adopted to 
ensure a non-zero weighting at all regression points, and AIC is used to select the 
bandwidth. 
The problem of multicollinearity 
Another problem associated with GWR is the multicollinearity in the models. Brunsdon 
et al., (2012) point out that collinearity is an inherent problem, which is particularly 
pertinent in the study of spatial data. The multicollinearity problem occurs when 
explanatory variables in the model are correlated. The problem is particularly relevant 
to GWR because collinearity is more pronounced when the localised data samples are 
smaller. Some localities may exhibit collinearity when the data is spatially 




The problem can be addressed by measuring the degree of collinearity in the data by 
variance inflation factor (VIF), which estimates the degree to which the sampling 
variance of each parameter is amplified by the collinearity in other independent 
variables in a model. VIF values can be computed by the OLS tool prior to the 
construction of GWR models to decide which explanatory variables should be selected.  
As a rule of thumb, a VIF value above 7.5 is problematic (Rosenshein et al., 2011), but 
this depends on what we are trying to estimate. High VIFs may be unproblematic if a 
straightforward prediction is made by a model. If one variable has a high VIF value, 
other (one or more) variables will normally have high VIF values because they are 
correlated. When any variables exhibit excessively high VIF values, the variables can 
be omitted from the model or more data can be obtained in order to reduce the standard 
errors. Alternatively, predictors may be recoded using orthogonal polynomials to 
reduce correlations (Bock, 2019). 
Apart from VIF, the OLS tool is used to perform diagnostic tests for overall model 
selection as well. The Koenker p-value is used to test for nonstationary relationships in 
a model. A small and statistically significant Koenker p-value means the relationships 
between variables vary across the study area and are nonstationary. In this situation, 
robust probabilities should be consulted to determine coefficients. 
Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP) 
MAUP is a long-standing concern in spatial analysis, especially in the case of census-
type data that involves different levels of aggregation (e.g. county, district, sub-district, 
etc.). The problem arises when different spatial units are used to mapped the same data, 
which can produce different analytical results and may lead to misinterpretation of the 
relationship between variables (Dark and Bram, 2007; D. Wong, 2008). As shown by 
Openshaw and Taylor (1979), many different possible ways to aggregate spatial units 
can produce correlations that range between -1.0 and +1.0 even with the same data set. 
There are two issues related to the MAUP: scale and zone. The scale problem 
arises when the data collected at one scale is applied at a different scale, which can 
produce variation in statistical results. For example, aggregation of individual data 
tends to produce more tightly clustered regression results and stronger coefficients of 




different ways of grouping spatial units produce markedly different results from the 
same data (Openshaw and Taylor, 1979). 
The MAUP is certainly an important factor in this study as the assessed and sale 
prices data has been collected at individual level. In ArcGIS, I have employed data-
driven classification (natural breaks) to limit the impact of MAUP in the analysis. 
However, natural breaks only allow for data-specific classification and are not useful 
for comparing different underlying data. I have also employed multi-scale data 
presentations to mitigate distortion effects from the zoning issue. In such cases, data are 
presented from four different unit scales: borough, sub-district, 1-kilometre grid and 
500-metre grid. 
Boundary Problem 
One methodological limitation often mentioned in studies on spatial point patterns 
using administrative boundaries concerns the edge effect. The problem involves the 
failure of spatial models to include the influence of data points outside the study area 
(Gao et al., 2017; Sadler et al., 2011). These influences exist because people can travel 
freely across arbitrary borders and locational effects can extend beyond certain 
boundaries. Researchers often use arbitrary administrative boundaries such as census 
tracts and block groups without paying careful attention to the fact that resources 
beyond a given boundary can affect behaviours or values within a given spatial unit 
(Rodeiro and Lawson, 2005). Edge effects manifest as arbitrary boundaries fail to fully 
capture these effects, resulting in distortion of estimates. In their study on location 
modelling within the mass appraisal process, Lockwood and Rossini (2011) assert that 
using administrative boundaries can lead to a marked difference between the predicted 
values of adjacent properties located on different sides of such boundaries. 
Edge effects can be corrected for in a number of ways. In Ripley's (1979) study, two 
types of edge corrections are examined. The first approach involves the elimination of 
border effects by mapping the region on to a torus, and the other involves the inclusion 
of points lying outside but within a reasonable distance of the study areas. Another 
method of correcting for edge effects is to create a buffer zone around the study region 
(Wong and Fotheringham, 1990). Points within the buffer zone are considered in terms 




The shape of study regions is a related issue as it may influence statistical results. 
The nearest-neighbour statistic, for example, tends to measure point patterns as being 
increasingly clustered when the shape of the region becomes more elongated 
(Fotheringham and Rogerson, 1993). A possible solution to this issue, and that of edge 
effects, is to explore a large number of random drawings of shape and sizes of regions 
within a defined area and carry out significance test for each region (Ibid.). Particularly 
in the field of property assessment, it is evident that GWR can reduce prediction errors 
arising from edge effects, and that GWR-based models are more in line with the market 
(Lockwood and Rossini, 2011). The efficacy of GWR in improving model accuracy is 






5.8  Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to explain how three analytical methods—assessment ratio 
analysis, spatial autocorrelation analysis and GWR—can be applied to property data. 
Although none of the methods is new to housing studies, this study is unique in terms 
of the combination and sequence of the methods. Thanks to the generous involvement 
of the PVB, the scale of the data sets used in this study is unprecedented in property 
research in Thailand. The data on assessed house prices covers a period of 12 years. By 
incorporating this data with sale prices, property price determinant variables and 
cadastral maps, we gain highly comprehensive data sets suitable for property tax 
analysis at a city-wide scale. Further analysis of these data sets, beyond the scope of 
this study, would certainly produce results that would contribute to the fields of urban 
housing economics, urban geography and property valuation. 
Particularly in Thailand, there has never been an application of the IAAO’s ratio 
analysis to a study area as holistic as in this study. A/S ratios of properties located in all 
metropolitan areas of Bangkok are analysed based on all approaches suggested by the 
IAAO—i.e. LOA, COD and PRD. These approaches are used as a preliminary analysis 
of the A/S ratio differentials in all Bangkok boroughs. The results of such analysis will 
allow us to determine and compare assessment coverage throughout the capital city. 
The results are also compared with those of international studies in terms of assessment 
performance in large urban areas. 
The type of spatial autocorrelation analysis chosen in this study is global and local 
Moran’s I. The global Moran’s index is used to identify if there is a spatial 
autocorrelation in the data. The test is performed on the A/S ratios across the study 
area. The local test is then performed on the same data at different spatial units. The 
units of choice are administrative boundaries (borough and sub-district) and artificial 
grids (1-kilometre and 500-metre). The bivariate local Moran’s I is considered in terms 
of analysing the spatial correlation between A/S ratios and population or housing 
density. However, it is evident that there is a strong relationship between A/S ratios and 
housing density. Therefore, only the analysis of univariate local Moran’s index on A/S 
ratios is performed in this study. 
GWR is the last approach adopted in this study. As mentioned earlier, GWR is 




accurate results (see Bidanset and Lombard, 2014; Lockwood and Rossini, 2011). The 
use of GWR in property tax modelling can produce more accurate assessments than 
multiple regression analysis (MRA) or most automated valuation modelling (AVM) 
techniques (Borst and McCluskey, 2008; McCluskey et al., 2013; Moore, 2009). Before 
performing the GWR analysis, OLS is used as a diagnostic test to perform two tasks. 
One is to determine the appropriate set of variables and the other is to ensure a 
nonstationary relationship in each model. GWR is then performed using the selected set 
of variables to determine their influence on assessed prices. 
Finally, the limitations in this study are identified in Section 5.7. There are five 
limitations ranging from the quality of data to methodology-related concerns. The 
solution to the issue of sale price data quality is to cross-validate the data of the Land 
Registry with the PVB’s survey data. This step is carried out in the data cleansing 
process. The methodology-related problems include the size of bandwidth in GWR 
models, the problem of multicollinearity, MAUP and edge effect. Solutions to these 
problems are drawn from the literature. Some solutions discussed are applied and will 
be presented in the remaining chapters. 
The last two chapters (6 and 7) present data analysis and discussion of research 
findings. Chapter 6 explains how the data is analysed by the three methods. Before the 
presentation of the main analysis, the chapter provides an overview of the assessed 
price in relation to the sale price data. The data covers all areas of Bangkok. The final 
chapter provides a summary and discussion of findings in relation to the research 
questions and hypotheses. The thesis concludes with research implications and 
recommendations with the aims of improving assessment processes and setting a 




Chapter 6  Data Analysis and Results 
In this chapter we will explore the housing market in Bangkok through both spatial and 
non-spatial analyses of property data. The main aim is to reveal irregularities in 
assessed price, and to see whether they have caused any systemic inequities or not. I 
attempt to test for both horizontal and vertical equities, for which the analysis is three-
fold. The first is ratio analysis, which measures assessment equity on a broad scale—
i.e. borough level. This conventional approach is powerful in that, if the sale price data 
is accurate, A/S ratio analysis can produce meaningful results for assessment levels at 
certain areal scales. The analysis is akin to the assessment coverage ratio in the simple 
ratio model of Bahl and Linn (1992). Spatial autocorrelation analysis (local Moran’s I) 
is then applied at property level to identify more specific areas with underlying 
assessment problems. Finally, GWR is performed to explore the impact of explanatory 
variables on housing assessed prices. Two GWR models are presented and discussed. 
There are five main parts to this chapter. The first section (6.1) provides a 
descriptive account of housing assessed prices. It includes an overview of assessed 
prices between 2008 and 2019, which covers three assessment cycles. The second 
section (6.2) presents the assessment ratio analysis at borough level, with maps to 
facilitate comparison of results between boroughs. The third section (6.3) shows how 
spatial autocorrelation analysis is performed on A/S ratios. The presentation of the 
results of local Moran’s I is based on four areal units and on area-specific boundaries. 
In the fourth section (6.4), OLS diagnostic testing and GWR analysis are presented. 
This section also makes use of maps to show the spatial distribution patterns of selected 






6.1  Overview of the Assessed Prices in Bangkok, 2016-19 
In order to understand the working of the whole assessment process, we will first 
examine spatial distribution of assessed price for all types of properties. This 
preliminary analysis includes land values of nearly all private properties in Bangkok. 
The purpose of this analysis is to see how assessed prices are distributed geographically 
over the entire BMA. Five types of property—as classified by assessors—are presented 
in the data set. The most predominant property type in terms of the number of units is 
residential, which accounts for about two-thirds of the total units. The rest comprises 
commercial, agricultural, industrial and vacant land. 
In Figure 6.1, overall levels of current assessed (vacant) land values are presented at 
500-metre grid scale (b) along with property density (a). The results reveal a 
concentration of highly assessed properties in the CBD and peripheral boroughs along 
the river banks. There are more properties with assessed values higher than the mean 
(11,916 baht or £264.8 per square metre) located on the east side. The spatial 
distribution of assessed prices is consistent with that of property density except in the 
two easternmost boroughs, Lad Krabang and Nong Chok, where more industrial 
properties are located. 
 
When comparing the spatial distributions of assessed (vacant) land values of 
residential properties with those of all types of properties, it is found that, in general, 
they are similar in western suburban and central areas (see Figure 6.2). However, there 
are some disparities in assessed land values that should be mentioned. As compared to 




total assessed land values, properties with lower residential assessed land values are 
largely found in the two easternmost boroughs, Lad Krabang and Nong chok. It is 
possible that high assessed values in these boroughs have been caused by industrial 
properties and vacant lands as they altogether account for the majority of all properties 
in the areas. Low residential assessed values in Parthum Wan district located in the 
CBD have raised a concern over systemic errors in assessed prices, which will be 
further investigated in the following sections. Another observation is that highly 
assessed residential land values are located in suburbs of both sides of the river, but 
more concentrations of the high assessed values can be found on the east side. This in 
part confirms my hypothesis that the east side of Bangkok has become a more attractive 
location for residential units than the west because it has better accessibility to 
employment and commercial centres as well as government agencies. 
 
 
Bangkok has seen major changes in urban development and public transport during 
the past few decades (Perera et al., 2007). These changes have not gone unnoticed by 
residents and investors, and the housing market in Bangkok has been more or less 
affected by these factors. Sale prices of residential properties are assumed to have been 
adjusted according to these factors, but the extent to which assessed price can adjust to 
the changing market circumstances remains questionable. We will now turn our 
attention to assessed prices for residential properties in their entirety, which include 
land and improvement values. 




Using data from the current assessment cycle, Table 6.1 presents descriptive 
statistics for assessed values of residential properties. Thirty-three of the city’s fifty 
boroughs have mean assessed house prices higher than the overall mean assessed price 
for Bangkok. What we can notice from the results is that there is a marked difference 
between the highest and lowest assessed prices per square metre, 269,628 baht and 
341 baht (about £5,991 and £7.6 per square metre respectively). Boroughs with marked 
differences are mostly located in inner Bangkok. The borough with the largest 
difference in housing assessed values is Dusit (255,052 baht or £5,668 per square 
metre), compared with Sai Mai, which is the outer suburban borough with the smallest 
difference of 12,750 baht or £284 per square metre. Albeit not totally conclusive, we 
can make a general observation that inner Bangkok and some areas in eastern suburbs 
tend to have wider disparity in housing assessed prices than other areas. Is this 
phenomenon a direct result of particularly higher transaction prices in those areas? 
When comparing assessed with sale values of residential properties, it is found that 
they have similar patterns of geographical price distribution (see Figure 6.3). The only 
difference is that the sale prices seem to be significantly higher in suburban areas on 
both sides of the city, which confirms my hypothesis that assessed prices are catching 
up with sale prices. The housing sale prices tend to have larger disparities between the 
highest and the lowest values in the same areas as the assessed prices. These areas are 
located in inner Bangkok, which also includes most parts of the CBD. However, a 
major difference between the two data sets is that the sale prices have significantly 
bigger ranges than the assessed prices have in all boroughs (see Table 6.2). In Dusit, for 
example, the range of sale prices is 431,210 baht (£9,582), nearly twice as much as that 




Table 6.1 Summary of housing assessed prices (baht/m2) in Bangkok 
Borough Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Bang Bon 15,566.73 15,578.13 3,572.08 27,952.81 
Bang Kapi 14,040.63 13,178.67 2,232.75 43,158.13 
Bang Khae 15,469.24 15,376.32 3,007.00 26,270.84 
Bang Kho Leam 40,062.97 39,142.20 10,223.44 80,884.68 
Bang Khun Thian 13,253.86 13,137.24 778.82 33,010.92 
Bang Na 18,128.82 17,238.78 4,232.75 49,402.54 
Bang Plat 16,230.91 14,660.77 3,956.39 52,708.70 
Bang Rak 42,260.33 34,675.21 10,056.42 258,984.00 
Bang Sue 20,900.90 18,770.58 2,865.10 73,715.91 
Bangkean 7,733.49 7,500.00 800.00 42,372.88 
Bangkok Noi 17,684.06 15,535.38 3,870.56 56,864.00 
Bangkok Yai 17,218.59 17,681.94 2,627.58 34,831.52 
Bueng Kum 15,069.10 13,718.32 404.17 57,686.48 
Chatuchak 17,360.17 15,976.67 3,430.04 85,548.80 
Chom Thong 20,348.36 19,902.24 2,230.83 33,614.58 
Din Dang 20,601.07 18,375.13 3,077.63 71,635.00 
Don Mueang 13,889.12 13,657.26 2,607.39 73,574.36 
Dusit 48,919.99 44,170.78 14,576.20 269,628.80 
Huai Khwang 21,662.78 17,429.01 8,143.85 108,558.35 
Khan Na Yao 15,408.92 14,632.75 746.35 36,083.33 
Klong Sam Wa 11,106.03 10,861.30 534.55 25,202.72 
Klong San 23,613.60 20,493.30 2,652.35 251,249.24 
Klong Toei 34,179.85 31,797.52 2,587.62 94,690.29 
Lad Krabang 10,806.54 10,422.18 365.57 42,508.11 
Ladprao 16,809.52 15,397.44 2,241.89 71,467.14 
Lak Si 15,866.20 14,992.44 4,857.69 39,880.74 
Min Buri 11,112.96 10,838.49 838.88 31,815.79 
Nong Chok 6,909.30 6,796.95 341.15 41,506.15 
Nong Kheam 12,240.30 12,076.41 1,082.29 22,169.10 
Parthum Wan 49,467.65 45,235.38 17,041.20 108,814.05 
Phasi Charoen 13,813.65 12,861.75 2,062.21 96,888.11 
Phra Khanong 17,054.49 15,012.00 4,528.60 87,647.06 
Phra Nakhon 60,115.63 55,946.35 15,822.20 112,986.55 
Phya Thai 25,507.98 21,872.78 6,676.65 165,219.63 
Pom Prap Sattru Pai 67,964.12 63,638.07 20,577.86 146,714.79 
Prawet 16,903.64 16,652.92 762.24 84,417.89 
Rat Burana 14,243.17 14,833.30 1,619.57 75,118.85 
Ratchathewi 48,530.94 40,647.94 9,555.37 131,905.60 
Sai Mai 7,588.47 7,375.00 1,000.00 13,750.00 
Samphanthawong 81,479.32 65,195.25 16,728.00 188,250.00 
Saphan Sung 15,898.51 16,152.16 840.29 31,100.00 
Sathorn 42,809.11 41,604.00 14,229.17 104,443.43 
Suanluang 22,569.76 23,108.14 1,595.64 102,497.94 
Taling Chan 17,039.37 13,672.85 1,915.63 45,881.25 
Thawi Watthana 12,778.71 11,903.24 1,564.40 28,210.59 
Thon Buri 19,460.46 17,043.77 4,160.74 57,850.46 
Thung Kru 16,167.59 15,656.85 3,601.32 67,770.43 
Vadhana 53,964.68 47,163.72 6,004.99 189,361.02 
Wang Thong Lang 22,798.30 23,521.29 4,147.75 35,192.27 
Yannawa 43,269.89 41,054.26 12,855.71 94,932.62 
Total 15,816.96 13,735.63 341.15 269,628.80 




Table 6.2 Summary of housing sale prices (baht/ m2) in Bangkok 
Borough Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Bang Bon 26,558.92 23,717.46 4,237.29 60,000.00 
Bang Kapi 21,970.52 18,055.56 2,000.00 133,792.05 
Bang Khae 27,091.32 25,875.00 2,000.00 83,710.41 
Bang Kho Leam 55,765.63 45,454.55 10,000.00 158,940.40 
Bang Khun Thian 21,456.06 20,793.27 625.00 84,102.01 
Bang Na 23,569.61 18,750.00 3,518.52 82,599.12 
Bang Plat 19,965.58 18,416.79 2,500.00 72,580.65 
Bang Rak 52,004.33 41,666.67 7,352.94 831,513.28 
Bang Sue 31,308.74 24,193.55 136.14 156,250.00 
Bangkean 19,770.00 16,992.34 623.44 61,205.27 
Bangkok Noi 28,933.77 26,388.89 2,439.02 116,666.67 
Bangkok Yai 35,013.54 38,618.38 2,535.50 71,948.36 
Bueng Kum 26,619.43 21,199.28 611.11 95,291.48 
Chatuchak 23,179.09 17,723.88 2,252.25 116,033.76 
Chom Thong 39,071.10 38,760.50 2,255.64 82,048.46 
Din Dang 32,395.90 27,573.53 5,000.00 418,019.48 
Don Mueang 23,303.67 24,254.81 2,419.35 66,236.41 
Dusit 63,155.10 52,419.35 11,267.61 442,477.88 
Huai Khwang 34,567.25 25,000.00 6,944.44 264,084.51 
Khan Na Yao 28,035.53 27,525.93 829.65 89,473.68 
Klong Sam Wa 17,294.65 16,666.67 300.00 61,576.35 
Klong San 33,151.37 27,978.55 2,500.00 308,823.53 
Klong Toei 60,999.16 39,195.88 5,375.00 396,153.85 
Lad Krabang 17,012.19 17,098.04 380.89 74,239.13 
Ladprao 26,244.15 20,333.33 675.68 101,878.61 
Lak Si 32,873.87 22,947.26 1,328.99 76,492.54 
Min Buri 14,835.46 13,949.58 892.86 38,709.68 
Nong Chok 9,417.10 9,040.89 305.62 25,953.13 
Nong Kheam 14,902.06 14,062.50 1,262.63 41,666.67 
Parthum Wan 70,685.97 51,419.35 9,615.38 622,679.86 
Phasi Charoen 19,958.50 16,666.67 1,470.59 68,965.52 
Phra Khanong 23,889.06 18,687.71 4,098.36 112,303.28 
Phra Nakhon 84,856.47 67,307.69 8,610.79 464,876.03 
Phya Thai 46,447.96 32,894.74 4,000.00 354,166.67 
Pom Prap Sattru Pai 101,992.66 71,847.10 12,931.03 927,083.33 
Prawet 29,897.06 31,291.95 1,233.87 77,586.21 
Rat Burana 22,546.91 19,673.81 1,013.51 66,875.00 
Ratchathewi 77,752.03 55,070.12 6,622.52 422,654.27 
Sai Mai 22,079.19 23,236.89 943.40 55,110.50 
Samphanthawong 156,292.08 97,348.48 22,026.43 1,342,105.26 
Saphan Sung 26,122.01 27,086.82 1,374.48 71,995.19 
Sathorn 52,829.71 44,326.24 9,661.84 175,000.00 
Suanluang 37,858.48 35,287.08 2,500.00 129,629.63 
Taling Chan 29,641.03 26,666.67 1,250.00 100,000.00 
Thawi Watthana 18,142.80 17,187.50 1,458.33 51,470.59 
Thon Buri 24,519.03 23,121.39 2,654.87 91,743.12 
Thung Kru 25,688.77 24,444.44 4,000.00 65,625.00 
Vadhana 122,227.18 80,604.62 4,539.95 1,029,109.59 
Wang Thong Lang 50,864.37 47,621.11 2,875.00 138,888.89 
Yannawa 66,690.73 51,470.59 10,000.00 220,175.44 
Total 26,560.11 22,580.65 136.14 1,342,105.26 





6.1.1  Changes in Housing Assessed Prices in Bangkok, 2008-19 
In this section we will investigate how assessed price has changed throughout Bangkok 
during the past twelve years, from 2008 to 2019. During this period, there have been 
two formal reassessments of all properties in the country, one in 2011 and the other in 
2015. Properties sale data that were used in both reassessments had been collected 
several times before final assessments were carried out. This has raised a question 
about the timing of market price adjustments, which may not be consistent throughout 
the whole data set and geographical areas of Bangkok. 
In addition, the timing of property surveys has raised another concern over the 
assessments. Property assessment surveys are based on geographical area, which means 
that most properties in each borough had been inspected at different time periods. The 
time period between the first and last surveys can extend over two years due to limited 
manpower of the PVB. As Person A, a manager in the East Bangkok assessment 
division, put it: 
There are only 28 staff in my division who are responsible for the 
assessment of over one million land parcels. The assessment process must 
be completed within three years. It begins with data validation, property 
surveying, data analysis, assessed price determination and cadastral map 
preparation. Every step requires careful attention to property details because 
the data we receive from the Land Registry is not always up-to-date. So 
assessors have to check the map parcel by parcel. 




The 50 boroughs of Bangkok are grouped into 17 areas according to the boundaries 
defined by the Land Registry’s offices. There are two divisions of assessors, one is 
responsible for west Bangkok (seven areas) and the other is responsible for east 
Bangkok (ten areas)—see Table 6.3 for details. Each assessing division works on 
different geographical areas and assessors work in one area to another at different time; 
therefore, it is possible that properties are assessed differently according to locations. 
As Person B, an assessor in the West Bangkok assessment division, put it: 
First we choose the area that we have to work on based on the boundaries 
defined by the Land Registry, which are larger than administrative 
boundaries. We work area by area until the whole assessment process is 
complete. Roughly a year before the announcement of new assessments, we 
review the prices and update sale price data for every area. And again, this is 
carried out one area at a time. 
Changes in assessed prices (in percentage terms) over three assessment cycles are 
presented at 500-metre grid level in Figure 6.4 (a-b). In general, the results suggest that 
significant increases in assessed prices between the 2008-11 and 2012-15 cycles are 
distributed evenly throughout Bangkok except in seven suburban boroughs in the 
east—with blue outline in Figure 6.4 (a). Some decreases and slight increases in 
assessed prices in these boroughs are irregular relative to the price adjustment patterns 
in the rest of Bangkok. In the subsequent assessment cycle (2015-19), there are 
fourteen boroughs with irregularities in assessed price adjustments, which are located 
in the west and inner Bangkok—with blue outline in Figure 6.4 (b). Changes in 
assessments in these boroughs are relatively low compared to the rest of Bangkok. The 
results confirm my hypothesis that assessors tend to average out assessed values to 
avoid complaints and assessment appeals. Assessed values of the properties that were 
substantially raised in the previous assessment cycle tend to remain unchanged in the 





The results also reveal particular areas in Bangkok in which assessed prices have 
changed relatively slowly. These residential properties are located in five boroughs 
with purple boundaries shown in Figure 6.4 (a and b). If we compare the results to 
changes in the housing market price during the same period, we find that the 
assessment levels in five out of six boroughs indicate a certain degree of inconsistency. 
In Lak Si and Don Mueang (boroughs in north Bangkok), for example, the average 
change in assessed prices between the 2008-11 and 2012-15 assessment cycles is only 
6.06 per cent, compared with the average change for Bangkok of 26.15 per cent. 
Between the 2012-15 and 2016-19 assessment cycles, the average change in assessed 
prices in the two boroughs drops to 3.35 per cent, compared with the whole Bangkok’s 
average of 17.22 per cent. This evidence confirms the variability in assessed values 
that, to some extent, appears to be location specific. 
Apart from these observations, there have been more significant increases in 
housing assessed prices in the east than in the west side of Bangkok. The growth in 
assessed prices during the past eight years has been largely caused by properties located 
along newly developed urban rail transit lines (REIC, 2019). Interestingly, these new 
lines are not only limited to the east side, and in fact the developments are even more 
intensive in west Bangkok. There are thirteen boroughs in west Bangkok that contain 
newly constructed rail transit lines, compared with ten boroughs in east Bangkok. Why 
do housing assessed prices in east Bangkok seem to be more sensitive to the urban rail 
transit developments than other areas? In order to answer this question, we need to 




carry out further analyses on sale prices and other factors that have an influence on the 
housing market, which will be presented in the following sections. 
Table 6.3 Areas of assessment 
Assessment division Land registry office Borough 
Division 1 
(West Bangkok) 
Inner Bangkok Phra Nakhon 
 Dusit 
 Pom Prap Sattru Pai 
 Parthumwan 
 Bang Rak 
 Samphanthawong 
 Yannawa 
 Bang Kho Leam 
 Sathorn 
Bang Khen Bang Khen 
 Sai Mai 
Bang Khun Thian Bang Khun Thian 
 Chom Thong 
 Bang Bon 
Bangkok Noi Bangkok Noi 
 Taling Chan 
 Bang Plat 
 Thawi Watthana 
Thon Buri Thon Buri 
 Klong San 
 Bangkok Yai 
 Rat Burana 
 Thung Kru 
Don Mueng Don Mueng 
 Lak Si 
Nong Kheam Nong Kheam 
 Phasi Charoen 
 Bang Khae 
Division 2 
(East Bangkok) 
Phra Khanong Phra Khanong 
 Klong Toei 
 Bang Na 
 Vadhana 
Bang Kapi Bang Kapi 
 Wang Thong Lang 
Chatuchak Chatuchak 
 Bang Sue 
Ladprao Ladprao 
Bueng Kum Bueng Kum 
 Saphan Sung 
 Khan Na Yao 
Lad Krabang Lad Krabang 
Min Buri Min Buri 
 Klong Sam Wa 
Huai Khwang Huai Khwang 
 Phya Thai 
 Ratchathewi 
 Din Dang 
Prawet Prawet 
 Suanluang 
Nong Chok Nong Chok 
Total 17 50 




6.2  Assessment Ratio Analysis 
The uniformity of assessed prices is measured among different boroughs by comparing 
median A/S ratios. An A/S ratio for each observed property is calculated from 
transactions that occurred between 2008 and 2017, which covers three assessment 
cycles. Sale prices used in the calculation are consistent with the assessment timing—
selected transactions occurred before assessments became effective. There are 69,724 
residential properties included in the ratio analysis. 
The IAAO standards call for the upper and lower bound of the 95 per cent 
confidence interval of the median A/S ratio to be between 0.90 and 1.10 (IAAO, 
2013b). Properties with A/S ratios below 0.90 are generally considered under-assessed, 
and properties with ratios above 1.10 are considered over-assessed. Properties with 
ratios falling within the 0.90 to 1.10 range are generally considered to be accurately 
assessed. 
A histogram of A/S ratios is shown in Figure 6.5. The distribution of A/S ratios 
confirms that, in general, housings in Bangkok were under-assessed. They were 
assessed on average at 72 per cent of their reported sale prices, with the minimum and 
maximum A/S ratios of 0.10 and 1.99 respectively. Residential properties that met the 
IAAO standards (with A/S ratios ranging from 0.90 to 1.10) account for 17.9 per cent 
of total properties under observation, of which 74.88 per cent were under-assessed (less 
than 0.90) and 7.22 per cent were over-assessed (over 1.10). 




When comparing properties from different sale price levels, it is found that the top 
10 per cent of properties have an average A/S ratio of 0.49, while the bottom 10 per 
cent have an average A/S ratio of 1.03. The results indicate that on average higher-
value properties were relatively under-assessed by just over half of their market value. 
If we look at the distribution of A/S ratios across the entire price range, it is evident that 
the ratios reduce as property market values increase (see Table 6.4). The average A/S 
ratio of properties in the fifth quintile is not much more than half that of properties in 
the first quintile. Given similar tax rate structure for all property values and assuming 
that sale prices represent market value and reflect property wealth, assessment 
inequities arise as people who possess less wealth have higher property tax liability. 
Table 6.4 Measures for A/S ratios as defined by sale prices 
Properties within: 
A/S ratio: 
Mean Minimum Maximum Number of observations 
1st Quintile 0.9857 0.1560 1.9972 14,259 
2nd Quintile 0.8172 0.1572 1.9977 13,666 
3rd Quintile 0.6669 0.2011 1.9917 13,909 
4th Quintile 0.5891 0.1186 1.9448 13,929 
5th Quintile 0.5371 0.1004 1.9479 13,961 
Source: Land Registry (2016) and PVB, (2016b) 
 
From a geographical perspective, it can be seen in Table 6.5 that on average none of 
the properties in any Bangkok boroughs is being over-assessed, as median A/S ratios 
for all boroughs are less than one. Among all boroughs, only the following five 
boroughs have upper and lower bounds of median A/S ratios that meet the IAAO 
standards: Pom Prap Sattru Phai, Phra Nakhon, Parthum Wan, Bang Rak, and 
Chatuchak. Four of these are within the inner Bangkok area, and they are very similar 
in terms of economic development and social settlement. Phra Nakhon and Pom Prap 
Sattru Phai are the site of some of the most historically important buildings and famous 
tourist attractions such as the Grand Palace, Wat Phra Kaew (Temple of Emerald 
Buddha) and Khaosan Road. Adjacent to each other, Bang Rak and Parthum Wan 
occupy the main part of the core CBD where high-value office buildings and big 
shopping centres are located. 
Located just outside the inner Bangkok area, Chatuchak has been prioritised as a 
transportation hub, including interchange stations for the BTS and MRT, coach 




developments in the urban rail transport hub have been built in Bang Sue, which is a 
borough adjacent to Chatuchak. The area has recently become a popular location for 
office buildings, as well as several mixed-use developments ranging from commercial 
to high-rise residential properties with a high unit per area ratio.  
The tendency that properties in suburban areas of Bangkok are generally under-
assessed is evident in the map of median A/S ratios (Figure 6.6). Lower median A/S 
ratios are located in both eastern and western suburbia of Bangkok. These areas, 
particularly in the east, have been destinations for urban sprawl since the late 1980s due 
to rapid economic growth, rural-urban migration and urbanisation. The development 
process had been largely shaped by the first Bangkok Master Plan (1992) and urban 
land expropriation policy9. Covering the total distance of 94 kilometres, the three stages 
of expressway in BMA have connected the eastern and northern suburbia to the 
downtown and the southern suburban areas. However, as a result of unplanned 
conversion of eastern fringe’s vacant lands into urban land use and inexorable rise in 
car ownerships, people living in these suburban areas have been suffered from serious 
traffic congestion, especially when travelling to and from employment hubs in the 
downtown (Pongsawat, 1995). 
What the results suggest is that high-value residential properties in suburban areas 
tend to be under-assessed. Some might assume that these under-assessed properties are 
large detached houses because of their suburban locations, but in fact they are not. An 
examination of housing types in each price range reveals that terraced houses are the 
most under-assessed property type, and account for 37 per cent of the total properties in 
the fifth quintile, while detached houses account for only 10 per cent. In the first 
quintile, however, there are approximately the same number of terraced houses and 
detached houses that were over-assessed, each of which account for 30 per cent of the 
total properties. The number of detached houses that fall in the first quintile is relatively 
high as they account for 18.6 per cent of the total observations.  
 
9 Expropriation of Immobile Property Act 1987 gives the government power to expropriate private properties for 
public purposes, which largely involve the construction of the expressway systems (toll way) aiming at alleviating 




Table 6.5 Median A/S ratios in 50 Bangkok boroughs 
Borough 
95% Confidence Interval for Median 
Median Lower Bound Upper Bound  Sample Size  
Wang Thong Lang 0.459 0.431 0.483                     683  
Bangkok Yai 0.489 0.458 0.528                     234  
Chom Thong 0.529 0.515 0.551                     965  
Lak Si 0.565 0.527 0.594                 1,108  
Prawet 0.566 0.564 0.569                 4,317  
Khan Na Yao 0.569 0.565 0.583                 1,543  
Bang Khae 0.579 0.573 0.582                 2,065  
Don Mueang 0.591 0.585 0.597                 4,715  
Taling Chan 0.594 0.554 0.638                     461  
Bueng Kum 0.614 0.594 0.630                 2,593  
Saphan Sung 0.627 0.616 0.636                 2,332  
Thung Kru 0.629 0.614 0.644                 1,588  
Bang Bon 0.635 0.617 0.656                     809  
Bang Khun Thian 0.638 0.630 0.639                 4,893  
Lad Krabang 0.644 0.639 0.649                 3,254  
Vadhana 0.644 0.523 0.767                     264  
Sai Mai 0.651 0.643 0.656                 5,221  
Rat Burana 0.658 0.621 0.681                 1,194  
Klong Sam Wa 0.667 0.655 0.680                 4,302  
Suanluang 0.669 0.662 0.672                 2,989  
Bangkok Noi 0.672 0.591 0.787                     293  
Bang Kapi 0.722 0.697 0.741                 2,143  
Nong Chok 0.742 0.733 0.748                 1,257  
Thawi Watthana 0.745 0.714 0.768                     591  
Din Dang 0.749 0.706 0.789                     706  
Phya Thai 0.760 0.669 0.830                     299  
Ladprao 0.762 0.740 0.786                 1,515  
Min Buri 0.763 0.753 0.778                 1,914  
Phasi Charoen 0.770 0.737 0.792                     615  
Bang Khen 0.786 0.762 0.802                 3,278  
Huai Khwang 0.793 0.749 0.829                     648  
Yannawa 0.821 0.773 0.864                     517  
Dusit 0.822 0.771 0.945                     103  
Ratchathewi 0.827 0.731 0.871                     182  
Klong San 0.839 0.809 0.859                     532  
Klong Toei 0.846 0.736 0.928                     200  
Nong Kheam 0.869 0.862 0.880                 2,472  
Phra Khanong 0.872 0.819 0.912                     553  
Bang Sue 0.875 0.839 0.918                     835  
Bang Kho Leam 0.885 0.743 0.953                     130  
Thon Buri 0.903 0.847 0.925                     156  
Bang Na 0.907 0.876 0.937                     543  
Samphanthawong 0.924 0.804 0.973                     112  
Bang Plat 0.930 0.871 0.978                     104  
Chatuchak 0.931 0.915 0.945                 1,227  
Sathorn 0.947 0.854 1.000                       99  
Bang Rak 0.950 0.926 0.966                 1,046  
Parthum Wan 0.956 0.916 0.996                     114  
Phra Nakhon 0.958 0.899 0.995                     147  
Pom Prap Sattru Phai 0.982 0.924 0.999                     179  





One plausible explanation for higher A/S ratios in the downtown area is that 
assessment practice does not normally differentiate between residential and commercial 
properties (PVB, 2009). Given vaguely defined land use patterns in downtown 
Bangkok where residential units are situated among other land uses, either in the same 
building (mostly shophouses) or on the same street as commercial units, property 
transactions of all types of land use included in assessment processes are grouped 
together (Chiamprasert, 2014). Assessors then adopt a street value assessment 
approach, in which properties on the same street are given the same value regardless of 
their types. Therefore, the gap between assessed and sale prices of properties in the 
downtown areas tend to be smaller than those in suburban areas where relatively few 
commercial properties exist. 
Property assessment levels in inner suburbs that are within BTS/MRT catchment 
areas—e.g. Chatuchak and Bang Sue—are higher than in other inner suburbs such as 
Wang Thong Lang and Bang Kapi, which were located outside the BTS/MRT 
catchment areas when the assessment took place. It is found that median A/S ratios in 
boroughs located within the catchment areas are all above Bangkok’s average of 0.744, 




but the A/S ratios of properties located within the BTS/MRT catchment areas remain 
lower than the average. This could in part confirm the lag of assessed price caused by 
imperfection in the property assessment process, in which the increase in assessed price 
tends to be consistent in all areas in order to avoid complaints and appeals, which 
increase workloads for assessors. Substantial increases in assessed prices in particular 
areas, even with the support of market evidence, would raise questions from the 
property valuation committee. Person C, a senior figure in the PVB, mentioned that: 
…In general, assessors have to report to the committee the percentage 
changes in assessed prices in each area. The committee members usually 
focus on the areas with the most significant increase in the prices, asking for 
the underlying causes. Assessed price adjustments normally sit between 20 
and 30 per cent. 
Average housing assessed prices in Bangkok increased by 22 per cent between 2008 
and 2017, while average housing market prices increased by at least 40 per cent during 
the same period (Bank of Thailand, 2018). This discrepancy has exacerbated the under-
assessment problem, especially in an assessment system with infrequent reassessments 
and practices that tend to limit the increase in assessed values. 
During the past decade, there has been significant development in urban rail 
transport (Thansettakij, 2016). There is ongoing construction of seven additional lines 
of MRT, BTS and rapid train services, and three additional lines of urban rail transport 
are in the pipeline (their routes have been announced). These urban rail developments 
have significantly affected market house price in suburban areas. Average house price 
inflation in outer Bangkok between 2013 and 2015, during which time a plan to build 
ten new urban rail lines was announced, was about 8 per cent per year, compared to the 
average increase of 2.9 per cent per year between 2010 and 2012, and 4.5 per cent per 
year between 2016 and 2017 (Bank of Thailand, 2018). Despite two reassessments 
during the period, the data suggests that assessed prices have failed to catch up with the 
increase in market prices. 
The proportion of properties with A/S ratios within the IAAO standard range as 
well as the proportions of over- and under-assessed properties are presented in Table 6.6. 
Over half the observations in forty out of fifty boroughs are under-assessed. This is also 
shown in the map of the proportion of assessment ratios meeting the IAAO standards 




properties (top 28 boroughs in Table 6.6). The proportion of under-assessed properties 
ranges from 64 to 94 per cent of total observations. 
The results also indicate that boroughs with over 90 per cent of properties being 
under-assessed are suburban areas that are not far from the core CBD. This includes 
Suanluang, Chom Thong, Bang Khae, Prawet and Wang Thong Lang. However, these 
areas are notorious for severe traffic congestion as they have relatively high densities of 
residential units owned by middle-income households who travel to work in the 
downtown by private car. Road networks in these areas are limited to small alleys, and 
there are only a few main roads and expressways that link the areas with the CBD. 
Since the planned urban rail transport expansions in the areas were announced in 2013, 
house price inflations have increased considerably. During the transition of assessment 
cycles, assessed prices failed to catch up with increases in market prices resulting from 
speculations. This suggests that under-assessment of properties might in fact have been 
caused by systemic assessment problems—e.g. regulations concerning assessed price 
cap and assessment practices—rather than the quality of sale price data. 
Moreover, as shown in Figure 6.7, there is a clear pattern of a higher proportion of 
accurately assessed properties in inner Bangkok than in outer boroughs. All inner 
boroughs have a proportion between 27 and 44 per cent compared to the average of 23 
per cent for the entire of Bangkok. Inner suburban areas such as Chatuchak and Huai 
Khwang that have gone through early developments of advanced rail transport 
infrastructures have relatively high proportions of accurately assessed properties 
compared to other inner suburban boroughs that have undergone subsequent 




Table 6.6 Proportion of A/S ratios meeting IAAO standards in 50 Bangkok boroughs 
Borough Under-assessed Meet Standards Over-assessed 
Suanluang 94% 4% 2% 
Chom Thong 94% 5% 1% 
Bang Khae 93% 6% 2% 
Prawet 92% 6% 2% 
Wang Thong Lang 91% 8% 2% 
Thung Kru 87% 10% 3% 
Bang Bon 87% 11% 2% 
Saphan Sung 84% 13% 3% 
Khan Na Yao 83% 13% 4% 
Bang Khun Thian 81% 14% 5% 
Don Mueang 80% 14% 6% 
Nong Chok 79% 14% 6% 
Lad Krabang 83% 15% 3% 
Taling Chan 75% 15% 10% 
Bangkok Yai 74% 15% 10% 
Lak Si 73% 16% 12% 
Bueng Kum 78% 17% 5% 
Klong Sam Wa 78% 18% 5% 
Sai Mai 77% 18% 6% 
Rat Burana 71% 18% 11% 
Thawi Watthana 72% 19% 9% 
Bangkok Noi 66% 21% 13% 
Phasi Charoen 66% 23% 12% 
Min Buri 65% 25% 9% 
Ladprao 65% 25% 9% 
Bang Kapi 67% 25% 8% 
Bang Khen 64% 25% 11% 
Phya Thai 65% 26% 9% 
Vadhana 67% 27% 6% 
Dusit 54% 27% 18% 
Klong San 60% 27% 13% 
Din Dang 66% 28% 7% 
Bang Sue 51% 28% 21% 
Huai Khwang 61% 28% 11% 
Yannawa 57% 28% 15% 
Sathorn 44% 28% 27% 
Ratchathewi 60% 29% 11% 
Nong Kheam 55% 30% 15% 
Bang Kho Leam 51% 31% 18% 
Phra Khanong 53% 32% 15% 
Bang Na 49% 33% 18% 
Bang Rak 44% 33% 24% 
Chatuchak 46% 33% 21% 
Bang Plat 43% 34% 23% 
Klong Toei 54% 38% 9% 
Phra Nakhon 42% 38% 20% 
Thon Buri 47% 38% 14% 
Samphanthawong 46% 40% 13% 
Parthum Wan 36% 42% 22% 
Pom Prap Sattru Phai 40% 44% 17% 





The COD result suggests that assessment levels in outer Bangkok boroughs are 
more horizontally equitable than those in inner areas. In other words, similar priced 
homes in most outer boroughs have been assessed fairer than those in most of the inner 
boroughs. As shown in Table 6.7, lower COD values are mostly found in outer 
boroughs rather than inner ones. Distribution patterns of COD throughout Bangkok 
reveal that areas in which housing is more similar in terms of types tend to have lower 
COD. Housing in these areas is more affordable and usually occupies greater space. 
Areas such as Suanluang, Prawet and Bang Khae have been popular destinations for 
middle-income residents who would rather pay for more space than close proximity to 
workplaces in the CBD (Figure 6.8). 
The results also reveal moderate levels of COD in northern and southern fringes of 
Bangkok. Transport infrastructure in these areas has been extensively developed during 
the study period. This includes an extension of the BTS blue line from Bang Sue that 
runs through Bang Plat, Bangkok Noi and Bangkok Yai, connecting the central 
transport hub to western boroughs. There is also a new expressway route that runs from 
Bang Sue through Taling Chan, creating a new bypass ring road that links the centre to 




the west side of the city (Realist, 2017). In fact, many locations in these northern fringe 
areas have been occupied by a vast variety of house types. Some properties have been 
used for both commercial and residential purposes. This is believed to have caused 
some difficulties in the assessment process and, therefore, created disparities of 
assessed prices within the same category of housing types. 
The southern fringe of Bangkok has long been a destination for the most various 
types of land use comprising industrial, commercial and residential. This area has gone 
through certain levels of gentrification since the late 1990s. Warehouses along the river 
have been converted to large scale outdoor markets, and many residential zones have 
been granted licenses for restaurants and shopping malls (RYT9, 2015). This 
phenomenon has not only significantly affected property values but also changed 
characteristics of the area. Affected boroughs includes Rat Burana and Yannawa, which 
have CODs of 38.4 and 33.6 per cent respectively, which are higher than Bangkok’s 
average COD of 30.8 per cent. The COD results suggest that assessments of residential 
properties in densely and diversely developed areas tend to be more horizontally 
inequitable than those in areas in which less dense and diverse properties exist. 
Interestingly, it would be more understandable if more diverse land uses cause 
higher vertical but not horizontal inequities. This is partly due to assessment systems 
that do not clearly differentiate properties according to their types/uses. As person D, 
an assessor in the West Bangkok assessment division, put it: 
…We draw sale prices from all kinds of properties. Main roads with lots of 
shophouses are typically defined as commercial use, where smaller alleys 
are defined as residential use. However, these definitions of 
commercial/residential uses may not have a direct relationship with the 
types of sale properties from which the assessed prices are derived. It is 
more about the feelings of most assessors. If it looks like a busy area then it 
is commercial use, that’s it. 
 In principle, in order to get close to the market values, properties of different uses 
should be assessed using different approaches. For example, commercial properties are 
typically assessed by their revenue generation capacity (income approach) while 
residential properties are typically assessed by market comparison approach (because, 




Table 6.7 COD for 50 Bangkok boroughs and proportion meeting IAAO standards 
Borough 
 Proportion within: 
COD 10% of median 15% of median 
Suanluang 18.2% 47.2% 59.3% 
Bang Khae 20.3% 36.2% 51.4% 
Prawet 20.3% 40.1% 55.8% 
Nong Chok 21.6% 40.3% 52.3% 
Chom Thong 22.6% 30.1% 46.4% 
Nong Kheam 23.1% 29.3% 43.6% 
Saphan Sung 23.9% 28.6% 45.2% 
Bang Bon 24.0% 27.6% 37.2% 
Thung Kru 24.2% 26.6% 39.7% 
Thon Buri 24.8% 42.9% 51.9% 
Lad Krabang 25.1% 29.4% 40.0% 
Thawi Watthana 25.1% 23.7% 34.5% 
Min Buri 25.3% 27.2% 37.8% 
Pom Prap Sattru Phai 25.9% 44.1% 48.6% 
Sai Mai 27.0% 24.8% 38.4% 
Klong Sam Wa 27.4% 20.8% 31.9% 
Bang Plat 27.5% 34.6% 46.2% 
Bang Rak 27.5% 31.0% 41.5% 
Bang Khen 27.5% 19.2% 27.8% 
Bang Khun Thian 27.6% 25.5% 37.5% 
Bang Na 28.0% 28.2% 41.1% 
Phasi Charoen 28.2% 19.8% 30.2% 
Bang Sue 29.1% 18.8% 34.5% 
Bang Kho Leam 29.3% 20.8% 32.3% 
Sathorn 29.4% 28.3% 40.4% 
Phra Khanong 29.6% 19.9% 35.4% 
Parthum Wan 30.0% 40.4% 46.5% 
Don Mueang 30.7% 24.6% 39.3% 
Huai Khwang 30.7% 15.0% 23.5% 
Ladprao 30.9% 17.7% 25.7% 
Ratchathewi 31.0% 17.6% 34.1% 
Khan Na Yao 31.3% 26.4% 39.0% 
Bang Kapi 32.0% 15.7% 25.3% 
Din Dang 32.1% 14.7% 23.7% 
Samphanthawong 32.9% 33.9% 46.4% 
Chatuchak 33.3% 30.1% 39.4% 
Yannawa 33.6% 14.1% 20.1% 
Klong San 34.2% 21.6% 32.7% 
Bueng Kum 34.3% 16.3% 27.2% 
Klong Toei 35.0% 13.5% 27.5% 
Phra Nakhon 35.1% 33.3% 43.5% 
Phya Thai 37.1% 10.4% 18.4% 
Rat Burana 38.4% 11.5% 18.3% 
Wang Thong Lang 39.0% 10.0% 17.0% 
Dusit 41.5% 18.4% 27.2% 
Bangkok Noi 42.1% 7.2% 12.3% 
Taling Chan 43.3% 13.9% 22.8% 
Vadhana 45.7% 9.1% 10.2% 
Lak Si 51.5% 8.9% 12.4% 
Bangkok Yai 52.7% 19.2% 22.6% 





We will now turn our attention to the PRD index, which is a measure for vertical 
equity, in which 1 represents perfect vertical equity. As shown in Table 6.8, PRD of all 
boroughs in Bangkok is ranked from the smallest to the largest values. None of 
Bangkok’s boroughs has met the IAAO’s standard PRD index range of 0.98 to 1.03. 
However, the results have revealed some interesting geographical distribution patterns 
for PRD throughout Bangkok. It is evident that occupants of lower priced homes are, in 
general, experiencing disadvantages as PRD indices in all boroughs are higher than 
one. Vertical inequity is highly concentrated in some downtown and inner suburban 
boroughs. As shown in Figure 6.9, the geographical distribution of PRD confirms that 
the problem of inconsistency in assessed prices is caused by the assessment method, 
namely that, particularly in the CBD, residential properties have been assessed using 
the same approach as commercial ones. This has caused the most serious disadvantages 
for low priced housing in the following central boroughs: Parthum Wan, Vadhana, 
Klong Toei and Sathorn. 
It is also immediately clear from the spatial distribution shown in Figure 6.9 that 
moderately high levels of PRD are concentrated in eastern suburbia. With PRD ranges 




between 1.174 and 1.180, these eastern boroughs—including Ladprao, Bueng Kum, 
Khan Na Yao, Wang Thong Lang, Bang Kapi and Huai Khwang—stand out from their 
surroundings. The results can be explained by the fact that properties in these boroughs 
have been assessed by the same team of assessors (East Bangkok division). Given 
relatively diverse types of housing in these areas, errors in assessment seem to be 
repeated, which causes specific assessment error patterns within certain price ranges 
(BMA, 2013). Once these errors happen, they have been upheld by assesment practices 
that focus on continuity of assessed values in all areas rather than on closing the gap 






Table 6.8 PRD for 50 Bangkok boroughs 
Borough PRD 
Chom Thong 1.045 
Nong Chok 1.045 
Bang Bon 1.056 
Bang Khae 1.063 
Suanluang 1.071 
Thon Buri 1.073 
Prawet 1.077 
Bang Plat 1.079 
Thung Kru 1.082 
Lad Krabang 1.092 
Nong Kheam 1.096 
Saphan Sung 1.098 
Bang Khun Thian 1.106 
Min Buri 1.111 
Sai Mai 1.114 
Bang Khen 1.123 
Chatuchak 1.124 
Don Mueang 1.127 
Klong Sam Wa 1.128 
Din Dang 1.135 
Thawi Watthana 1.142 
Rat Burana 1.149 
Phra Khanong 1.154 
Bang Sue 1.163 
Dusit 1.173 
Ladprao 1.174 
Bueng Kum 1.180 
Phasi Charoen 1.183 
Khan Na Yao 1.191 
Wang Thong Lang 1.192 
Bang Kapi 1.199 
Yannawa 1.208 
Bang Na 1.235 
Huai Khwang 1.261 
Bang Kho Leam 1.266 
Bangkok Yai 1.274 
Taling Chan 1.283 
Lak Si 1.306 
Bangkok Noi 1.336 
Ratchathewi 1.345 
Klong San 1.364 
Pom Prap Sattru Phai 1.383 
Phra Nakhon 1.384 
Phya Thai 1.472 
Samphanthawong 1.564 
Sathorn 1.676 
Bang Rak 1.685 
Klong Toei 1.895 
Vadhana 2.016 






In fact, a similar conclusion to the COD analysis can be drawn from the PRD 
results. Given an average PRD level for Bangkok of 1.27, most boroughs with 
higher-than-average PRD levels are areas where dense property developments exist. If 
we reconsider the assessment approach adopted by the PVB, in which street values are 
assigned according to the majority property type on each street, properties can not be 
precisely assessed by such a crude differentiation technique. In areas where properties 
of various values and types are located, it is even harder for a single assessed price to 
capture sufficient market forces that translate into transaction prices. Therefore, these 
areas are prone to more assessment errors and wider gaps between assessed and sale 
prices than other areas with less property density. 
The analytical methods that we have employed in this section have produced some 
useful results that allow us to compare A/S ratios among boroughs, but the association 
between assessed and sale prices are difficult to judge from the descriptive statistics 
and choropleth maps. It is still impossible to identify, for instance, the tendency of 
some groups of properties within certain value ranges to show systemic assessment 
biases, especially those that are location related. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate 




spatial inequities at a more detailed areal unit. In the following section, a more detailed 




6.3  Spatial Autocorrelation Analysis 
The non-spatial empirical results laid out in the previous section suggest that there are 
disparities in property assessments in certain areas of Bangkok. The most noticeable 
pattern is the presence of higher A/S ratios and a higher degree of both horizontal and 
vertical inequity in inner city areas. Also, there are disparities in the level of 
assessments between certain suburban and central boroughs. However, the results do 
not specify neighbourhoods or housing submarkets that may have been inaccurately 
assessed. In this regard, spatial autocorrelation analysis is useful for determining 
assessment errors at more detailed areal units—i.e. street level, which may better help 
identify potential causes of the problems. 
A preliminary global spatial autocorrelation analysis of A/S ratios gives the p-value 
of zero, which indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis. The z-score of 25.77, 
and the Moran’s index of 0.29, indicate a relatively strong spatial autocorrelation, with 
less than one per cent likelihood that this clustered pattern could be the result of 
random chance. The results, however, do not distinguish whether clustered patterns are 
dominated by concentrations of high or low values. In the following section we will 
move on to local Moran’s analysis of A/S ratios throughout the study area to identify 
specific locations of these clusters. 
6.3.1  Univariate Local Moran’s I: A/S Ratio 
In this section we move the analysis from borough to property levels. It can be seen 
from the ratio analysis that both horizontal and vertical inequities exist and that they 
vary by geographical areas. However, the approach does not clearly identify the extent 
to which the problem occurs at specific locations. Local Moran’s analysis can identify 
clusters and outliers of A/S ratios at smaller geographial scales. An A/S ratio for each 
property is compared to that of its surrounding properties through weight matrix. A 
z-score is an indicator for clusters and outliers. In this study, it is assumed that a 
positive z-score of two or greater indicates that the data point is similar to its 
neighbours, and a negative z-score of two or greater indicates that the data point is 
dissimilar from its neighbours.  
When locations of clusters and outliers of A/S ratios are identified, they can directly 




values, which are the core of the assessment processes. Assessors derive street values 
from a number of sales located on the same street (or a group of similar streets) using 
market comparison approach. The street value is the average of these sale prices in 
relation to the values of properties located on other streets nearby (PVB, 2009). 
Clusters of A/S ratios can be interpreted as groups of uniformly but inaccurately 
assessed properties, and outliers of A/S ratios can be interpreted as neighbourhoods 
with dissimilarities in either assessed or sale prices (or both) that seem to have certain 
kind of assessment bias. My hypothesis is that A/S ratio clusters tend to be street-
specific and can be directly related to systemic bias in assessment practices, while 
outliers tend to relate to occasional errors that are not systemic. 
The results of univariate local Moran’s statistic for the A/S ratio are presented in 
Figure 6.10—it would be helpful to read the results in relation to the level of urban 
developments exhibited in Figure 6.11. The figure shows the results in four areal units: 
borough, sub-district, 1-kilometre grid and 500-metre grid (see Table 6.9 for details). In 
general, the results suggest that clusters and outliers are largely concentrated in the 
suburban areas in both eastern and western parts of Bangkok. All types of clusters and 
outliers are crucial for the identification of assessment problem types. While the results 
from all areal units exhibit the same tendency in general, maps presented at smaller 
areal units (Figure 6.10 c-d) reveal more clusters and outliers in outer suburban areas in 
both sides of the city. 
A cluster of high-high A/S ratio indicates a concentration of relatively over-
assessed properties, and a low-low cluster indicates the concentration of relatively 
under-assessed properties. These two types of clusters imply that either the properties 
in these areas have been continually mis-assessed over the period of three assessment 
cycles or that they are disproportionately affected during housing booms. The existence 
of these two types of cluster can in fact be interpreted as indicating systemic 
assessment errors. The results of this study are in fact contrary to those of Heavey 
(1983), who found that properties in the core CBD tend to be over-assessed relative to 
those in peripheral areas. But the local Moran’s results in Bangkok indicate that 
properties in suburban areas tend to be assessed higher than those in the city centre. In 
this case, however, it is not totally appropriate to interpret clusters of high-high A/S 




otherwise. A low-low cluster, on the other hand, can be interpreted as concentrations of 
under-assessed properties as the evidence suggests. 
A high-low outlier indicates that relatively over-assessed properties are surrounded 
by under-assessed properties, and a low-high outlier indicates that under-assessed 
properties are surrounded by relatively over-assessed properties. These two types of 
outlier particularly indicate potential assessment errors as they demonstrate 
inconsistencies in assessment standards as well as inaccucary of the assessed prices. It 
is possible that the outliers are the result of the difference in the assessed prices of two 
or more groups of properties located on different streets. These observations will be 
confirmed by street-level analysis in the following section. 
More high-low outliers are found in the eastern, northeastern and western parts of 
Bangkok. Especially in the northeast, high-low outliers are often accompanied by high-
high clusters. Low-high outliers seem to be relatively scattered and they appear in the 
east more than the west. Unlike high-low outliers and high-high clusters, the low-high 
outliers are mostly located in large gated communities or isolated housing 
developments rather than in mixed-use areas along the main roads and urban rail 
transport lines (PVB, 2016b, 2019). In fact, this sort of irregularity of under-assessed 
properties surrounded by over-assessed properties is likely to have been caused by high 
market values of high-end housing in the suburbs. While it is not conclusive that 
outliers have been caused by the assessment practices, they can, to some extent, 
confirm the existence of spatial inequities of assessed prices. 
Table 6.9 Descriptions of areal units 
Areal unit Number of unit 
Area (km2) 
Mean SD 
Borough 50 31.66 41.05 
Sub district 169 9.37 11.36 
1-km grid 2,345 1.00 0.01 
500-m grid 7,841 0.25 0.00 






Figure 6.10 Spatial distribution of clusters and outliers of A/S ratios in Bangkok 





As shown in Figure 6.12, the distribution of A/S ratios in inner Bangkok including 
the CBD seems to be fairly uniform. There are relatively small numbers of either 
clusters or outliers of A/S ratios in most inner boroughs. A few concentrations of 
low-low clusters are found in Bangkok old town, particularly on Yaowarat Road 
(Chinatown), and in new commercial districts such as Parthum Wan, Vadhana, Klong 
Toei and Ratchathewi. Most developments in these areas are old shophouses that are 
mainly used for commercial purposes. Only a few properties have residential units on 
the higher floors. Most residential properties in the areas are located in small alleys 
(PVB, 2016b). In the CBD, there are very few outliers of either types. High-low 
outliers are found in small alleys rather than in main roads, but no concentration can be 
detected. 
In the eastern suburbs, there are more concentrations of high-low and low-high 
outliers, mostly located in gated residential communities (Figure 6.13). The 
concentrations of high A/S ratios are found along similar road/alley networks. This is 
presumably because assessment errors as the spatial pattern of concentration is 
consistent with the assessment practices that employ street value approach—providing 
a single assessment for the same street regardless of land use composition or individual 




housing characteristics. The concentrations of low-high outliers are, however, slightly 
different as they are, in general, located along main roads. There is also a higher 
number of high-high clusters, which attests to a larger continuous area as compared 
with the concentrations of outliers. Clusters of low-low A/S ratios, on the other hand, 
tend to mingle with groups of outliers in most locations. 
Similar spatial distribution patterns are found in western suburban areas, but the 
concentration of high-low outliers is less scattered and mostly located along main roads 
and urban rail transport lines, as is the concentration of low-low clusters (Figure 6.14). 
However, the spatial distribution pattern of low-high outliers and high-high clusters 
largely emerges in residential communities of similar housing characteristics. In Nong 
Kheam, for example, most of the low-high outliers are located in high-end gated 
communities. In Bang Khun Thian, however, the low-high outliers seem to be spread 
along secondary and tertiary road networks. 
The results in west Bangkok suggest that property assessment inconsistencies tend 
to occur in the areas where recent significant adjustments of assessed prices have been 
made. In Thawi Watthana and Taling Chan, for instance, there are less occurrences of 
clusters and outliers because assessed prices during the past two cycles have been fairly 
stable. These areas saw a marked increase in assessed prices during the reassessment in 
2012. On the contrary, in Nong Kham, Bang Bon and Bang Khun Thian, there was a 
relatively large increase in assessed prices during the last reassessment in 2016, which 






Figure 6.13 Distribution of clusters and outliers of A/S ratios in East Bangkok 




6.4  Regression Analysis 
6.4.1  Diagnostic Tests 
The regression analysis begins with the OLS modelling to determine appropriate 
independent variables and to examine whether the spatial distribution of the 
standardised residuals is random or not. The global Moran’s I is used to test if the 
residuals are spatially autocorrelated. Given the z-score of 0.074 and the Moran’s index 
of 0.052, it is confirmed that there is no cluster of the distribution of standardised 
residuals (see Figure 6.15). All parameters at the global scale have intuitive sign and 
are statistically significant (Table 6.10). 
In the first OLS model (A), the dependent variable is the assessed price, and there 
are four explanatory variables that play an important role in the assessment process. 
The distance to urban rail transport station and the distance to main road variables have 
been omitted from the first model to see how these variables perform under the 
assumption that the effects of urban rail transport have already been accounted for in 
the transaction price. 
The Koenker test gives a significant p-value, which is reflective of the fact that the 
relationships between variables in the model are nonstationary across the study area. 
Therefore, we refer to the robust probabilities to determine if the explanatory variables 
are statistically significant. In terms of model redundancy, none of the variables 
exhibits high VIF values, which indicates no multicollinearity problem. 
The results reveal that the building area variable has the greatest effect on assessed 
price, followed by the land area and building age variables. However, it is surprising 
that transaction price has the least influence on assessed price. This is contrary to our 
hypothesis that sale price is a key determinant of assessed price, given that the market 
assessment approach directly derives assessed value from sale data. 
Table 6.10 OLS model estimation results (model A) 
Variable Coefficients Robust S.E. Robust-t Robust-p VIF 
Property age 5.3235 1.2586 4.2295 0.0000 1.0034 
Building area 13.8306 3.4383 4.0224 0.0000 1.5329 
Land area -7.7235 1.8828 -4.1021 0.0000 1.4314 
Transaction price 0.2991 0.0301 9.9086 0.0000 1.1414 
Number of observations 3,673 
R2 0.5836 






The second OLS model (B) has included two additional variables: distance to rail 
station (distance between each property and the nearest urban rail transport station) and 
distance to main road (distance between each property and the nearest access point to 
the nearest main road). A test for spatial autocorrelation of the standardised residuals 
indicates a negative result as it gives the z-score of 0.077 and the Moran’s index of 
0.055. The model estimation is shown in Table 6.11 and the spatial distribution of 
standardised residuals is presented in Figure 6.16. The OLS model B is also tested 
statistically significant for Koenker p-value, we therefore consult robust p-values for 
statistical significance of the variables. The VIFs in this model show acceptable 
correlation between the variables. 
Interestingly, the two additional variables have improved the model as the AIC 
value of model B is lower than that of model A, and the adjusted R-squared value in 
model B is slightly higher than that of model A. When considering the relationship 
between variables, it appears that building area remains the most influential variable, 
followed by land area and building age. However, it should be noted that the distance to 
main road and rail station variables have a greater impact on the overall assessed price 
than the transaction price variable has, which implies that proximity to public 
infrastructure may not have been fully reflected in sale price. In addition, variations in 
assessed prices are more likely to be influenced by building types and their areas rather 




than changes in sale prices. Again, this contradicts our hypothesis on the PVB 
assessment practices, which derive assessed price directly from sale price, and give 
more weight to sale data than building costs/ages. 
Table 6.11 OLS model estimation results (model B) 
Variable Coefficients Robust S.E. Robust-t Robust-p VIF 
Property age 3.9808 1.1335 3.5119 0.0004 1.0112 
Building area 12.9615 3.2331 4.0089 0.0000 1.5362 
Land area -7.2039 1.7817 -4.0432 0.0000 1.4349 
Transaction price 0.2847 0.0294 9.6699 0.0000 1.1894 
Distance to rail station -0.5974 0.0549 -10.8656 0.0000 1.1280 
Distance to main road -1.5600 0.1477 -10.5583 0.0000 1.1032 
Number of observations 3,673 
R2 0.6080 









In the first two OLS models, we did not consider the density aspect. The data allows 
us to examine three types of density: property density (all types), housing sale density 
and population density. A preliminary variable analysis shows strong positive 
correlations between property density and population density and between property 
density and property sale density. This suggests that property sale density and 
population density are represented by property density. Therefore, only the property 
density variable is added to OLS model C (Table 6.12). Global Moran’s analysis 
confirms that spatial autocorrelation of the model’s standardised residuals does not 
exist, with the z-score of 0.071 and Moran’s index of 0.051. The spatial distribution of 
the standardised residuals is shown in Figure 6.17. 
The additional variable improves the overall performance of the model, as evident 
in the higher R-squared value and lower AIC value than seen with OLS models A 
and B. One overall relationship does not markedly change: building area remains by far 
the most influential variable in the model, followed by land area, which still has a 
significant negative effect on assessed price. This means that larger houses—in terms 
of total area—tend to be assessed lower than smaller houses. The question is whether 
larger property area reflects higher property wealth or not. A linear correlation analysis 
between land parcel area and sale price gives a coefficient value of -0.024, which 





Table 6.12 OLS model estimation results (model C) 
Variable Coefficients Robust S.E. Robust-t Robust-p VIF 
Property age 3.4578 1.1962 2.8905 0.0038 1.0141 
Building area 12.6679 3.1659 4.0013 0.0000 1.5372 
Land area -7.2918 1.7822 -4.0913 0.0000 1.4351 
Transaction price 0.2779 0.0295 9.3922 0.0000 1.2158 
Distance to rail station -0.3034 0.0685 -4.4290 0.0000 1.4237 
Distance to main road -1.3838 0.3608 -9.8672 0.0000 1.1141 
Property density 1.8641 0.1402 5.1653 0.0000 1.4207 
Number of observations 3,673 
R2 0.6178 









6.4.2  GWR Models 
The GWR modelling gives local parameter estimates for each observation point. The 
GWR model has better goodness of fit compared to that of the OLS models, which is 
confirmed by lower AIC value and significantly higher adjusted R-squared value in the 
GWR model. The fact that the GWR outperforms the OLS model indicates that the 
nonstationary effects play an important role in providing better fit for the GWR model. 
In general, the GWR results are different, and perhaps more precise, than those of the 
OLS, as they demonstrate more consistent coefficient values. 
The results of the GWR model shown in Table 6.13 indicate that property age has 
the most effect on assessed price. It has a significant negative effect on assessed price, 
possibly because of the PVB’s assessment method, which accounts for depreciation 
rates of improvements. Building area is the second most influential parameter, followed 
by land area and distance to main road. The land area parameter still has a negative 
impact on assessed price, which also confirms the tendency of assessments to 
significantly reduce as land parcel depth increases—part of the PVB’s assessment 
methods (PVB, 2009). As the distance to main road parameter has a greater impact on 
assessed price than the distance to rail station, it is assumed that the effect of proximity 
to urban rail transport stations has been reflected in sale price. 
Table 6.13 GWR model estimation results (model A) 
Variable 
Coefficients 
Mean Min Max SD 
Property age -49.3781 -329.4150 309.6633 63.6920 
Building area 26.8435 -6.8541 68.2327 14.2190 
Land area -14.3411 -54.1337 8.5714 8.0514 
Transaction price 0.2114 0.0453 0.4188 0.0668 
Distance to rail station 0.0109 -11.9694 15.3819 1.9674 
Distance to main road -2.3714 -55.8678 4.1852 6.5372 
Number of observations 3,673    
R2 0.7855    
Adjusted R2 0.7636    








Figure 6.18 Distribution of the property age parameter (GWR model A) 




Figure 6.18 shows the distribution of the parameter estimates associated with 
property age—the number of years accounted for in building depreciation factor. It is 
evident that, on average, assessed prices of properties in suburban areas are sensitive to 
building age, especially in the eastern boroughs of Prawet, Wang Thong Lang and 
Bang Kapi. An average range of property age coefficient values applies largely in outer 
eastern suburbs, such as the boroughs of Lad Prao, Bang Khen, Bueng Kum and Khan 
Na Yao. As a result of economic boom, these boroughs were target areas for residential 
developments between the early 1980s and the late 1990s, during which Bangkok had 
not seen much residential development in other areas except in the city centre (BMA, 
1977, 1992). Therefore, housing in these areas tends to be relatively old compared with 
more recent residential developments in outer suburbs. The depreciation factors 
employed by the PVB allow for a substantial deduction of depreciated replacement 
costs from total assessed values, especially for buildings ten years of age or more. 
A similar spatial distribution pattern of the property age coefficient values is found 
in western suburbs, but the degree of impact is lower. In inner city areas, however, the 
effect of property age is not significant because low-rise housing has been increasingly 
converted to either commercial use or condominium, which create more locational 
values and drive housing price inflation. The effect of property age subsides as it 
accounts for a smaller proportion of total assessed value, which has increased with the 
market price. 
The building area and land area parameter estimates have similar spatial distribution 
patterns (Figures 6.19 and 6.20). More significant coefficient values are found in 
suburban areas on both sides of the city. In fact, the results of all three variables 
relating to property characteristics exhibit the same tendency of spatial distribution 
pattern for coefficient values. However, two marked disparities are witnessed in the 
results. First, in general, the building area variable has a positive impact on the assessed 
price, while the impact of the land area variable is negative. As the affected areas are 
largely suburban, it is possible that more variations in residential property types and 
characteristics have caused greater changes in assessed values. Second, the results 
reveal a greater impact of the land area variable in certain inner Bangkok areas, starting 
from the eastern river bank located just west of the CBD up to the heritage areas of 
Phra Nakorn and Pom Prap Sattru Phai boroughs. Boroughs in north Bangkok 




The sale price variable has random effects on assessed prices throughout Bangkok 
(see Figure 6.21). The spatial distribution pattern of the transaction price parameter 
indicates that, overall, property assessed prices in seven clusters have been most 
affected by sale prices. The areas where these clusters are located have either been 
recently regenerated or benefited from an expansion of urban rail transport lines (BMA, 
2009). Furthermore, the result is also consistent with an increase in A/S ratios in the 
areas, which indicates a growth in assessed prices during the last two assessment 
cycles. The assessment practice, which tends to average out the assessed value, has 
suppressed an increase in assessed price in the core urban centre and inner suburbs. 
Assessors do not favour assessed price disparities and have tried to close the price gap. 
Another interesting finding is that assessed prices in areas where urban rail network 
hubs are located, e.g. Huai Khwang and Chatuchak, appear to be less sensitive to sale 
prices. This is surprising, given that these areas have been transformed from traditional 
residential areas to commercial and densely populated mixed-use zones (TerraBKK, 
2017). During the past decade, assessed prices in these areas seem to have already 
caught up with sale prices (PVB, 2012, 2016b). From a mass appraisal point of view, 
the results reflect good progress in the adjustment of assessed prices. However, the 
findings also suggest certain inconsistencies in the assessment process, as we can see 
that clusters of sale price insensitivity are unevenly distributed throughout areas 
containing a majority of properties that fail to meet the IAAO standards on assessment 
level. Ideally, the effects of sale price on property assessments should be distributed 
more evenly across space. 
The estimation results for the distance to urban rail stations parameter indicate that 
assessed prices for properties in most of the urban rail transport catchment areas are 
sensitive to this parameter except in some suburban boroughs in the east (Figure 6.22). 
In general, locations of properties with assessed prices that are sensitive to the distance 
to urban rail transport station variable are consistent with the geographical distribution 
pattern of stations. The effects are most pronounced in areas where extension lines of 
urban rail transport have recently been completed, which are located in the boroughs of 
Bang Plat and Dusit. Evidence also suggests that seven—out of thirteen—urban rail 
transport lines are particularly influential in the model. Four of the seven lines are 
located in east Bangkok (the dark red, dark green, pink and grey lines) and the other 




central Bangkok (on both sides of the river including part of the CBD) reveal clusters 
of positive parameter coefficient values, which means that assessed prices tend to 
decrease the closer properties are to urban rail transport stations. 
The final variable in the model is an estimate of the impact of proximity to main 
road on assessed price. As shown in Figure 6.23, overall results exhibit the same spatial 
distribution pattern between main road layout and the impact of the distance between 
properties and the nearest main road on assessed prices. The effects of proximity to 
main roads have generally overcome those of proximity to urban rail transport stations 
in central and some inner suburban areas. The largest coefficient value range is found 
in the area where road developments are most concentrated. Given the fact that central 
Bangkok was the first BTS catchment area (since 1999), it appears that assessed values 
tend to reduce proportionately more with an increase in distance from main roads, 
particularly in areas where urban rail transport lines are older. 
The results also suggest that the effects of the distance to main road variable are less 
pronounced in outer suburban areas, especially in eastern and northern boroughs—i.e. 
Suanluang, Phra Khanong, Saphan Sung, Lad Krabang, Bueng Kum and Sai Mai. 
Several clusters of positive parameter estimates are found in these boroughs, which 
indicate that assessed prices tend to increase as properties are located farther from main 
roads. An increase in distance from main roads is considered a desirable characteristic 
of residential properties, presumably due to less traffic noise and pollution. Moreover, 
to a certain extent, the clusters of positive parameter estimates are likely caused by 
groups of gated residential communities in which some facilities (e.g. security, parks 







Figure 6.20 Distribution of the land area parameter (GWR model A) 







Figure 6.22 Distribution of the distance to rail station parameter (GWR model A) 




A further look at urban development level 
In GWR model B, the assessed price variable is regressed on the same set of 
explanatory variables as GWR model A, but the property density variable is also 
included to see whether it can improve model performance as it did in OLS model C. 
The results in Table 6.14 suggest that the additional variable does not improve model 
performance, given the higher AIC value in GWR model B. The lower adjusted 
R-squared value in GWR model B also indicates that it accounts for a lower proportion 
of the variance of assessed prices (dependent variable), meaning that model A is a 
better fit for the data set. 
The balance among parameter estimates in GWR model B seems to have improved 
but their relationships remain largely the same as in GWR model A. Inclusion of the 
property density variable results in an increase in the effects of the proximity to rail 
station variable in relation to the transaction price variable. The gap between the 
distance to main road and the distance to rail station coefficients is also narrowed. The 
property density reflects the development level of all areas of Bangkok, regardless of 
property types. Therefore, it can, to some extent, represent the notions which assessors 
have of an area based on its property density. It is found that the property density 
variable has a greater impact on assessed price than either the transaction price or the 
distance to urban rail station variables. This confirms our hypothesis that, in a mass 
appraisal system, urban development level plays an important role in the determination 
of assessed price. 
Table 6.14 GWR model estimation results (model B) 
Variable 
Coefficients 
Mean Min Max SD 
Property age -26.2817 -143.9381 6.4280 38.1573 
Building area 18.9641 6.4811 35.0308 7.4566 
Land area -9.2335 -17.0975 -2.9810 2.8578 
Transaction price 0.2388 0.1473 0.3291 0.0417 
Distance to rail station -0.4128 -1.8863 0.3894 0.4156 
Distance to main road -1.6376 -12.6433 0.2010 2.2963 
Property density 1.1226 -2.9207 3.2060 1.1766 
Number of observations 3,673    
R2 0.7026    
Adjusted R2 0.6968    





As shown in Figure 6.24, the spatial distribution patterns of the property density 
parameter estimate and property density levels (units per square kilometre) are similar. 
The density variable has a relatively greater impact on assessed price in west Bangkok, 
particularly in the boroughs of Thung Kru, Rat Burana, Chom Thong and 
Phasi Charoen. The impact is slightly reduced in the northern and southern fringes of 
the city. The findings suggest that new housing developments seem to have certain 
positive effects on assessed values due to higher sale volume of residential properties in 
the areas (PVB, 2016b). In contrast to the results outlined earlier, the lowest impact of 
the property density variable is evident in old residential zones within inner eastern 
suburbs. Part of these areas have been redeveloped and gentrified as a result of 
significant improvements in public infrastructure (Pankeaw, 2019). These areas are 








6.5  Conclusion 
In this chapter we have investigated property assessments within both spatial and non-
spatial frameworks. The chapter began with the description of the data. The main data 
set is property records obtained from the Land Registry, which consists of all 2.14 
million properties in Bangkok. The data is then merged with another data set obtained 
from the PVB. The second data set has been verified by assessors and contains 
comprehensive property attributes. The PVB also provided another set of data, which 
contains values of street units and their principle land use types. The analysis consists 
of four main types of residential properties, including terraced houses, shophouses, 
semi-detached houses and detached houses. 
The preliminary analysis of assessed prices found that disparities between assessed 
housing land values and those of other types of land use exist in certain areas, 
especially in the eastern fringe of Bangkok. Assessed price disparities also exist within 
the assessed housing land values, which are mostly clustered in inner city areas. The 
analysis of the spatial distribution of assessed prices in relation to sale prices indicates 
greater disparities in suburban areas compared with the city centre. I then examined the 
changes in assessed prices during the three assessment cycles and found certain areas 
where assessed price levels remain largely unchanged, while assessed prices in other 
areas have markedly increased. The results confirm that, to some extent, assessment 
inequities exist, and they are unevenly distributed across the study area. 
In terms of assessment uniformity, the ratio analysis found that assessment levels of 
properties with lower market values are higher than those of properties with higher 
market values. Evidence suggests that the assessed prices of high-value properties have 
been adjusted at a slower rate, which means that the assessment system is incapable of 
sufficiently increasing assessed prices for these properties. When considering the equity 
aspect of the assessments, it is found that horizontal and vertical inequities tended to 
exist in similar areas, mostly concentrated in the city centre and inner suburban 
boroughs. This was confirmed by the spatial distribution patterns of COD and PRD. 
In the spatial analytical context, we began with spatial autocorrelation analysis. 
Local Moran’s statistic revealed certain areas with irregularly high or low A/S ratios as 
compared with adjacent areas. In general, the CBD tended to exhibit relatively small 




A/S ratios, which confirmed the findings that lower priced residential properties are 
inequitably assessed as compared with higher priced ones. This is potentially caused by 
the under-assessments of higher priced residential properties. In suburban areas of both 
sides of the city, more concentrations of clusters and outliers were identified. 
Essentially, there are two important findings regarding assessment inconsistencies. 
First, the street value assessment method is claimed to have a substantial impact on 
assessment level, as clusters and outliers of A/S ratios are found located along road 
networks with similar street values. Second, more assessment inconsistencies occur in 
areas where there is a greater increase in assessed prices than in areas where assessed 
prices have remained more stable during the past two assessment cycles. 
Finally, in the regression analysis, the OLS tool was used to perform model 
selection. It was found that the model that includes both intrinsic and extrinsic variables 
performs better than the one that includes only the former. The nonstationarity in the 
data had certain effects on explanatory variables, especially the intrinsic ones, as the 
GWR results reflected different relationships between property characteristic variables. 
The GWR results indicate that property age is the most influential variable, followed by 
building area and land area. In contrast to our hypothesis, both transaction price and the 
proximity to urban rail transport stations have a limited impact on the variation in 
assessed prices. In terms of the spatial distribution patterns of the coefficient values, the 
results suggested that areas with low effects of location associated variables coincide 
with areas with assessment problems. 
The following chapter will discuss the findings in relation to all of the research 
questions described at the outset of this thesis and conclude this study by offering 




Chapter 7  Discussion and Conclusion 
This thesis has examined the property tax system in Thailand by using the assessed 
prices in Bangkok during the period of the past twelve years as a case study. The 
breadth of the data sets in this study has enabled us to analyse property assessed values 
in relation to market prices and other relevant factors that play an important role in the 
housing market.  
This final chapter concludes the thesis by restating key findings and provides 
discussion based on property tax policies and research problems. The chapter is divided 
into five main sections. The first section summarises the findings obtained in this study, 
and discusses their contributions to existing theories and research methods. The second 
section discusses the main findings in relation to the research questions posed in the 
first chapter. The third section presents the implications of the findings in this research. 
The fourth section contains recommendations for property tax policy and future 





7.1  Summary of Findings 
Empirical findings 
The case study findings on the performance of property assessments demonstrates how 
they have been derived and distributed over geographical areas. Serving as property tax 
base, the property assessments were tested for their ability to reflect wealth, and 
thereby to inform tax collection. Property wealth is not directly investigated, but rather 
measured through two proxies: market price and urban development level. In this 
regard, for assessed prices to reflect property wealth, they are expected to be similarly 
distributed over geographical areas. 
The preliminary analysis of assessed land prices shows certain areas of Bangkok 
where the level of assessed prices does not conform with the level of urban 
development, as defined by property density. When focused on residential properties, it 
is found that there are pockets of unevenly distributed clusters of assessed land prices 
throughout inner suburban areas, the patterns of which differ from the spatiality of 
other property classes. This presents a clearer case for assessment inequity, which is 
considered as one of the most pressing issues because property land values form the 
largest part of total assessed prices. 
The analysis of both assessed and sale prices reveals similar patterns of price 
distribution, but higher levels of sale prices are noticeable in some areas. A wide 
disparity within sale prices should have resulted in the same pattern for assessed prices. 
However, it appears that the gap in sale prices is at least, on average, four times higher 
than that in assessed prices. More continuity in assessed prices reflects the nature of 
assessment practice, which confirms our hypothesis on the tendency towards limited 
and aberrant adjustment of assessed prices due to systemic and institutional constraints. 
Assessors are often pressured by peers and supervisors to maintain price continuity 
between different assessment areas. In such a system of mass appraisal, the 
convenience of having a predefined assessed price for every property is traded off 
against price accuracy and fairness. 
The results of the assessed price analysis during the three assessment cycles (from 
2008 to 2019) reveal two important findings. First, a significant change in assessed 
prices is evident in different suburban localities. During the reassessment in 2012, 




increased while those of properties in most boroughs in south-eastern suburbs remain 
largely the same. During the subsequent reassessment in 2016, however, assessed 
prices for properties in the north-western boroughs stagnated while those of properties 
in the south-eastern boroughs significantly increased. The situation suggests what I call 
an ‘average out’ of assessed prices over geographical spaces. Second, there are certain 
boroughs where assessed prices had remained relatively unchanged during the period of 
twelve years. This occurs in five boroughs in which property density is relatively high. 
The situation has raised concerns over property tax fairness that stem from the problem 
of under-assessment. 
In the assessment ratio analysis, it is found that A/S ratios of residential properties 
throughout Bangkok do not follow the level of market prices. Assessment levels tend to 
decrease as market prices increase. The underlying assumption is that market prices 
reflect property wealth. Therefore, the lower assessment levels of properties in higher 
market price ranges indicate that a large part of property wealth remain untaxed. If we 
consider the results in relation to the Land and Building Tax structure, even where only 
a few of the wealthiest property owners are liable to the tax, the amounts payable are 
based on relatively low and inaccurate assessed values. This would restrict local 
revenues and create unevenly distributed tax base as the property tax becomes 
effective. If the exemption of the minimum taxable value of over 50 million baht is 
lifted, lower-value properties would be liable to proportionately higher tax due to the 
current level of assessment. 
In terms of spatial distribution of assessment ratios, the results indicate that higher-
value properties in suburban areas are subject to lower assessed values. It is also found 
that, in general, properties in inner city areas are assessed higher compared with those 
in other areas, regardless of the market value ranges they are in. This situation indicates 
that location has a great influence on assessment level for all types of properties. This 
problem is caused by the assessment practice, which does not elaborately differentiate 
properties according to their classes, and by a lack of accurate property data on actual 
property uses provided by the Land Registry. In this regard, local governments are 
required to start collecting their own property data solely for property tax purposes, 
which may not be consistent with the data collected by the Land Registry and the PVB 





The COD and PRD results confirm the conclusion drawn from the preliminary 
analysis that properties in suburban areas are more equitably assessed than those in 
inner city areas. The results are in fact considered from both horizontal and vertical 
equity grounds. The spatial distribution of the level of assessments implies, to some 
extent, the degree of assessment inequities as measured by the COD and PRD. Lower 
A/S ratios tend to result in a higher degree of horizontal and vertical inequities, and 
vice versa. However, assessed prices in Bangkok are far from meeting the IAAO 
standards in all three aspects of consideration: assessment level, horizontal equity and 
vertical equity. 
The spatial autocorrelation analysis using local Moran’s statistic reveals a similar 
number of high-low and low-high outliers but a discrepancy between the number of 
high-high and low-low clusters. Most of the significant statistics are located outside the 
CBD. In general, outliers of A/S ratios are smaller in number compared to clusters, and 
their spatial distribution patterns tend to be along secondary or tertiary road networks, 
with a few groups of low-high outliers located along main roads. In contrary, clusters 
of high-high A/S ratios do not seem to follow the spatial distribution of road networks 
but rather are concentrated in larger groups in certain parts of outer suburbs across the 
city. The spatial distribution pattern of low-low clusters is clearly different from that of 
high-high clusters as they are concentrated in smaller groups and are more dispersed. 
The results confirm earlier findings that the street value assessment approach adopted 
by the PVB has caused disparities in assessed prices in different geographical areas, 
and spatial inequities are rooted in assessment practices that follow the approach. 
Finally, in the GWR analysis we dove deeper into the origins of assessment systems 
as certain factors affecting assessed prices were considered. Both of the GWR models 
that regress on assessed prices give similar results in terms of the relationship between 
a number of the most influential explanatory variables. Assessed prices are affected by 
property characteristics the most. Property age is the most influential variable in the 
models, followed by building area and land area. The results also reveal that distance to 
main road is more influential than transaction price and distance to urban rail stations. 
In model B, an additional variable (property density) has made transaction price the 
least effective variable and significantly improved the effect of distance to rail station. 
The property density variable itself has a relatively strong effect on assessed prices 




prices are significantly affected by property age and area, which leads to the conclusion 
that the use of costs approach has overcome the influence of market prices in the 
property assessment system.  
Theoretical contributions 
Over the course of the previous six chapters, we have developed an understanding of 
property tax systems from a number of different perspectives, which do not always 
coincide. From an economic viewpoint, property tax is often considered to be a good 
and preferable tax, especially for local governments. Tax efficiency, however, largely 
depends on three components of property tax: rate, base and administration. We have 
found that all three components must perform well in order to make the whole property 
tax system efficient. For example, a well-designed tax rate structure can hardly perform 
if it is based on inaccurate property assessments, or if local governments use loopholes 
in property tax legislation in favour of some groups of people, they cannot collect 
sufficient revenues and inequities develop despite an accurate tax base.  
The case study findings on property assessments suggest that property tax should be 
based on land values rather than combined values of land and developments, but a 
well-designed assessment system must readily be in place. In this regard, accurate land 
values can be derived from a cost approach based on sufficient and updated property 
data rather than on approximate costs of buildings. Property wealth can be represented 
by land value if development costs are precisely assessed and deducted from the whole 
property value. The issue of narrow base of LVT can be addressed by an adjustment of 
tax rates. However, this only applies in the case of residential property tax, in which 
property values can be represented by a large amount of transaction prices. In other 
cases, such as commercial buildings, it is more difficult to find comparable transactions 
for comparison and an income assessment approach should be used. 
With regard to different views on property taxation, it is argued in this thesis that 
property tax burdens can translate to an increase in house prices (in the long run) only 
if the tax structure allows. In this case, property tax exemptions must be limited and 
should not be based on property value. They should instead be based on personal 
circumstances—e.g. income, employment status, number of occupiers, etc. Especially 
in residential property taxation, tax base should be wide enough to generate awareness 




resident should contribute property tax proportionate to their property wealth—or value 
of the property they live in—as defined by market values. 
Furthermore, I argue against the capital tax view that considers property tax as a 
distortionary tax. Given a nationally designed tax rate structure, accurate assessment 
and appropriate zoning of tax jurisdictions will improve distortion problems in property 
tax systems. Accurate property assessments are the key to avoid resistance from 
taxpayers and minimise inequities that may arise from poor tax administration. 
However, this argument is not based on the exaction process proposed by Fischel 
(2001), whereby local governments are able to maximise tax collection by collecting 
tax deficits as side payments from developers. The process is viable in theory but 
difficult to implement in Thailand because of the diversity of land uses, lack of accurate 
tax base, and limited expertise of local governments in property assessment. 
As many countries including the UK have adopted banding assessment systems, it 
is argued that this is not an appropriate solution for property tax base. The argument is 
based on the heterogeneity of the property market and various facets of housing 
ownership. In order to meet the equity principle of taxation, housing assessments 
cannot be grouped into a few price ranges. Regardless of tax rate schemes, assessed 
prices must be regularly updated instead of sacrificing assessment accuracy for 
popularity of property tax and cheaper, less time-consuming reassessment.  
This study has confirmed the theory proposed by Lin (2010) that spatial inequity 
arises when property assessments fail to reflect certain location-associated price-
determining factors. By comparing the GWR results with the spatial distribution of 
assessed prices, it is found that areas in which the effects of neighbourhood 
characteristic variables are relatively low are the same areas where assessment 
problems exist. The results in this study agree with the findings of Bae et al. (2003) on 
the limited effects on house prices of urban rail transport lines after they have opened. 
This study has also performed further GWR analyses on top of those done by 
Malaitham et al. (2013) for which there were only two BTS lines and one MRT line at 
the time. The impact of eight additional urban rail transport lines is included in the 






The aim of the methodology is to present more comprehensive analyses on housing 
assessed and sale prices. The distinction of the methodology in this study is the 
combination of three analytical approaches that are beneficial to each other. All 
methods are useful in analysing not only house prices but also mass appraisal systems. 
As a result, we could easily identify the geographical areas where assessment problems 
exist and measure the impact of various housing and neighbourhood attributes on 
assessed prices. The results offered us an opportunity to thoroughly evaluate the 
property tax systems and quantify the level of inconsistencies in assessed prices along 
with their important determinants. 
Although each method used in this study is not new to housing research, the 
interpretation of their results in relation to each other gives concrete evidence at least 
for the confirmation of assessment inequities and for the identification of problematic 
localities. The extent of the data used and the comprehensiveness of analytical methods 
adopted in this study are unprecedented in property tax research in Thailand. This has 
allowed us to produce substantial quantitative measures for the evaluation of the 
property assessment systems, which is beneficial for the improvement of future 
property tax policies in Thailand. 
In this study, GWR models regress on assessed price, not on A/S ratios as in other 
studies (Gilderbloom et al., 2012; Payton, 2012). Sale price is assigned as an 
independent variable to determine its relative influence on assessed price. The results 
give us deeper insights into the assessment processes, which are useful in identifying 
actual causes of assessment errors. The analysis of property assessments also reveals an 
interesting relationship between variables, in which locational and market attributes 
seem to have less impact on assessed prices than property attributes. This distinct 
aspect of the method used in this study has therefore produced an alternative for the 





7.2  Discussion 
In the first chapter I outlined six questions that need to be addressed by the outcomes of 
this research. The first question was about the uniformity and progressiveness of the 
assessed price. Assessment ratio analysis found that assessed prices in most Bangkok 
boroughs fail to meet the IAAO standards. The median A/S ratio analysis reveals that 
only five out of fifty boroughs can meet the standards, and the rest are largely 
under-assessed. Therefore, it is concluded that, in most parts of Bangkok, there is a lack 
of uniformity among property assessments of all value ranges. When comparing A/S 
ratios with property market prices, it is found that overall assessed prices in Bangkok 
were regressively distributed. A/S ratios tend to reduce as property prices increase. The 
difference between the average A/S ratios of properties in the highest value range (the 
fifth quintile) was almost twice as low as that for properties in the lowest value range 
(the first quintile). This clearly indicates that tax base is significantly regressive on its 
own. Even tax rates are progressive, it is likely that the regressive effects of tax base 
will offset the progressivity in tax rate, which will yield regressive tax burdens as a 
result. 
The discrepancy between assessed and market prices is measured by the levels of 
A/S ratios, and the results are mapped to show their spatial distribution patterns. The 
results indicate that the discrepancy is more pronounced in suburban areas, especially 
the inner ones. The lowest discrepancy of A/S ratios is found in the inner areas of 
Bangkok including the CBD and some recently gentrified areas to the north of the city. 
It is also found that boroughs in both eastern and western fringes of Bangkok have 
average assessment levels higher than boroughs that are closer to the city centre. 
Boroughs with particularly low levels of A/S ratios are mostly new catchment areas for 
urban rail transport lines, which are located on both sides of the city. The results 
suggest that, in the next cycle, assessed prices in these areas (Bang Bon, Bang Khae, 
Chom Thong, Wang Thong Lang, Suanluang and Prawet) need to be thoroughly 
compared with sale prices. 
Areas with disproportionately high discrepancies are either boroughs where new 
lines of urban rail transport have recently been built or outer suburbs where there are 
increasing number of gated housing developments and educational institutions. In 
Lad Krabang, for example, there has been expansion of a public university, outer ring 




accommodate a higher number of students and workers. Other areas with relatively 
high assessment to market price discrepancy seem to have similar characteristics, 
particularly developments in public infrastructure that tend to attract more residents to 
the areas. 
Systemic biases of property assessments are identified by the spatial autocorrelation 
analysis and the GWR. It is found that assessment practices and certain assessing 
methods are the main causes of the problem. In fact, these causes are further 
exacerbated by the nature of mass appraisal systems, which require assessors to process 
a considerable number of properties in a limited timeframe. Accordingly, assessors are 
required to adapt their assessing practices and methods to cope with these challenges, 
which seems to have resulted in assessed prices diverging from market values. In the 
case of Bangkok, the street value approach had been used in assessing all properties 
during the study period, which had caused disparities in assessments to be unevenly 
distributed over geographical areas. The distribution patterns of particularly 
under-assessed properties and of groups of high-high A/S ratio clusters are consistent 
with the assessment approaches adopted by the PVB. It is also found that the cost 
approach used to derive land value was the main cause of assessment inconsistencies, 
as shown by the GWR results. It is evident that the higher assessed price adjusts, the 
more impact the cost approach has on the level of assessments. 
In general, owners of higher value properties in certain outer suburban areas have 
benefited from assessment biases as they are subject to proportionately lower assessed 
prices. In terms of housing classes, terraced houses (townhouses) in suburban areas, in 
particular, are mostly under-assessed. Disadvantaged groups are owners of lower price 
houses, especially those that are located in inner city areas. In areas where there is a 
lower proportion of housing to other types of properties, lower price houses seem to be 
assessed higher because the assessment practices do not clearly differentiate sale data 
according to actual land uses. In this situation, it is found that housing types do not 
have much influence on assessment levels. It is property location that plays a key role 
in assessed price setting. 
What the results in this study suggest is that market assessment approach is 
certainly necessary in deriving accurate assessed values. The combination of market 
and non-market assessment approaches has caused biases and higher dependency on 




frequently updated sale and property data, which can be achieved only if there is 
cooperation between government agencies. There should be a unified government data 
centre incorporating vital information, which can support the work of most government 
agencies. Computer-assisted assessment systems that utilise spatial regression 
techniques can be used but they must provide different models for different classes of 
properties. The use of such systems, however, should be limited to the update of 
assessment values, which means frequent surveys and market comparison assessments 
are mandatory. 
LVT is clearly an appropriate method of assessment, which can be traced back to 
Ricardo, Henry George and Lloyd George. Taxes imposed on land alone assume that 
the land will be used to its most profitable potential (highest and best use), involving 
development which is usually subject to planning regulations. LVT is seen as a tax on 
the ownership of land, considered as an asset, rather than a tax on its economic use or 
development (Dye and England, 2010; McCluskey et al., 2007). In this sense, LVT is a 
tax directly imposed on economic rent, which is considered efficient. However, there 
are three major limitations to LVT. First, LVT may not be able to raise sufficient 
revenues for local governments due to restricted tax base. Therefore, local governments 
may have to increase tax rates in order to maintain sufficient revenue levels. Second, 
LVT should be implemented only when assessors have reliable property attribute data 
and accurate structure costs, otherwise the problem of inequitable tax base may arise. 
Finally, as with other types of property tax, LVT is not neutral, either in terms of the 
location or density of development (Dye and England, 2010). Lowering the tax on 
structure can lead to opposing results: either an increase in the demand for larger 
housing at the urban fringe as its cost decreases or an increase in the number of 
structures being built on a given area (Brueckner and Kim, 2003). 
An alternative to LVT is split-rate property tax, which differentiates land from 
improvement. Land is taxed at a higher rate because, as previously mentioned, it is 
economically reasonable to do so. Buildings are taxed at relatively lower rates to 
minimise deadweight loss. The advantages of the split-rate property tax can be viewed 
from two scenarios. First, moving from the conventional property tax, in which the 
same rate is imposed on both land and buildings, to the split-rate tax can lower 
deadweight loss due to lower rates imposed on buildings and higher rates imposed on 




moving from an extreme case of a pure land tax to the split-rate property tax is that it is 
a more practical alternative. The split-rate property tax tends to increase incentive for 
developments on small lots because buildings are liable for lower tax rates, which 
would lead to a higher level of economic development, particularly in cities 
experiencing economic decay (Cohen and Coughlin, 2005). However, one of the 
disadvantages of the split-rate property tax is that, as with LVT, there are transaction 





7.3  Implications 
Given the above conceptualisation, it is clear that property assessment for tax purposes 
is a challenging task. The analysis in this study has provided enough evidence to 
confirm that residential properties should be the main base for property taxation due to 
the extent and scale of housing distribution and the benefits that residents receive from 
local governments. Accordingly, property tax exemptions for residential properties 
should be kept to a minimum, regardless of the degree of political resistance at the 
point of first implementation of the tax. In particular, LVT of residential properties is 
preferable to other types of property tax as it tends to cause less economic distortions. 
Improvements should be taxed at a minimum rate or exempted from tax if possible. 
In the design of the Land and Building Tax structure, policymakers should be 
informed that each tax jurisdiction has different levels of urban development and 
property type/value compositions. Therefore, a single tax rate and base scheme can 
hardly be applied to all boroughs. Local governments should be given power to 
determine their own property tax rates within certain limits, without which tax 
competition between jurisdictions is likely to result in their not being able to collect 
sufficient revenues to finance local services. Neighbourhood and housing submarket 
are not synonymous but they have a straightforward relationship (Galster, 2008). 
Property tax zones can be different from administrative boundaries if this helps create a 
more evenly distributed tax base. 
Following the benefit view of taxation, tax base should be clearly classified 
according to property uses. In this regard, assessment methods for residential properties 
should be separated from those of other property classes due to the different benefits 
they receive from local authorities. Ideally, residential property tax should be singled 
out from other property taxes to avoid complexities in assessment processes. Market 
assessment approach should be prioritised over other approaches due to its ability to 
derive market values and typically large volumes of housing transactions. For other 
types of property taxes such as the one on commercial properties, their assessments 
should be combined with, for example, corporation tax so that extortions or double 
taxation can be mitigated or avoided. 
This study has demonstrated how property tax inequities arise from inconsistencies 




analysis of the performance of the property tax system. However, the limited 
availability of data on other property classes and demographics has impeded this study 
from performing a more comprehensive analysis on the entire property tax system. 
Future research can make use of increasingly available data to perform comparative 
analyses of different types of properties, and to investigate impact of other 
demographic variables—e.g. household income and education level. This will certainly 
give us a better insight into other pressing problems such as income inequality and 
displacement. 
The evaluation of assessed prices in this study forms a basis for further research on 
tax incidence, which can develop based on the findings on spatial variations in housing 
prices. Specifically, assessment coverage ratios can be compared with final taxable 
values and tax liability to identify potential causes of, for example, variations in tax 
revenues, and measures that can be used to increase tax collection. Such research would 
benefit from the inclusion of data on personal circumstances, which can help determine 
tax exemptions and reductions. The determination of tax rates in the policymaking 
process would also benefit from the findings on the causes of disparity in assessed 
values. As this study has proved that the top determinants of assessed prices are 
property-specific, policymakers should be aware of this fact when designing tax rates 
or exemptions/reductions that vary by property types. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the effects of property assessment disparity on 
renters are not explored in this study. The analysis in this study is based on the 
assumption that tax burdens completely fall on property owners. Policies aiming to 
mitigate property tax effects on low-income households should be mainly based on the 
rental housing market because, particularly under current market situations, not many 
people on low income can afford to buy. As well, types of housing are not always a 
good representative of the income levels of occupiers. Locations, neighbourhoods and 
submarkets can also reflect income levels. Therefore, all of these factors must be 




7.4  Recommendations 
Earlier in this thesis, I argued that the origin of property tax inequity is rooted in the 
property assessment system. A property assessment system begins with property data 
collection by the Land Registry, which requires a legal system that must be 
well-functioning in order to provide accurate property data. This should be set as a goal 
in the long run. There should be, at the least, cooperation between the Land Registry, 
the PVB and urban planning authorities to share the same database. By achieving this, 
the government sector can tremendously reduce administration costs, improve its 
service quality and shorten policy implementation timeframes. 
In the short run, reassessment should be carried out more frequently. I would 
suggest that a two-year cycle should allow for inaccurately assessed prices to adjust 
more quickly, resulting in a narrower disparity between assessed and market prices. 
However, this will certainly put more time pressure on assessors, who will have to 
complete the same tasks twice as quickly. The issue can be addressed with the use of 
new technology to store vital data and decrease processing time between property 
survey and assessed price determination. If a well-functioning data storage and sharing 
system is established, confidential data can be securely shared between government 
authorities, which will help shorten the duration of the assessment process and gain the 
trust of taxpayers. In addition, a more efficient property record keeping system will 
facilitate the assessment appeal process by reducing review and reassessment time, 
which will make property tax easier to administer. All of these components form a 
fundamental basis for a more equitable property tax system. 
Furthermore, the property assessment process can be improved by incorporating 
location and demographic variables into assessment models. As evident in this study, 
assessed prices are largely influenced by property-specific variables such as property 
age and building area. This is problematic due to the fact that structures should not be 
the main part of tax base. To guard against the worsening of this situation if the 
government were ever to decide to replace the Land and Building Tax with, for 
example, a split-rate property tax, the PVB should develop assessment approaches that 
reflect more dimensions of the housing market. The property tax base in Thailand is in 
fact suitable for split-rate property tax and LVT because the components of land and 
structure values are already separated. An additional effort has to go into making the 




With respect to the improvement of the assessment approach, my suggestion is to 
adopt GWR or other spatial hedonic regression techniques as a principle analytical 
method. A separate regression model can be constructed for each housing submarket, 
which is determined by land use zoning, planning regulations, neighbourhood types, 
etc. However, Glaeser (2007) cautions against hedonic modelling on account of its 
limited ability to reflect the average willingness to pay of residents across the 
population. He asserts that, on a conceptual level, housing prices can only reflect the 
willingness to pay of the marginal resident in certain areas. This issue requires 
thoughtful interpretation by the researcher. Another issue is that hedonic estimates are 
compromised of correlations between observed submarket/neighbourhood attributes 
and the error term in the regression. No matter how hard we try to control for area 
characteristics, these are almost impossible to measure perfectly in practice. Such bias 
can be mitigated by lowering the level of analysis to the degree where we can be more 
confident that submarkets/neighbourhoods are comparable (Ibid.). 
Areas for future research would include testing the performance of the Land and 
Building Tax after it becomes effective in January 2020. Capitalisation effects of the 
property tax can be measured from an increase in market price, but this has to be done 
in relation to other important price determinants, potentially by spatial regression 
modelling. For instance, a study may compare urban rail station proximity premium 
values between different catchment areas. The results of such analysis would help the 
central government to better determine appropriate future tax rates and give local 
governments more information on how to improve their property tax administration. 
Furthermore, additional research can be done at a more specific spatial scale—i.e. a 
case study of several neighbourhoods. The use of mixed-research methods that include, 
for example, in-depth interviews and focus groups would give researchers more 
insightful information that may help them understand the perceptions of taxpayers 
toward the tax. 
On the relationship between income distribution and property wealth, further 
research should be carried out on residential property submarkets that reflect social 
class difference. Detailed census data would particularly benefit this research. The data 
sets should at least include the following socioeconomic aspects: household 
composition (e.g. number of people, sex and ethnic origin), household expenses, 




attainment, population density, labour force participation, and place of usual residence. 
It is also important that geographies are included in the data sets, ideally at the finest 
level possible. If data permits, a comparative study of the policy outcomes of property 
tax in relation to other taxes such as personal income and value added taxes would 
produce more insightful results on the net level of tax burden, and would allow us to 
compare distortions caused by different taxes. 
By incorporating the census data with information on buildings—e.g. living 
quarters, offices and commercial facilities—as well as data on travelling patterns, 
planning regulations and macroeconomic indicators, it is possible to explore the 
distribution of housing prices through more sophisticated hedonic models. Obviously, 
there are other aspects of the housing market that are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Housing prices are certainly influenced by factors other than property-specific ones. 
Simply covering demand-side factors that affect an individual’s decisions is not enough 
to explain the change in housing prices. Market equilibrium is determined by both 
demand and supply quantities. Factors affecting housing supply like land use 
restrictions, construction costs, housing stocks and structure of land ownership should 
also be included in future studies to achieve a more rounded understanding of the 
workings of the housing market.  
Moreover, it would be interesting to explore housing markets across cities. A study 
of this sort would certainly benefit from the Rosen-Roback model, which allows for the 
fact that income and amenities differ across space (Roback, 1982; Rosen, 1979). The 
model treats the metropolitan area as a single indifferent entity, so that transport costs, 
housing prices and amenity levels are homogeneous. Additional aspects that can be 
covered in such a study would be the interaction between wages, amenity levels and 
housing costs. An expanded version of the model was constructed by Gyourko and 
Tracy (1991) to study the effects of intercity fiscal conditions on the quality-of-life 
index, which reflects the willingness to pay (to live in a city). Their results show that 
intercity fiscal differentials are almost as important as amenity differentials in 
determining the quality of life. Therefore, high housing prices reflect not only high 
income of residents or high levels of amenities but also better fiscal conditions. The key 
takeaway from the research is that the local quality of life may be more malleable than 




governments. Future study would benefit from the incorporation of commuting and 
migration data with conventional property variables.  
Regarding inequities in the housing market, I believe the area that has largely been 
neglected in the growing body of studies is low-income housing. Policy debate on the 
topic appears to revolve around the effectiveness of supply-increasing strategies in 
response to the problem of slum housing. In many countries, one of the most popular 
solutions is to increase the supply of public housing, with the main objective of 
substituting it for low-quality private housing. A traditional method of policy 
implementation is to directly or indirectly boost the supply of public housing via public 
or subsidised private units (Weicher, 1979). But such a policy has been questioned by 
Muth (1975) as being counterproductive due to the elastic long-term supply of private 
low-quality housing. It has also been found that the subsidisation of private housing 
units such as the Help-to-Buy scheme in the UK, for example, overly focuses on 
stimulating the demand but fails to expand the supply, resulting in a housing 
affordability crisis due to housing shortage (Hilber and Schöni, 2016). Further studies 





7.5  Final Reflections 
The analysis provided in this study has expanded our view on property taxation and the 
processes behind this unpopular tax. Property tax is certainly a good tax in theory but 
often not a successful one in practice. It has probably created more fears than any other 
taxes have in the modern world despite its low significance in terms of revenues in 
most countries. I hope that this study helps develop an understanding of the tax to some 
extent. The central lesson to be learned from this study is that every tax has the 
potential to be a good tax, it just depends on the way it is designed and implemented. 
Most existing problems in property tax systems are not inherent, rather they are the 
results of neglecting the importance of local fiscal adequacy. Property assessments, for 
example, require regular update to maximise property tax coverage ratio, but, as we see 
in many countries, they are left to become obsolete. What this study has shown is that 
many realistic measures can be taken to alleviate assessment problems if policymakers 
can make informed decisions regarding the assessment process. 
Property tax has enormous potential for wealth distribution and local government 
revenue. There is no investment that can create wealth to the extent that property can, 
particularly in the long run. The logic of wealth tax is that excessive wealth 
accumulation is a result of market failure and the government’s inability to design 
appropriate policies to eliminate economic rents. If the economic rents are left untaxed, 
there is a gap for property owners to accumulate wealth faster, which will certainly 
exacerbate economic inequality problems. Therefore, wealth tax is the most reasonable 
fiscal policy option to redistribute and allocate capital. The redistribution of capitals 
takes two principle forms. First, the rate of accumulation of rental income is moderated 
by imposing higher tax rates on investment properties relative to owner occupied ones. 
Second, the accumulation of property wealth is slowed and prevented by taxing net 
wealth or imposing maximum rates on unutilised properties—e.g. unoccupied houses 
and vacant land. The allocation of capital can be achieved by ensuring that property tax 
is locally collected and spent. 
One of the main reasons for the difficulties in property tax reform is that legislation 
can hardly be amended in a short time due to rigid law-making processes and political 
resistance. This largely concerns the revision of property tax rate and administration. 
However, property tax base is a relatively flexible function, which can be more easily 




faster and more accurately than ever before. One of the essential requirements is that 
assessments must be supported with reliable evidence. 
I believe I have shown that improving the property tax system is not only 
achievable, but also essential in light of the need for social equality and honouring our 
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Appendix A: Depreciation Factors Used by the PVB 
 
Building Age Year 1-5 Year 6-10 Year 11-15 Year 16-20 Year 21-42 Year 43 onward 
Concrete/brick 1% per year 1% per year 2% per year 2% per year 2% per year 76% deduction 
Concrete/brick 
and wooden 
2% per year 4% per year 4% per year 5% per year 85% deduction 
 
Building Age Year 1-5 Year 6-15 Year 16-18 Year 19 onward 

























































Appendix C: Additional GWR Results (Model B) 
Figure C-1 Distribution of the property age parameter 
 





Figure C-3 Distribution of the land area parameter 
 






Figure C-5 Distribution of the distance to urban rail station parameter 
 
 
Figure C-6 Distribution of the distance to main road parameter 
